Institute for
New Economic Thinking

Working Papers
ineteconomics.org/workingpapers

Engendering Pluralism in Economics: Gendered Perspectives from an International Survey of Economists*

Mohsen Javdani†

Working Paper No. 238

August 20th, 2025

ABSTRACT

This study contributes to growing calls for greater pluralism in economics by examining how gender shapes economists' normative and epistemological orientations. Drawing on original survey data from 2,425 economists across 19 countries, we document systematic gender differences in views on a broad range of issues. Female economists are significantly more likely to support progressive equity-oriented positions, challenge mainstream assumptions, and endorse pluralistic approaches to inquiry. We also find stark gender differences in political ideology: women are far more likely than men to identify as left-leaning—particularly far-left—while men disproportionately align with centrist or right-leaning ideologies. These ideological divides

*Funding for this project was provided by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) FAS #: F19-04900. This study has obtained ethics approval from the Behavioral Research Ethics Board at the University of British Columbia (#H16-01480).
†School of Public Policy, Simon Fraser University, 515 West Hastings Street, Vancouver, BC V6B 5K3, Canada. E-mail: mjavdani@sfu.ca. ORCID: 0000-0002-5341-6881

account for some of the gender differences in views, underscoring the mediating role of political ideology. However, the influence of ideology itself varies by gender: moving rightward on the ideological spectrum reduces support for some progressive positions more sharply among men than women. This suggests that gendered experiences inform distinct interpretive frameworks that persist even within shared ideological categories. Taken together, our findings highlight that gender diversity in economics is not merely demographic but epistemic—and that realizing its transformative potential requires institutional environments that value and legitimize dissenting and underrepresented perspectives.

https://doi.org/10.36687/inetwp238

JEL codes: A11, A13, B54, J16, D63

Keywords: Gender Diversity, Economics Profession, Pluralistic Diversity, Political Ideology.

1. Introduction

Attention to gender discrimination and inequities in economics surged in the wake of the #MeToo movement, a watershed moment that reshaped public discourse around power, accountability, and systemic gender-based discrimination and harm. Around the same time, the economics profession was forced into its own reckoning when a paper by then-undergraduate Alice Wu (2018) was described as "a very disturbing report," revealing a "toxic environment for women in economics." (Wolfers, 2017). Wu's analysis of over a million anonymous posts on a widely-read economics forum used machine-learning techniques to reveal disturbing evidence of "stereotyped and offensive" gender-based language.

Her findings quickly captured media attention and ignited scrutiny that exposed the profession's broader entrenched "gender problem." Major outlets—including *The New York Times* (Wolfers, 2017, 2018), *Financial Times* (Coyle, 2017), *The Wall Street Journal* (Morath, 2017), *The Economist* (Economist, 2017), *BBC News* (Gittleson, 2017), and *Bloomberg* (Smith, 2018) — spotlighted Wu's findings. According to economist Janet Currie, Wu had quantified "something most female economists already know" revealing "attitudes that persist in dark corners of the profession" (Wolfers, 2017). These reports shifted attention from individual misconduct to deeper structural and cultural dynamics, exposing a masculinized, exclusionary professional culture in economics (Long, 2019; Lowrey, 2022).

In response, the issue of gender diversity in economics gained renewed urgency—though much of this attention has centered on tracking gender representation, leading to a wave of academic studies to measure women's presence across economics programs, faculty ranks, leadership roles, and top-tier mainstream journals (Bateman et al., 2021; Buckles, 2019; Chari, 2023; Costa-Dias et al., 2023; Gamage et al., 2020; Hengel, 2022; Lundberg & Stearns, 2019). While these representation metrics could serve as useful indicators of progress toward gender equity, they offer only a partial view. Focusing narrowly on representation risks conflating presence for influence and may obscure deeper questions about the discipline's intellectual diversity. Does increasing the number of women in economics occur in an environment that genuinely supports a broadening of perspectives, methodologies, and critiques? Or do entrenched institutional norms and structural hierarchies continue to privilege dominant paradigms shaped around gendered lines? These questions are especially pressing in light of long-standing critiques of mainstream economics as intellectually homogenous, methodologically rigid, and resistant to alternative perspectives.

To fully understand the implications of greater gender diversity in economics—and to recognize its full transformative potential— we must move beyond surface-level metrics and examine how the inclusion of women may reshape the discipline in more substantive ways. Specifically, how might gender diversity foster a more pluralistic, critically engaged, and socially responsive economics? This study addresses that question by analyzing systematic gender differences in views among economists across a wide range of social and economic issues, including critiques of the discipline itself. Drawing on original survey data from a diverse sample of 2,425 economists across 19 countries, it speaks to a core premise behind calls for diversity: that gender differences are not merely demographic, but reflect distinct lived experiences, socialization patterns, and structural positions—factors that shape how economists interpret, evaluate, and theorize the world.

Quantitative metrics —such as the percentage of women in academic positions or in high-profile journals— can help assess progress on gender inclusion. But they say little about whether that inclusion translates into *pluralistic diversity* or *engaged pluralism* within the field, a state where diverse perspectives, assumptions, and ways of knowing are actively integrated into disciplinary discourse (Barnes & Sheppard, 2010; Sheppard & Plummer, 2007). The distinction between diversity and plurality is essential here, as it highlights a potential disconnect between demographic representation—where gender is primarily understood as a statistic—and intellectual inclusivity, where gender diversity brings a range of experiences, insights, and epistemological approaches into economics discourse. Without an emphasis on plurality, efforts toward gender diversity risk becoming superficial, creating spaces where women are present but where the intellectual environment remains constrained by entrenched, often male-dominated, structures, frameworks, and norms.

Feminist economists have long argued that mainstream economics is shaped by gendered dynamics, assumptions, and frameworks that privilege particular voices and approaches while marginalizing others. They point out that mainstream economics often operates within a masculinized framework, one that prioritizes quantitative, competitive, and market-centered approaches and monetized activities, while sidelining perspectives focused on social equity, care work, and collaborative methodologies (Agenjo-Calderón & Gálvez-Muñoz, 2019; Becchio, 2020; Ferber & Nelson, 2003; Folbre, 2001; Kim, 2023; Nelson, 1996, 2019). As a result, focusing solely on representation fails to address deeper structural issues and raises the possibility of a "conformity trap"—where women are included but are expected to conform to prevailing paradigms.

Underscoring this concern, Zacchia's (2017) analysis of more than two decades of Italian academic publications finds that while the share of women in economics has grown, their research topics have increasingly converged with those of men, particularly toward mainstream and high-bibliometric-score fields, and away from heterodox approaches and the history of economic thought. This "homologation" pattern suggests that, in the absence of structural change to support dissenting or alternative approaches—such as feminist, ecological, or postcolonial economics—gender inclusion can reinforce existing intellectual hierarchies (Fourcade et al., 2015) and limit the transformative potential of diversity.

Shifting from a focus on demographic representation to a commitment to pluralistic diversity could also help address the "leaky pipeline" phenomenon—the steady attrition of women from economics as they progress through academic and professional stages (Buckles, 2019). A more pluralistic intellectual environment—one that values and integrates diverse methodologies and perspectives and meaningfully supports underrepresented voices—could not only reverse this attrition but also foster more equitable advancement throughout the profession (Bayer & Rouse, 2016).

This study contributes to the broader effort to examine how gender shapes the intellectual terrain of economics by systematically analyzing gender differences in economists' views across a wide range of issues. In doing so, it deepens our understanding of how gender diversity may translate into intellectual diversity within the discipline. Such insight is essential to building a more pluralistic discourse—one where diversity is not reduced to numbers but embraced as a means of broadening perspectives and challenging dominant frameworks.

