Government & Politics

When the very fabric of society is threatened by prolonged austerity or a financial sector collapse, a deliberate re-structuring of debt may be necessary to restore the hopes of renewed prosperity.

After an era of vigorous expansion a downturn can reveal a large stock of debt relative to the economy’s capacity to service it.

What has been learned now that the Euro zone’s fault lines have been revealed? Where are Europe and the Euro zone today?

The Institute joined the Centre for International Governance Innovation, and the Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change in hosting its third-annual plenary conference in Berlin from April 12-15, 2012.

With my remarks today on financial markets and the financial crisis, I do not make any claims to originality. Rather, they are intended as a reminder of certain circumstances that are already familiar to us, in one form or another.

The global economy is in turmoil. Societies are unstable and not anchored by faith in the system or social order.

In a classic book and subsequent articles, Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) have shown how the broad contours of international financial history over the past century and a half can be well understood by appealing to the famous economictrilemma which emerges from the standard Mundell-Fleming model many of us still teach our undergraduates.

The euro area’s sovereign debt crisis continues though significant steps have been taken to resolve it.

In preparing this paper I have decided not to embark upon the decades-old issue of optimal-currency areas and governance as such. I assume that one of my colleagues on the panel will do that. Instead I will present an historical case of over-indebtedness of parts of a common-currency area somewhat similar to the present challenge of Europe, or rather of the Euro area with its common currency.

At a time when China is the favored investment destination in the global market, it seems unlikely that it would ever face capital flight.

This is a small paper on a big subject: the polarization of American politics since the mid-1970s. In its early stages this process bore more than a passing resemblance to the opening scenes of a Grade B disaster movie: With almost everyone’s attention focused elsewhere, a series of tiny, seemingly insignificant departures from long standing routines took place.

The theme of this session is very timely and controversial, on the ability of sovereign governments to supervise Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs), now officially described as G-SIFIs, global systemically important financial institutions.

After the inception and, hopefully, the passing of the most dangerous phase of the international financial crisis, economists have returned to the long favoured subject of global imbalances.

The presentation explains that Indian Economy is basically a market-oriented economy with constant rebalancing between state andmarket.

Many companies around the world have discovered they can benefit financially from integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) targets in their daily operations and strategy.

Simon Johnson at the Institute’s 2011 Annual Conference.

Some questions can only be answered by educated guess. The question at the centre of this round table pertains to this category. We should not be ashamed of this kind of limitation of our capacity to predict the future.

Paper presented at Bretton Woods Conference

In directing panelists to distinguish between what governments “can” and “will” do, this session’s title frames economic policymaking as a balancing act. Principled efforts to define and pursue the public interest are contested and repeatedly knocked off course by conflictingpersonal, bureaucratic, and political concerns that impinge on government decisionmakers.

Financial crises are staggeringly costly. Only major wars rival them in the burdens they place on public finances.

The crisis of the export led model in the EMU countries and its monetary and financial consequences on European integration.

The global financial crisis—and the Great Recession that followed—have inflicted tremendous economic and social damage across the world. Thankfully, we now appear to be on the path to recovery—though it remains sluggish and uneven, and in need of continued policy support in many advanced economies.

The purpose of the paper is to argue for attention to be paid, not only to choice of theory, but also to choice of theoretical approach, in order to address issues posed by the crisis.

Since the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis more than a decade ago, world leaders have been searching for ways to make the global financial system more resilient, less crisis-prone, and better able to play its essential role in supporting broadly-shared growth.

The current debate on new Global Financial Architecture is, in a way, the continuation of the debate that was intensified consequent upon the Asian crisis.

Many people regard the recent financial crisis as a painful addition to an already massive body of evidence that demonstrates the inadequacy of today’s economic models of “rational” markets.

The current economic and financial crisis, and it is both, has already imposed great costs on the global economy. Nor is there any guarantee that we have seen the worst and that recovery is now assured.

Economic theory has modeled itself on theoretical physics. It has sought to establish timelessly valid laws that govern economic behavior and can be used reversibly both to explain and to predict events.

The Institute for New Economic Thinking convened many of the world’s most distinguished economists, academics and thought leaders at its inaugural Conference at King’s College, University of Cambridge.

William Janeway’s Far-Ranging Seminar on Fundamental Debates in Innovation and Finance

Many thought the financial crash was a final blow to capitalsim. Why does it still reign supreme? Anatole Kaletsky outlines the shape of things to come.