Perry G. Mehrling is professor of economics at Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. He was professor of economics at Barnard College in New York City for 30 years. There, he taught courses on the economics of money and banking, the history of money and finance, and the financial dimensions of the U.S. retirement, health, and education systems. His most recent book is The New Lombard Street: How the Fed became the dealer of last resort (Princeton 2011). His best-known book Fischer Black and the Revolutionary Idea of Finance (Wiley 2005, 2012) has recently been released in a revised paperback edition. Currently, Prof. Mehrling directs the educational initiatives of the Institute for New Economic Thinking, one of which is his course Economics of Money and Banking, available on Coursera at www.coursera.org/course/money.
Perry G. Mehrling
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Why is the IMF getting involved in the Eurocrisis, and why is its involvement taking the form of lending to individual member states of the Eurozone?
The fact of the matter is that European bank funding markets are collapsing onto the ECB balance sheet.
Europe is embarked on a grand experiment, managing modern financial crisis without a dealer of last resort, so refusing to follow the lead of the 2008 Fed.
A week ago, Mark Carney, chairman of the Financial Stability Board, warned of emerging global consequences of the escalating eurozone crisis.
Featuring this expert
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