There exists very thin empirical evidence regarding gender differences in views among economists. Albelda (1995) analyzes 213 responses from a 1992 survey of U.S.-based members of the American Economic Association (AEA), covering views mostly pertaining to the impact of feminism on economics. She finds that most "AEA members think there has been little feminist impact in economics" and "most are not interested in seeing feminist economic research develop." (P. 254). The study also reveals persistent gender gaps in both the professional and analytical treatment of women in economics. For instance, male economists were significantly less supportive of greater attention paid in economics to issues such as women's labor force participation and occupational structure, measurement of women's contribution to economic output, the economic status of minority women, and the effects of economic policies on women. Stark divides also emerged in perceptions of gender equity within the profession: nearly one-third of men believed it was easier for women to gain tenure and promotions, while less than 4% of women agreed.

Davis (1997), in a study of 734 economists in the United States and Canada drawn from the AEA's 1993 membership directory, finds that while "a majority of men and women have similar opinions" (P. 167), there exists a "a significant difference of opinion among men and women regarding the influence of race and gender on the direction and scope of economic research." (P. 171). For example, while 76% of women agreed that the gender composition of the profession influences research agendas, 53% of men disagreed. The gender gap was also stark on perceptions of professional culture: over 98% of women agreed that there is a "good-old-boy" network in economics, versus a significantly lower proportion of men.

Hedengren et al. (2010) provide further evidence of gender differences in views among economists through their analysis of 35 petitions signed by economists between 1994 and 2009. Their findings indicate that male economists were significantly more likely to support petitions that advocated for less government intervention and emphasized free-market principles, described as "liberty-augmenting." In contrast, female economists were more inclined to sign petitions supporting government intervention, particularly in areas related to social and welfare policies, consistent with an interventionist stance. These results align with broader patterns seen in previous studies, suggesting that gender differences extend beyond research interests to ideological leanings on economic policy.

May et al. (2014) examine a sample of 143 economists from the 2007 AEA Directory, focusing on those with both undergraduate and PhD degrees from U.S. institutions, to explore gender differences in views on important policy issues. Their study finds that while male and female economists share common views on core economic principles and methodological approaches to economics, significant differences arise on issues such as government intervention, redistribution, and labor standards. Female economists were generally more supportive of government-backed redistribution and regulations, reflecting a greater concern for social welfare and equality. Additionally, women were more likely than men to see gender inequality as a persistent issue within both the broader labor market and the economics profession itself, suggesting a nuanced understanding of economic equity.

While these studies offer valuable insights into gender differences in views among economists, they also have important limitations. Most notably, they rely on relatively small samples, primarily consisting of U.S.-based economists and members of the AEA, which limits their generalizability. Additionally, the surveys used often include a narrow set of questions—largely involving straightforward, one-dimensional statements—that may not fully capture the range or complexity of gender-based differences in economic perspectives. Importantly, these studies rely on data collected in the 1990s or early 2000s—before recent shifts in disciplinary culture and public discourse. To address these gaps, our study draws on a substantially larger and more diverse sample of 2,425 economists from 19 countries. Our survey design incorporates both straightforward paired propositions and more nuanced, multi-dimensional statements, enabling a more comprehensive analysis of gender differences in economic views.

Another key contribution of our study is that it offers the first systematic analysis of how political ideology mediates gender differences in economic views. Unlike previous studies that treat gender as an isolated explanatory factor, we explore how gender and ideology intersect in shaping economists' perspectives. Rather than simply "explaining away" gender differences, political ideology operates in tandem with gendered experiences—reflecting distinct patterns of socialization, lived experience, and structural positioning. This approach allows us to capture deeper, more complex dynamics behind observed gender differences and to assess whether they reflect broader ideological divides or distinct perspectives that transcend them.

Our analysis reveals a complex and fragmented landscape of opinions among economists that do not align neatly with standard ideological labels like conservative versus progressive. Rather, the responses reflect a tapestry of divergent, and at times inconsistent views and internal tensions. While some degree of consensus exists on issues like government regulation and corporate power, notable divides emerge on topics such as corporate profitability, personal responsibility, and meritocracy—suggesting deep-seated tensions in how these issues are understood within the profession.

Significant gender differences further characterize these divides. Female economists consistently express views that place greater emphasis on equity, social justice, and structural critique than their male counterparts. They are more likely to support government intervention, acknowledge the harms of rising income inequality and corporate power, and recognize structural barriers to success. Female respondents also appear more inclined to question the core assumptions of mainstream economics and to endorse pluralistic approaches to economic inquiry. Across a set of 15 normative statements—many of which challenge neoclassical orthodoxy or highlight issues of inequality—female economists reported substantially higher levels of agreement. These patterns reflect not only differences in policy preferences, but deeper divergences in how economic problems are understood and evaluated.

These gender differences remain largely unchanged even after accounting for a wide range of personal and professional characteristics. However, controlling for political ideology reduces the magnitude of many observed gender gaps, underscoring its role as a significant mediating factor. This reflects the stark gender differences we find in the distribution of political ideology among economists: women are substantially more likely than men to identify with left-leaning, particularly far-left, political ideology, while men are far more likely to align with centrist or right-leaning ideologies. These differences persist even after adjusting for individual and professional characteristics, pointing to robust ideological divides along gender lines.

Importantly, our findings also show that political ideology influences economists' views differently by gender. While moving rightward on the ideological spectrum is consistently associated with less support for progressive and equity-oriented positions for both men and women, the magnitude of this shift is in some cases less pronounced among women. In several cases—particularly among right- and far-right-leaning economists—women remain more supportive of positions that emphasize inequality, structural disadvantage, and concern about corporate power.

Taken together, the results underscore the complex and intersecting roles of gender and political ideology. While ideology helps understand some of the observed gender differences in views, it does not eliminate them. Substantial differences persist even after accounting for political ideology—indicating that gendered perspectives inform economic thought in ways that transcend traditional ideological boundaries. Recognizing this intersection is critical for understanding the diversity of viewpoints within the profession and the potential for gender diversity to broaden the intellectual and normative horizons of economics.

2. Data

The target population for this study consisted of economists, mostly academics, from 19 different countries.[1] To identify economic institutions, we used the Economics Departments, Institutes, and Research Centers in the World (EDIRC) website, provided by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. This allowed us to compile a list of economics departments, government agencies, independent research institutions, and think tanks in each target country. We then manually extracted the email addresses of economists from the websites of these institutions to invite them to participate in the survey, conducted between October 2017 and April 2018.

During the email extraction process—particularly in multidisciplinary departments, research institutes, and government agencies—it was often difficult to distinguish economists from non-economists based on website information. To avoid excluding economists, we collected all listed email addresses and relied on a self-filtering mechanism: both the email invitation and the survey's first page clearly stated that the survey was intended for economists. Due to this broad collection method, we cannot provide a reliable participation rate, as we do not know the exact number of economists in the extracted list. The estimate is further complicated by numerous autoreplies from individuals on leave, sabbatical, or no longer affiliated with the institution. Based on available information, we estimate a participation rate of approximately 15%, though this is likely conservative. Despite this limitation, summary statistics (Table A1 in the online appendix) and institutional response distributions (Figures A1–A3 in the online appendix) suggest that our final sample includes a significantly diverse group of economists.

