Edward J. Kane


Edward J. Kane is Professor of Finance at Boston College. From 1972 to 1992 he held the Everett D. Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary Economics at Ohio State University. A founding member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Kane rejoined the organization in 2005. He served for twelve years as a trustee and member of the finance committee of Teachers Insurance. Currently, he consults for the World Bank and is a senior fellow in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Center for Financial Research. Previously, Kane has consulted for numerous agencies, including the IMF, components of the Federal Reserve System, and three foreign central banks. He consulted as well for the Congressional Budget Office, the Joint Economic Committee, and the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress. He is a past president and fellow of the American Finance Association and a former Guggenheim fellow. He also served as president of the International Atlantic Economic Society and the North American Economics and Finance Association. Kane is a longtime research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He has authored three books and coauthored or coedited several more. He has published widely in professional journals and currently serves on seven editorial boards. He received a BS from Georgetown University and a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

By this expert

Europe’s Zombie Megabanks and the Differential Regulatory Arrangements that Keep Them In Play

Paper Working paper | | Sep 2017

This paper analyzes the link between Kamakura Risk Information Services (KRIS) data on megabank default probabilities and credit spreads.

Ethics vs. Ethos in US and UK Megabanking

Paper Working Paper Series | | May 2016

Company law in the US and UK fails to acknowledge that authorities’ propensity to rescue giant banks from the consequences of insolvency assigns taxpayers a coerced and badly structured equity stake in too-big-to-fail institutions.

A Theory of How and Why Central-Bank Culture Supports Predatory Risk-Taking at Megabanks

Paper Working Paper Series | | Dec 2015

This paper applies Schein’s model of organizational culture to financial firms and their prudential regulators.

Tracking Variation in Systemic Risk at US Banks During 1974-2013

Paper Working Paper Series | | Jul 2015

This paper proposes a theoretically based and easy-to-implement way to measure the systemicrisk of financial institutions using publicly available accounting and stock market data.

Featuring this expert

Professional Expertise or Politics Driving Economists’ View of Hillary and Bernie?

Article | Feb 9, 2016

Bullet-point financial reform proposals are either too simple or too vague.

The Gift of Deregulation

Article | Dec 14, 2015

‘Tis the season to celebrate gift giving. But for big banks Santa Claus comes all the time, in the form of handsomely wrapped subsidies and subtly packaged regulatory nuances worth more more gold than the wildest dreams of the Three Wise Men.

Bankers Think They Have an Ethical Duty to Steal From Taxpayers

Article | Jun 16, 2015

It doesn’t make sense to pay someone to rob you.

Beyond Dodd-Frank

Video | Aug 3, 2014

Has the Dodd-Frank Act had its intended effect?