Professor Tahoun is as an Associate Professor at London Business School. Tahoun has been a research scholar at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and the Wharton School, a faculty member at the London School of Economics, a research fellow at the University of Valencia, and a banker at HSBC. His research tackles important questions in society ranging from the quid-pro-quo relations between politicians and the corporate world, the economic consequences of the Egyptian Revolt, and the global development of securities law in response to corporate scandals during the past 200 years. He has also been engaged in comparative international work on executive compensation, looking for the roots of cross-country differences in pay packages. His current research agenda focuses on measuring a firm’s exposure to political risk and to technology shocks and exploring how this exposure affects firms in capital and factor markets. He has published his research in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Review of Financial Studies, the Journal of Financial Economics, the Journal of Accounting Research, the Journal of Accounting and Economics, the Accounting Review and the Review of Finance. The New York Times and the FT have covered his work. Tahoun was granted the Referee of the Year award by the Journal of Accounting Research and was made a member of its editorial board. Tahoun was named as one of the Top 40 Professors under 40.
By this expert
How Well Does Financial Regulation Work?
What 200 Years of Government Interventions in Financial Markets Can Tell Us
Corporate Scandals and Regulation
Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre-empt corporate misbehavior?
Many Politicians Voting for the TARP Bailout Protected Their Own Wealth
Amid heightened focus on conflicts of interests, new research shows how legislators’ votes on the 2008 bank bailout tracked with the exposure to peril of their personal stock portfolios
The Personal Wealth Interests of Politicians and the Stabilization of Financial Markets
We examine whether personal wealth interests affect politicians’ decisions about stabilizing financial markets.