Participation in the survey was voluntary, and participants were assured that they could withdraw at any time, with their responses not being used if they chose to do so. In line with the terms of our ethics approval, we have restricted our analysis to those who completed the entire survey, resulting in a final sample of 2,425 economists.[2]

[1] These countries include Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. The entire (English) survey was translated into French, Italian, Japanese and Brazilian Portuguese to allow participants from corresponding countries to complete the survey in their own native language if they choose to. As Table A1 in our online appendix suggests, close to 93 percent of our sample are academic economists from various ranks and positions.

[2] A total of 3,288 economists participated in our survey. There were 454 participants who quit the survey at the very beginning (in the questionnaire section where they were asked to provide background information). Another 409 people withdrew from the survey at some point after they started evaluating the statements.

Our analysis of gender differences in economists' views draws on two distinct sets of survey responses. The first consists of seven pairs of binary, relatively straightforward propositions (see Figure A1). For each pair, participants selected the statement that best reflected their view. Responding to each pair was optional, and some participants skipped one or more. Nonetheless, 96% of the final sample responded to at least six out of the seven pairs (see Table A2 in the online appendix for details). As a result, the number of responses analyzed per pair ranges from 2,263 to 2,396 economists, depending on the pair analyzed.

The second set of responses involves participants' evaluations of 15 statements by prominent economists on topics such as fairness, inequality, the role of government, intellectual property, globalization, and economic methodology (see Section 1 in the online appendix for the full list). Participants rated each statement on a 5-point scale from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." Unlike the binary propositions, these statements were selected to capture more complex and normative dimensions of economic debates. This design allowed for a deeper examination of participants' views and ideological orientations beyond what simpler choices could reveal.

It is important to note that the data used in this study comes from a larger online survey that included a randomized controlled experiment. In that experiment, the 15 statements were randomly attributed to different sources to assess the effects of ideological alignment and source authority. Since this study focuses on a different question, we analyze only the subset of responses unaffected by the experimental treatment—excluding those where source attribution was altered. As participants were randomly assigned to treatment conditions, the excluded responses form a random subset, avoiding selection bias. Of the 36,375 total evaluations by our 2,425 economists, 12,687 were excluded on this basis.

3. Results and Discussions

To lay the groundwork for our analysis, we first explore the distribution of responses to our paired propositions, as shown in Figure 1, offering a broad overview of the landscape under examination. The data reveals a complex and at times contradictory array of opinions among economists, touching on critical economic, social, and moral issues. These views defy the neat categorization of conventional ideological labels like conservative versus progressive or left versus right, which appear increasingly inadequate for capturing the complexities of today's ideological discourses. Rather than presenting coherent ideological patterns, the responses reflect a tapestry of often conflicting considerations, with unresolved tensions and inconsistencies.

One area of broad consensus emerges around *the need for government regulation of business in the public interest*. A substantial 85 percent of economists agree that such regulation is necessary, while only 15 percent argue that *it usually does more harm than good*. This strong support likely reflects concerns about market failures and the risks associated with unregulated private interests. Similarly, 80% believe that *too much power is concentrated in the hands of a few large companies*, signaling widespread apprehension about corporate dominance, which further reinforces the call for regulatory intervention.

However, this consensus over corporate power quickly begins to unravel when opinions on corporate profitability come into focus. A narrow majority (54 percent) believe that *most corporations make a fair and reasonable amount of profit*, while 46 percent think *corporations make too much profit*. This split is particularly revealing. Despite the widespread acknowledgment of concentrated corporate power, many economists hesitate to characterize corporate profits as excessive. This disconnect is especially perplexing given that a core principle in economics is the relentless drive of businesses to maximize profit—a force that dictates decisions and shapes market behavior. If too much corporate power is not manifesting in excessive profits—its ultimate objective—then where does this power reveal itself? When corporations dominate markets—through monopolistic practices, consolidation, and regulatory influence—they exert undue control over prices, labor conditions, and supply chains, inflating profits at the expense of consumers, workers, and competitors. This stark contradiction between economists' acknowledgment of market power and their reluctance to critique corporate profitability highlights a deeper inconsistency in their assessment of corporate behavior. It is perhaps unsurprising, though, given that mainstream economics has long avoided critically scrutinizing corporations as the dominant actors in today's economy, instead clinging to the fictional *homo economicus* as its primary unit of analysis.

The issue of income inequality further highlights this divide. Seventy-eight percent of respondents believe that *rising income inequality has significant socioeconomic consequences that warrant serious attention*. Yet, a notable 22 percent dismiss this focus on inequality as wrongheaded, arguing instead that poverty—not inequality—should be the primary concern. This division points to a deeper unresolved tension within the profession. When the question shifts to the causes of economic disadvantage, the contradictions grow more apparent: while 69 percent of economists attribute the struggles of marginalized groups such as women, immigrants, and racial minorities to systemic discrimination, 31 percent place the blame on individual failings. This reflects a persistent divide between structuralist interpretations of inequality and the belief in personal responsibility. The fact that such a sizable minority rejects systemic explanations in favour of individual blame underscores the uneasy alignment within the field, suggesting that economists are far from unified in their acceptance of structuralist critiques typically associated with progressive perspectives.

The economists' divide over meritocracy further underscores these divisions and contradictions. Fifty-six percent of economists acknowledge that *hard work and determination are no guarantee of success*, recognizing the role of structural obstacles in limiting social mobility. Yet 44 percent still hold the belief that people can succeed if they work hard enough. This near-even split reveals a persistent attachment to the ideal of personal agency, even among some of those who recognize systemic barriers. The fact that nearly half of respondents continue to uphold the meritocratic ideal, despite widespread acknowledgment of structural barriers, highlights a key inconsistency in economists' thinking. While many seem to accept that systemic inequalities play a major role in limiting opportunities, a significant portion remains unwilling to abandon the notion that individual effort is sufficient for success. Together, these contradictions reflect the profession's unresolved and conflicting perspectives on inequality, meritocracy, and social mobility.

The only area of near-universal agreement is found on the question of morality and religion. An overwhelming 95 percent of economists agree that *belief in God is not necessary to be moral or possess good values*, with only 5 percent asserting that *belief in God is essential for morality*. This consensus indicates that most economists share a secular approach to ethics, transcending traditional political and ideological divisions. In academic and professional contexts, this broad acceptance of secular morality suggests a shared value system that prioritizes ethical behavior independent of religious belief.

In sum, these responses illustrate a profession marked by some notable inconsistencies and divisions. While there is consensus on issues like government regulation, corporate power, income inequality, and secular morality, stark divisions remain on the nature of corporate profits, personal responsibility, and meritocracy. These positions do not align neatly with standard ideological categories, revealing that economists' views are shaped by complex and often conflicting considerations. This fragmented landscape raises important questions about how these perspectives differ by gender and how a more diverse range of voices could bring greater depth and richness to these ongoing debates.

3.1. Gender Differences Across Paired Propositions

Building on these broad patterns, the next stage of our analysis examines how these views differ by gender. This exploration will help determine if gender diversity within the field of economics contributes to a wider range of perspectives, potentially enriching the discipline. Results presented in Table 1 are derived from a series of OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is a binary indicator based on responses to pairs of propositions presented in Figure 1 and discussed above. For each pair, the indicator equals 1 when option 1 is selected and 0 when option 2 is selected. The coding is consistent, with indicators set to 1 when the chosen position reflects progressive, interventionist, or equity-oriented views, and to 0 when it aligns with conservative, free-market, or traditional perspectives.

