Ahmed Tahoun

Professor Tahoun is as an Associate Professor at London Business School. Tahoun has been a research scholar at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and the Wharton School, a faculty member at the London School of Economics, a research fellow at the University of Valencia, and a banker at HSBC. His research tackles important questions in society ranging from the quid-pro-quo relations between politicians and the corporate world, the economic consequences of the Egyptian Revolt, and the global development of securities law in response to corporate scandals during the past 200 years. He has also been engaged in comparative international work on executive compensation, looking for the roots of cross-country differences in pay packages. His current research agenda focuses on measuring a firm’s exposure to political risk and to technology shocks and exploring how this exposure affects firms in capital and factor markets. He has published his research in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Review of Financial Studies, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Journal of Accounting Research, the Journal of Accounting and Economics, the Accounting Review and the Review of Finance. The New York Times and the FT have covered his work. Tahoun was granted the Referee of the Year award by the Journal of Accounting Research and was made a member of its editorial board. Tahoun was named as one of the Top 40 Professors under 40.

By this expert

Firm-Level Political Risk: Measurement and Effects

Article | Jul 11, 2019

Political risk—and what firms do about it

Firm-Level Political Risk: Measurement and Effects

Paper Working Paper Series | | Jul 2019

We adapt simple tools from computational linguistics to construct a new measure of political risk faced by individual US firms: the share of their quarterly earnings conference calls that they devote to political risks.

How Well Does Financial Regulation Work?

Article | Mar 15, 2018

What 200 Years of Government Interventions in Financial Markets Can Tell Us

Corporate Scandals and Regulation

Paper Working Paper Series | | Dec 2017

Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre-empt corporate misbehavior?

Featuring this expert

Conflicts of Interest? Maybe Congress Should Look in the Mirror

Article | Jan 11, 2017

New evidence shows personal wealth interests drive Congressional votes