Edward J. Kane


Edward J. Kane was Professor of Finance at Boston College. From 1972 to 1992 he held the Everett D. Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary Economics at Ohio State University. A founding member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Kane rejoined the organization in 2005. He served for twelve years as a trustee and member of the finance committee of Teachers Insurance. He consulted for the World Bank and is a senior fellow in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Center for Financial Research. Previously, Kane consulted for numerous agencies, including the IMF, components of the Federal Reserve System, and three foreign central banks. He consulted as well for the Congressional Budget Office, the Joint Economic Committee, and the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress. He wa a past president and fellow of the American Finance Association and a former Guggenheim fellow. He also served as president of the International Atlantic Economic Society and the North American Economics and Finance Association. Kane was a longtime research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He authored three books and coauthored or coedited several more. He published widely in professional journals and served on seven editorial boards. He received a BS from Georgetown University and a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Please Don't Throw Me In The Briar Patch

Paper Working paper | | Sep 2014

The flummery of capital-requirement repairs undertaken in response to the Great Financial Crisis.

The Inevitability of Shadowy Banking

Paper Grantee paper | | Mar 2013

Shadowy banking is safety-net arbitrage. It employs substitutes for products and activities performed within the traditional banking sector.

Political Economy of Controlling Systemic Risk: What Governments Can Do Vs. What Governments Are Willing to Do

Paper Conference paper | | Apr 2010

In directing panelists to distinguish between what governments “can” and “will” do, this session’s title frames economic policymaking as a balancing act. Principled efforts to define and pursue the public interest are contested and repeatedly knocked off course by conflictingpersonal, bureaucratic, and political concerns that impinge on government decisionmakers.

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