The key explanatory variable is the gender indicator (0 for men, 1 for women). The analysis is conducted across four panels, progressively adding a rich set of control variables: Panel A shows unadjusted results, Panel B adds primary controls, Panel C incorporates additional controls, and Panel D further adjusts for self-reported political orientation (see the notes in Table 1 for further details). In what follows, we interpret the results, focusing on where significant gender differences emerge and how they change as we take into account the potential impact of various individual and professional characteristics.

Government Regulation (Pair 1): In the unconditional model (Panel A), women are 7 percentage points more likely than men to agree that government regulation is necessary to protect the public interest, representing a relative difference of 8.4 percent. This gender gap remains robust after controlling for various individual and professional characteristics in Panels B and C. However, in Panel D, when accounting for political ideology, the difference shrinks considerably to just 1.5 percentage points, and it becomes statistically insignificant. This suggests that much of the observed gender difference in support for regulation is mediated by underlying gender differences in political ideology. We explore these gender differences in political ideology further in the next section of our analysis.

Meritocracy (Pair 2): Gender differences regarding meritocracy are relatively modest and statistically insignificant. In the unconditional model, women are 3.2 percentage points more likely than men to reject the idea that hard work guarantees success. However, this difference is statistically insignificant. The difference becomes smaller in size, and remains statistically insignificant, when adding controls. However, controlling for political orientation in Panel D shifts the results, with women becoming 5 percentage points *less likely* than men to reject meritocratic ideals—a difference that is both statistically significant and notable in size. Once again, this suggests that gender differences in political ideology mediates a significant portion of the gender gap. The shift in direction further hints that, once comparing male and female economists with similar political ideologies, women may be slightly more inclined to support the idea of personal agency and effort over structural barriers in determining success. We explore this intriguing finding further in Section 3.2, where we examine the mediating role of political ideology in greater depth.

Discrimination (Pair 3): The issue of discrimination reveals one of the largest and most consistent gender differences across all pairs. In the unconditional model, women are 16.5 percentage points more likely than men to attribute the inability of disadvantaged groups to get ahead to systemic discrimination rather than individual responsibility, a significant average difference of 25 percent. This gap remains largely unchanged after controlling for various individual and professional characteristics. When political ideology is accounted for in Panel D, the difference narrows but remains substantial, with women still 8 percentage points or 11 percent more likely to endorse structural explanations for inequality. This enduring gap underscores a fundamental divide between male and female economists in how they perceive the root causes of social inequality, with female economists far more likely to acknowledge systemic barriers affecting marginalized groups.

This significant gender gap may be explained by the lived experiences of female economists, both inside and outside the profession. Within economics, women frequently encounter structural barriers and marginalization (Ginther & Kahn, 2004; Wu, 2018), shaping their heightened awareness of inequality and power dynamics. Additionally, outside the profession, women's roles and experiences, particularly in caregiving and unpaid labor, likely make them more attuned to issues of care and fairness, contributing to their stronger recognition of systemic discrimination and inequality. These combined experiences may foster a more critical perspective on structural barriers, influencing how female economists understand the root causes of social inequities.

Income Inequality (Pair 4): When it comes to income inequality, women initially appear 9.9 percentage points more likely than men to agree that rising inequality has serious socioeconomic consequences that demand attention, a significant average difference of 13 percent. Similar to our previous findings, gender differences in political ideology accounts for a large portion of this difference, as this difference shrinks to 3 percentage points and is no longer statistically significant in Panel D. This pattern indicates that much of the gender gap in concerns about income inequality is mediated by gender differences in political ideology.

Corporate Power (Pair 5): Gender differences are also evident in views on corporate power, with women 8.6 percentage points more likely than men to believe that too much power is concentrated in the hands of a few large companies, an average difference of 11 percent. Like our other findings, as our results in Panel D suggest, gender differences in political ideology contributes significantly to these gender differences. Women's stronger initial stance against concentrated corporate power aligns with their generally more progressive and interventionist outlooks and is mediated strongly through their systematic differences with their male economists in their political ideology.

Corporate Profitability (Pair 6): Another striking gender difference appears in perceptions of corporate profitability. In the unconditional model, women are 16.6 percentage points more likely than men to believe that corporations make too much profit, a striking average difference of 39 percent. Even after accounting for political orientation, the gap remains a significant 6.6 percentage points or 17 percent in Panel D. This persistence suggests that women economists hold more critical views on corporate profitability, reflecting deeper concerns about corporate excesses and economic inequality that are not fully accounted for by political ideology. The consistent gender gap in this domain highlights how female economists may be more sensitive to the social and economic implications of concentrated wealth and profit-making practices.

Morality and Religion (Pair 7): On the question of secular morality, gender differences are negligible. Across all models, the estimated gender gaps remain close to zero and statistically insignificant, indicating that both male and female economists largely share the belief that morality and good values do not require religious belief. This consensus suggests that, unlike other economic and social issues where gender divides are apparent, morality and religion are not areas of significant gender-based disagreement within the profession.

In summary, our regression results highlight significant gender gaps in economists' perspectives on critical socioeconomic issues. Female economists consistently demonstrate more progressive, equity-oriented views than their male counterparts, including a stronger recognition of the need for government intervention, the impact of rising income inequality, corporate power and profit excesses, and the structural barriers to success. These differences remain significant even after accounting for a wide array of personal and professional characteristics. These stark gender gaps likely stem from the lived experiences of female economists navigating a male-dominated profession, as well as the broader patriarchal structures they encounter in everyday life, which make them more attuned to recognizing and responding to the forces that sustain inequality and marginalization.

Moreover, our findings reveal that political ideology plays a powerful mediating role in these gender differences— *more so than the combined influence of the many personal and professional characteristics considered in our analysis*. This is an area that warrants careful attention. While some might view political ideology as merely a variable that can "explain away" gender differences, the relationship between gender and political beliefs is far more intricate. Rather than offering a simple explanation, political ideology interacts with gender in ways that fundamentally shape economists' views on key issues, calling for a nuanced understanding of how these forces interplay.

Gender permeates political views, attitudes and behavior, functioning not merely as a demographic characteristic but as a critical lens through which individuals experience and interpret social and political processes. It systematically and profoundly affects (political) socialization processes, lived experiences, and one's structural position within society. As a result, gender exerts a pervasive influence on how individuals conceptualize and understand politics, form their political opinions and preferences, to participation in political acts that engage with and influence the power dynamics, social norms, and collective decisions within a society. This impact underscores the centrality of gender in shaping political thought and behavior across societies.

Gender shapes political socialization by influencing the norms and expectations imparted to individuals from an early age through societal constructs. These differing lived experiences based on gender lead to distinct policy perspectives. Women's experiences with gender discrimination, pay inequity, limited upward mobility, unpaid labor, and concerns over reproductive rights significantly shapes their views on issues like equity, rights, structural barriers, and healthcare as cornerstones of their political ideology. These unique experiences manifest in systematically different policy preferences compared to men (Burns et al., 2001; Conover, 1983; Inglehart & Norris, 2000; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Van Ditmars, 2023). Gender also affects political participation, both in terms of rates and forms. Women often face greater barriers to political engagement, including limited access to networks and resources (Schlozman et al., 1994), or encountering gender biases and stereotypes, resulting in lower representation in formal political offices (Bauer, 2015; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Krook & Norris, 2014; Piscopo, 2019a, 2019b). Consequently, many women engage more in grassroots movements or community organizing, finding alternative pathways to political involvement (Baldez, 2003; Berry, 1998; Rai & Waylen, 2014). A deeper and more holistic understanding of these dynamics underscores that gender is intricately woven into the political fabric, profoundly shaping political engagement and perspectives.

