Edward J. Kane is Professor of Finance at Boston College. From 1972 to 1992 he held the Everett D. Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary Economics at Ohio State University. A founding member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Kane rejoined the organization in 2005. He served for twelve years as a trustee and member of the finance committee of Teachers Insurance. Currently, he consults for the World Bank and is a senior fellow in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Center for Financial Research. Previously, Kane has consulted for numerous agencies, including the IMF, components of the Federal Reserve System, and three foreign central banks. He consulted as well for the Congressional Budget Office, the Joint Economic Committee, and the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress. He is a past president and fellow of the American Finance Association and a former Guggenheim fellow. He also served as president of the International Atlantic Economic Society and the North American Economics and Finance Association. Kane is a longtime research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He has authored three books and coauthored or coedited several more. He has published widely in professional journals and currently serves on seven editorial boards. He received a BS from Georgetown University and a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Edward J. Kane
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Company law in the US and UK fails to acknowledge that authorities’ propensity to rescue giant banks from the consequences of insolvency assigns taxpayers a coerced and badly structured equity stake in too-big-to-fail institutions.
This paper applies Schein’s model of organizational culture to financial firms and their prudential regulators.
This paper proposes a theoretically based and easy-to-implement way to measure the systemicrisk of financial institutions using publicly available accounting and stock market data.
Recent weeks have surfaced an intense exchange of top-level finger pointing, both between Congress and the leadership of the Federal Reserve System, between Fed officials and executives in the private sector and within the Fed between the Board of Governors and the New York Reserve Bank.
Featuring this expert
An examination of some little-known ways nation states and central banks prop up megabanks
Pernicious cultural norms inside American banks and regulatory agencies have crowded out fundamental moral principles. Ed Kane proposes an antidote.
Bullet-point financial reform proposals are either too simple or too vague.
‘Tis the season to celebrate gift giving. But for big banks Santa Claus comes all the time, in the form of handsomely wrapped subsidies and subtly packaged regulatory nuances worth more more gold than the wildest dreams of the Three Wise Men.