3.2. Gender Differences in the Distribution and the Influence of Political Ideology

Given the significant and systematic role political ideology plays in mediating gender differences in views among economists, we extend our analysis by exploring gender differences in political ideology itself. To do this, we run a series of ordered logit regressions, where the dependent variable is an ordered categorical measure of political orientation. This variable ranges from 1 (far left) to 5 (far right) and is based on participants' self-reported political orientation on a scale of -10 (far left) to 10 (far right). The results are presented in Figure 2, with Panel A showing the unconditional gender differences in the probability of identifying with each category of political ideology, and Panel B adjusting for individual and professional characteristics.

Our findings reveal clear and consistent gender differences in political ideology among economists, which persist even after controlling for a rich set of characteristics. Female economists are significantly more likely to identify with left-leaning ideologies, particularly at the far-left end of the spectrum, with women 12.6 percentage points or 77 percent more likely to identify as far-left compared to their male counterparts. The gap remains significant even after adjusting for personal and professional factors. While the gender gap narrows slightly for economists identifying as left, women still demonstrate a stronger tendency toward progressive political ideologies with a 4.1 percentage points or a 10 percent higher probability of identifying as left. Conversely, male economists are more likely to identify with centrist and right-leaning political ideologies. The likelihood of male economists identifying as right-wing or far-right is significantly higher, with men being 7.5 percentage points or 80 percent more likely than women to align with right-wing views and more than twice as likely to identify with the far right.

Building on the stark gender differences in political ideology, we also examine whether political ideology shapes economists' views differently by gender. While we have established that female economists are more likely to align with left-leaning ideologies and men with centrist and right-leaning ones, we now investigate whether the effect of a given political ideology on views among economists varies systematically between men and women. To do this, we run a series of OLS regressions that allow the impact of political ideology on our paired propositions to differ by gender. This approach enables us to examine whether gender differences exist not only in the distribution of political ideology but also in how political ideology influences opinions on various key issues.

Our results are presented in Table 2.[3] The first key finding is that political ideology exerts a *very strong* and consistent influence on economists' views across all seven paired propositions. As economists move further to the right on the ideological spectrum, they become significantly less likely to adopt progressive, equity-oriented, interventionist socioeconomic positions. For example, compared to their far-left counterparts, male economists who identify as far-right are 69 percent less likely to support government intervention to protect the public interest (Pair 1), 78 percent less likely to recognize discrimination as a systemic barrier (Pair 3), 70 percent less likely to acknowledge the significant socioeconomic consequences of income inequality (Pair 4), and 50 percent less likely to identify excessive corporate power (Pair 5). Similar patterns are observed among female economists, though the effects tend to be smaller in magnitude.

In addition to these general trends, we find some evidence of gender differences in how political ideology affects views among economists. The effect of identifying as far left on views does not significantly differ between men and women across most propositions. However, an interesting exception emerges with regard to meritocracy (Pair 2), where far-left women are 7.8 percentage points *less likely* than their male counterparts to reject the notion that hard work and determination are no guarantee of success, suggesting a more individualistic view on this issue among far-left female economists. It is also notable that this lower probability of

[3] See Table A3 in our online appendix for adjusted predicted probabilities for each group, as opposed to differences in predicted probabilities reported in Table 2.

rejecting the meritocratic ideal persists between men and women in other categories of political ideology, although the difference is relatively smaller and statistically insignificant.

This persistent gender gap aligns with our results from Panel D in Table 1, where after controlling for political ideology women are *less likely* to acknowledge that hard work and determination are no guarantee for success for most people. This is an intriguing result since while female economists are more likely to hold more progressive equity-oriented positions across all other issues, including their position on discrimination as the main barrier experienced by disadvantaged groups, they are paradoxically less likely to reject the idea that hard work guarantees success.

One potential explanation is that this inconsistency reveals a complex interplay between personal and professional experiences. Female economists, having navigated a male-dominated field, may internalize meritocratic ideals, viewing their own success as the result of personal effort, which reinforces a belief in individual responsibility. At the same time, their heightened awareness of inequality—shaped by lived experiences both inside and outside the profession—leads them to recognize systemic barriers that impede marginalized groups. This duality likely reflects the tension between their own perseverance in overcoming challenges and their broader understanding of the structural forces that sustain inequity and marginalization.

Building on this complexity, the interaction between gender and political ideology are also present among left-leaning economists. Women identifying with the left are 6.3 percentage points more likely than their male counterparts to attribute disadvantage to systemic discrimination rather than individual responsibility (Pair 3). This suggests that left-leaning women may have a heightened sensitivity to equity-related issues, particularly those involving structural barriers. However, for other propositions, gender differences within the left are relatively small and statistically insignificant. A similar but more pronounced pattern is seen among centrists, where female economists are 19.1 percentage points more likely than their male counterparts to hold progressive views on discrimination (Pair 3), indicating a stronger recognition of structural barriers to inequality.

Among right-leaning economists, gender differences become relatively more pronounced. Women who identify with the right are 21.6 percentage points more likely than men to view rising income inequality as a significant socioeconomic concern (Pair 6), reflecting a heightened sensitivity to inequality even within relatively more conservative circles. Additionally, women on the right are 22 percentage points more likely than their male counterparts to believe that corporations make too much profit (Pair 4), underscoring their greater concern about corporate excess. While right-leaning women are also 11 percentage points more likely to recognize the role of discrimination in affecting marginalized groups (Pair 3), this difference is statistically insignificant.

A similar but stronger pattern emerges at the far-right end of the spectrum. Female economists who identify as far-right are 39.4 percentage points more likely than their male counterparts to believe that corporations make too much profit (Pair 6) and 37 percentage points more likely to express concerns about rising income inequality (Pair 4). While far-right women are also more likely to identify discrimination as a significant barrier for disadvantaged groups (Pair 3), the difference is not statistically significant. These results suggest that even among those on the far right, women are more likely to hold progressive views on specific issues, particularly those related to inequality and excess corporate profit.

Overall, these findings indicate that gender plays a pivotal role in not only determining the distribution of political ideology among economists but also in how political beliefs shape views on critical socioeconomic issues. Importantly, even when men and women share the same political ideology, women tend to demonstrate a greater sensitivity to issues of inequality, excess corporate profit, and structural barriers affecting disadvantaged groups, particularly within right-leaning ideological categories. These results reveal the nuanced and multifaceted ways in which gender and political ideology intersect.

3.3. Gender Differences in Agreement with Critical Statements

As discussed in Section 2, our analysis of gender differences in economists' views draws on two distinct sets of survey responses. While the first set focused on clear-cut binary propositions, the second set—examined in this section—captures economists' evaluations of 15 statements from prominent scholars. These statements cover a broad spectrum of economic issues, such as distributive effects of globalization, property rights, conflicts between private wealth and public interest, gender gaps in economics, fairness of capitalism, and critiques of economics discourse (see Section 1 in the online appendix for a full list).

By framing these issues within a multidimensional and normative context, this set of statements enables a more nuanced examination of gender-based differences in economists' perspectives. The statements collectively reflect a broad skepticism of economic orthodoxy, challenging the discipline's often narrow, mathematically driven approaches, its ideological predispositions, and its tendency to overlook social and ethical dimensions. Examining gender-based differences in views on these statements thus offers valuable insights into how gender diversity within economics might enrich intellectual plurality and deepen critical engagement with complex societal issues.

Figure 3 presents results from a series of OLS regressions estimating gender differences in agreement levels for each statement individually. The dependent variable is the agreement level, rated on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. This normalization enables us to express the estimated gender differences in standard deviation units rather than raw agreement scores, allowing for a clearer assessment of the relative magnitude and substantive significance of these differences.

Panel A reports results from regressions that control for personal and professional characteristics. Overall, female economists express higher agreement with a substantial number of statements critiquing various aspects of mainstream economics, structural inequalities, and social justice issues. With the exception of Statement 3, these higher agreement levels are both statistically significant and quantitatively substantial, ranging from 11 percent to 61 percent of a standard deviation.

Notably, the largest gender difference appears in response to Statement 5 by Carmen Reinhart, who asserts, "*Unlike most other science and social science disciplines, economics has made little progress in closing its gender gap over the last several decades. Given the field's prominence in determining public policy, this is a serious issue. Whether explicit or more subtle, intentional or not, the hurdles that women face in economics are very real.*" Female economists show an agreement level 61 percent of a standard deviation higher than their male colleagues, underscoring a pronounced gender disconnect in recognition of gender-related challenges within economics.

Female economists also express significantly higher agreement with various critiques of mainstream economic discourse and methodology as presented in Statements 6, 11, 12, 14, and 15. For instance, with Statement 6 by William Milberg, female economists show agreement levels 30 percent of a standard deviation higher than male economists. Milberg argues that economics' pursuit of universal knowledge of "the economy" often overlooks the importance of historical and contextual analyses of social institutions and politics, instead favoring models grounded in mathematical and statistical rigor. This pattern suggests that female economists may be more receptive to questioning the discipline's methodological assumptions and more inclined to support a pluralistic approach to economic analysis.

In Statement 11 by John Maynard Keynes, which critiques the reductionist tendencies of economics, female economists show agreement levels 15 percent of a standard deviation higher than their male counterparts. Keynes's criticism of mathematical formalism reflects broader skepticism towards methods that can obscure real-world complexities, and female economists appear to align more strongly with this critical perspective. Similarly, Statement 12 by Steve Keen criticizes neoclassical microeconomics and advocates for alternative approaches, such as behavioral and multi-agent models, that better capture social complexity. Female economists show an agreement level 24 percent of a standard deviation higher than male economists, suggesting a stronger preference for methodological diversity and alternative approaches to economic inquiry among women.

In Statement 14 by Richard Thaler, who discusses behavioral insights and the failures of traditional economic models to predict crises, female economists display agreement levels 13 percent of a standard deviation higher than men. This difference again highlights a gendered openness to alternative frameworks that diverge from traditional neoclassical assumptions.

Turning to statements addressing structural issues of inequality and social justice, female economists again show a stronger alignment with statements that critique the structural drivers of inequality. In Statement 9 by John Stuart Mill, which argues that certain types of property laws could perpetuate inequality, female economists report agreement levels 16 percent of a standard deviation higher than their male counterparts. This difference highlights that female economists may be more attuned to the justice implications of economic systems and supportive of critical viewpoints on how economic institutions may sustain inequality, resonating with gendered concerns about privilege, fairness and justice.

Similarly, in Statement 10 by Larry Summers, who highlights deep-seated issues within capitalism, such as rising unemployment, income inequality, and declining social mobility, the gender difference is 18 percent of a standard deviation, with female economists expressing greater agreement. These findings underscore a gendered concern for social justice and the distributive consequences of economic policies, suggesting that female economists may prioritize questions of fairness and systemic impact more strongly.

There are also statements where women economists express higher levels of disagreement. In Statement 7 by Irving Fisher, which discusses the potential biases economists acquire from their surrounding communities, female economists show lower levels of agreement, with a difference of 17 percent of a standard deviation. This divergence may indicate that male economists are more likely to acknowledge the social influences on economic perspectives, while female economists might see bias within the profession as stemming from broader institutional structures rather than localized community influences. Similarly, Statement 13 by Adam Smith discusses the negative effects of labor division on workers' intellectual engagement, where female economists report lower agreement levels than men, with a difference of 22 percent of a standard deviation. These differences may reflect differing views on the impact of labor structures and professional environments on individual agency.

Lastly, several statements yield small and statistically insignificant gender differences. For example, Statements 1, 2, 3, and 8 display minimal gaps in agreement levels between male and female economists, suggesting that on some issues, particularly those less directly tied to critiques of the profession or systemic inequality, gendered differences in views may be less pronounced.

The results in Panel B reinforce that gender differences in views on critiques of mainstream economics, structural inequality, and social justice issues are partly mediated by differences in political ideology. Since female economists are more likely to identify with left-leaning ideologies, as discussed in Section 3.2, adjusting for these ideological differences generally reduces the observed gender gaps in agreement with critiques of mainstream economic models and their approach to social issues. However, even after accounting for political ideology, substantial and statistically significant gender differences persist on some issues, including those represented by Statements 5, 6, 11, and 12. This persistence suggests that, beyond political ideology, gendered experiences and insights play a role in shaping critical viewpoints within the discipline.

4. Conclusion

This study examines the role of gender diversity in shaping the intellectual contours of the economics profession. While attention to gender diversity in economics has increased in recent years—largely in response to troubling findings that exposed a masculinized, exclusionary professional culture—much of the discourse remains narrowly focused on statistical representation. Efforts have largely centered on tracking women's presence in economics programs, academic ranks, leadership positions, and prominent mainstream journals. While these metrics are useful indicators of access and participation, they offer only a partial view. Statistical representation alone cannot capture the extent to which diverse voices exist, and are meaningfully included, engaged, and legitimized within economics. This limitation is particularly pressing in light of long-standing critiques of mainstream economics as intellectually homogenous, methodologically rigid, and resistant to alternative perspectives.

To fully understand the implications of greater gender diversity in economics—and to imagine their full significance— we must move beyond questions of representation and examine how the inclusion of women can shape the discipline in more fundamental ways—fostering a more pluralistic, critically engaged, and socially responsive economics. This study addresses that gap by examining systematic gender differences in views across a broad range of socioeconomic issues and by highlighting the powerful mediating role of political ideology. In doing so, it offers insight into how gendered patterns of lived experience, socialization, and structural positioning inform economists' normative and epistemological orientations. These differences are not incidental; they reveal how gender operates as a key axis through which economic ideas are formed, contested, and reimagined.

Drawing on a large and diverse international sample of 2,425 economists from 19 countries, our analysis reveals that there are substantively meaningful gender differences in views among economists on a wide spectrum of socioeconomic issues. Female economists are consistently more likely to hold more progressive, equity-oriented positions—particularly on issues such as income inequality, structural barriers to success, corporate power, and government intervention. They are also more inclined to question some of the dominant paradigms that underpin mainstream economic discourse and to endorse pluralistic approaches to economic inquiry.

We find that political ideology plays a significant mediating role in shaping economists' views and helps account for some of the observed gender gaps. Women are substantially more likely than men to identify as left-leaning—particularly far-left—while men are disproportionately aligned with centrist or right-leaning ideologies. These stark differences in ideological distribution help account, in part, for the gaps in views between male and female economists. However, ideology also influences economists' views differently by gender. Although moving rightward on the ideological spectrum is consistently associated with reduced support for equity-oriented and progressive positions for both men and women, this shift tends to be less pronounced among women. In other words, even when men and women share the same political ideology, women tend to show greater sensitivity to issues such as inequality, corporate excess, and structural barriers facing marginalized groups—particularly within right-leaning ideological categories.

These findings underscore that gender and ideology do not operate as independent factors, but intersect in ways shaped by broader dynamics of socialization, lived experience, and structural positioning. Interpreting political ideology merely as a control variable that "explains away" gender differences would obscure this deeper complexity. Gender permeates political views, attitudes, and behavior—not simply as a demographic marker, but as a critical lens through which individuals experience and interpret social and political life. As such, the systematic gender differences we observe reflect more than individual preferences or personality traits; they are shaped by structurally differentiated lived experiences and the distinct ways gender mediates exposure to and engagement with economic and political systems. In this sense, gender operates as a social force that profoundly informs how individuals understand economic realities and prioritize policy responses.

These findings point to an essential insight: gender diversity in economics has the potential to generate intellectual and pluralistic diversity. But this potential can only be realized if the discipline cultivates an environment for differing or dissenting voices to be heard, engaged, and legitimized. If economics is to remain responsive to the complexities of the world it seeks to analyze and influence, it must take seriously the value of pluralism—not as a symbolic gesture, but as an epistemic necessity. Gender diversity must be accompanied by structural changes that dismantle entrenched hierarchies—hierarchies that often devalue perspectives deemed "outside the mainstream," such as feminist economics (Albelda, 1995)—and make room for critical and heterodox approaches. Without such changes, inclusion risks becoming performative, reinforcing conformity rather than fostering pluralistic diversity (Zacchia, 2017).

The implications of our findings extend well beyond academic debates. Economists exert significant influence on public policy, shaping how societies understand, frame, and address pressing social and economic issues. If the perspectives that dominate the discipline are shaped disproportionately by a homogenous group and remain skewed along gendered lines, the resulting policy frameworks risk overlooking key dimensions, particularly around issues of inequality, care, and social vulnerability. Greater gender diversity—when paired with genuine openness to different perspectives—can serve as a catalyst for a more pluralistic discipline, diverse not only in demographics but in values, assumptions, and methodological commitments.

Our results thus speak to a broader imperative: if economics as a discipline seeks to remain relevant and responsive to real-world challenges, it must embrace a more pluralistic intellectual environment—one that not only welcomes but actively values the diverse perspectives that come with lived experience, social positioning, and ideological variation. Gender is not merely a demographic variable; it is a lens through which the world is seen, interpreted, and acted upon. Ensuring that this lens is reflected in economics discourse is essential not only for equity but for epistemic integrity.

Ultimately, fostering pluralistic diversity—by gender, ideology, and beyond—is not about diluting rigor but about expanding the discipline's analytical reach. It is about enabling the field to grapple with the complexity of human lives, social structures, and global challenges. Gender, as a structuring force of both experience and thought, is central to this transformation. Ensuring its place in economic discourse is not only a matter of equity but of intellectual integrity.

5. Reference

Agenjo-Calderón, A., & Gálvez-Muñoz, L. (2019). Feminist Economics: Theoretical and Political Dimensions. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 78(1), 137-166. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12264

Albelda, R. (1995). The Impact of Feminism in Economics-Beyond the Pale? A Discussion and Survey Results. The Journal of Economic Education, 26(3), 253-273. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220485.1995.10844877

Baldez, L. (2003). Women's Movements and Democratic Transition in Chile, Brazil, East Germany, and Poland. Comparative Politics, 35(3), 253-272. https://doi.org/10.2307/4150176

Barnes, T. J., & Sheppard, E. (2010). 'Nothing includes everything': towards engaged pluralism in Anglophone economic geography. Progress in Human Geography, 34(2), 193-214. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132509343728

Bateman, V., Gamage, D. K., Hengel, E., & Liu, X. (2021). The Gender Imbalance in UK Economics. https://res.org.uk/committee/women-in-academic-economics-report/ https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/28426

Bauer, N. M. (2015). Emotional, Sensitive, and Unfit for Office? Gender Stereotype Activation and Support Female Candidates. Political Psychology, 36(6), 691-708. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12186

Bayer, A., & Rouse, C. E. (2016). Diversity in the Economics Profession: A New Attack on an Old Problem. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(4), 221-242. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.4.221

Becchio, G. (2020). A history of feminist and gender economics. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315102559

Berry, J. M. (1998). The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925. Elisabeth S. Clemens. The Journal of Politics, 60(3), 879-881. https://doi.org/10.2307/2647657

Buckles, K. (2019). Fixing the Leaky Pipeline: Strategies for Making Economics Work for Women at Every Stage. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(1), 43-60. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.33.1.43

Burns, N., Schlozman, K. L., & Verba, S. (2001). The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation. In Cambridge, MA: Harvard U Press, 2001. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674029088

Chari, A. (2023). The 2023 Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession. http://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.113.815

Costa-Dias, M., Hengel, E., Jones, M., & Neves, H. (2023). Report on the status of women in academic economics within the UK. https://res.org.uk/committee/women-in-academic-economics-report-2024/ https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/28389

Coyle, D. (2017, August 27). Economics has a problem with women. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/6b3cc8be-881e-11e7-afd2-74b8ecd34d3b

Davis, W. L. (1997). Economists' Perceptions of Their Own Research: A Survey of the Profession. The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 56(2), 159-172. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1997.tb03458.x

Economist, T. (2017, December 19). Inefficient Equilibrium: Women and Economics. https://www.economist.com/christmas-specials/2017/12/19/women-and-economics

Ferber, & Nelson. (2003). Feminist economics today: beyond economic man / edited by Marianne A. Ferber and Julie A. Nelson. (M. A. Ferber & J. A. Nelson, Eds.). University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226775166.001.0001

Folbre, N. (2001). The invisible heart: economics and family values. New Press. ISBN: 9781565847477

Gamage, D. K., Sevilla, A., & Smith, S. (2020). Women in economics: a UK perspective. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 36(4), 962-982. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graa048

Gittleson, K. (2017, October 12). Where are all the women in economics? BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-41571333

Hedengren, D., Klein, D. B., & Milton, C. (2010). Economist Petitions: Ideology Revealed. Econ Journal Watch, 7(3), 288. https://econjwatch.org/articles/economist-petitions-who-is-signing-what

Hengel, E. (2022). Publishing While Female: are Women Held to Higher Standards? Evidence from Peer Review. The Economic Journal, 132(648), 2951-2991. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueac032

Huddy, L., & Terkildsen, N. (1993). Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates. American Journal of Political Science, 37(1), 119-147. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111526

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2000). The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective. International Political Science Review, 21(4), 441-463. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512100214007

Kim, M. (2023). Gender in Economics Fifty Years Ago and Today: Feminist Economists Speak. The Review of Radical Political Economics, 55(1), 8-25. https://doi.org/10.1177/04866134221093095

Krook, M. L., & Norris, P. (2014). Beyond Quotas: Strategies to Promote Gender Equality in Elected Office. Political Studies, 62(1), 2-20. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12116

Long, H. (2019, March 18). Female economists report widespread discrimination and sexual assault, prompting calls for major change. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/03/18/percent-female-economists-say-theyve-been-discriminated-against-prompting-calls-major-change/

Lowrey, A. (2022, November 26). Harassment in Economics Doesn't Stay in Economics. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/11/economics-sexual-harrassment-women-sexism/672239/

Lundberg, S., & Stearns, J. (2019). Women in Economics: Stalled Progress. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(1), 3-22. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.33.1.3

May, A. M., Mcgarvey, M. G., & Whaples, R. (2014). Are disagreements among male and female economists marginal at best?: A survey of aea members and their views on economics and economic policy. Contemporary Economic Policy, 32(1), 111-132. https://doi.org/10.1111/coep.12004

Morath, E. (2017, October 26). To Avoid Sexism on Job-Posting Site, Economists Petition to Start Their Own. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/to-avoid-sexism-on-job-posting-site-economists-petition-to-start-their-own-1509019820

Nelson, J. (1996). Feminism, objectivity and economics. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203435915

Nelson, J. (2019). Gender and Failures of Rationality in Economic Analysis. https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2019/preliminary/paper/AKz4fYKT

Piscopo, J. M. (2019). The limits of leaning in: ambition, recruitment, and candidate training in comparative perspective. Politics, Groups & Identities, 7(4), 817-828. https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2018.1532917

Rai, S., & Waylen, G. (2014). New frontiers in feminist political economy. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315884745

Schlozman, K. L., Burns, N., & Verba, S. (1994). Gender and the Pathways to Participation: The Role of Resources. The Journal of Politics, 56(4), 963-990. https://doi.org/10.2307/2132069

Shapiro, R. Y., & Mahajan, H. (1986). Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s. Public Opinion Quarterly, 50(1), 42-61. https://doi.org/10.1086/268958

Sheppard, E., & Plummer, P. (2007). Toward Engaged Pluralism in Geographical Debate. Environment and Planning. A, 39(11), 2545-2548. https://doi.org/10.1068/a40205

Smith, N. (2018, January 10). Economics Starts Reckoning with Its Gender Bias Problem. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-01-10/economics-starts-reckoning-with-its-gender-bias-problem

Van Ditmars, M. M. (2023). Political socialization, political gender gaps and the intergenerational transmission of left-right ideology. European Journal of Political Research, 62(1), 3-24. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12517

Wolfers, J. (2017, August 18). Evidence of a Toxic Environment for Women in Economics. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/upshot/evidence-of-a-toxic-environment-for-women-in-economics.html

Wolfers, J. (2018, February 2). Why Women's Voices Are Scarce in Economics. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/business/why-womens-voices-are-scarce-in-economics.html

Wu, A. H. (2018). Gendered Language on the Economics Job Market Rumors Forum. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 108, 175-179. https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20181101

Zacchia, G. (2017). Diversity in economics: a gender analysis of Italian academic production. Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series, (61). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3081220

6. Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Fraction of Respondents Selecting Each Option for Paired Propositions



Figure 2: Gender Differences in Political Orientation – Predicted Probabilities – Ordered Logit

Panel A: Unconditional	Panel B: Conditional



Note: Both 90% and 95% confidence intervals are shown for each estimate, with the two horizontal lines indicating the endpoints of the 90% confidence interval.

Figure 3: Gender Differences in Agreement Levels with Statements – OLS Results



Note: Agreement levels are z-normalized for each statement. Control variables include gender, PhD completion cohort, current status, country, and research area. Both 90% and 95% confidence intervals are shown for each estimate, with the two horizontal lines indicating the endpoints of the 90% confidence interval. The one-sentence descriptions provided for each statement offer abridged summaries; the complete statements can be found in the online appendix.

Table 1: Gender Differences in Binary Propositions – OLS Results

	Pair 1	Pair 2	Pair 3	Pair 4	Pair 5	Pair 6	Pair 7
Panel A: Unconditional Results							
Female	0.070***	0.032	0.165***	0.099***	0.086***	0.166***	0.002
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.010)
Percent Difference	8.4%	5.9%	25%	13%	11%	39%	0.21%
Panel B: Including Primary Controls							
Female	0.068***	0.020	0.153***	0.086***	0.063***	0.139***	-0.000
	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.010)
Percent Difference	8.2%	3.7%	23.4%	11.4%	8%	32%	0%
Panel C: Including Additional Controls							
Female	0.068***	0.015	0.151***	0.083***	0.055***	0.126***	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.010)
Percent Difference	8.16%	2.8%	23%	11%	7%	29%	0.6%
Panel D: Including Additional Controls + Political Orientation							
Female	0.015	-0.053**	0.081***	0.030	0.014	0.066***	-0.008
	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.010)
Percent Difference	1.7%	-9%	12.3%	4%	2.4%	17%	-1.5%
# of Observations	2396	2380	2306	2322	2356	2377	2263

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. The dependent variable is a binary indicator derived from pairs of propositions listed in Figure 1. For each pair, the indicator equals 1 when option 1 is selected and 0 when option 2 is selected. The coding is consistent, with indicators set to 1 when the chosen position reflects progressive, interventionist, or equity-oriented views, and to 0 when it aligns with conservative, free-market, or traditional perspectives.
Control variables include age, country/region of birth, current status/academic rank, country or residence, and research area. Additional controls include English proficiency, department of affiliation, PhD completion cohort, country of PhD completion, and undergraduate major. Political orientation includes five categories constructed based on participants self-reported position on a scale from -10 (far left) to 10 (far right): Far left = [-10 -7], Left = [-6 -2], Centre = [-1 1], Right = [2 6], Far Right = [7 10].

Table 2: Gender Differences in the Effect of Political Ideology – OLS Results

	Pair 1	Pair 2	Pair 3	Pair 4	Pair 5	Pair 6	Pair 7
Left	-0.019	-0.188***	-0.107***	-0.051**	-0.096***	-0.281***	-0.003
	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.031)	(0.008)
Centre	-0.161***	-0.426***	-0.363***	-0.197***	-0.184***	-0.414***	-0.056***
	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.014)
Right	-0.376***	-0.579***	-0.582***	-0.458***	-0.358***	-0.553***	-0.060***
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.017)
Far Right	-0.676***	-0.679***	-0.716***	-0.658***	-0.485***	-0.635***	-0.217***
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Percent Difference Far Right Vs. Far Left	69%	79%	78%	70%	50%	83%	22%
Far Left × Female	-0.002	-0.078**	0.016	0.008	-0.002	0.059	-0.015
	(0.019)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.039)	(0.015)
Left × Female	0.015	-0.044	0.063**	-0.006	0.017	0.046	0.002
	(0.015)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.008)
Centre × Female	0.009	-0.033	0.191***	0.008	0.043	0.053	-0.013
	(0.045)	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.058)	(0.030)
Right × Female	0.058	-0.042	0.114	0.220***	0.011	0.216***	-0.062
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.083)	(0.075)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.056)
Far Right × Female	0.046	-0.067	0.179	0.370**	0.140	0.394**	-0.124
	(0.151)	(0.108)	(0.161)	(0.169)	(0.165)	(0.160)	(0.168)
Percent Difference: Far Right Vs. Far Left	64%	86%	60%	31%	35%	36%	33%
# of Observations	2396	2380	2306	2322	2356	2377	2263

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. The dependent variable is a binary indicator derived from pairs of propositions listed in Figure 1. For each pair, the indicator equals 1 when option 1 is selected and 0 when option 2 is selected. The coding is consistent, with indicators set to 1 when the chosen position reflects progressive, interventionist, or equity-oriented views, and to 0 when it aligns with conservative, free-market, or traditional perspectives.
Control variables include age, country/region of birth, current status/academic rank, country or residence, and research area.
Political ideology includes five categories constructed based on participants self-reported position on a scale from -10 (far left) to 10 (far right): Far left = [-10 -7], Left = [-6 -2], Centre = [-1 1], Right = [2 6], Far Right = [7 10].
Estimated main effects (e.g., *Left*, *Center*) show the difference for men in those categories compared to Far Left men (the reference group). Interaction terms (e.g., *Left × Female*) capture the additional difference for women, relative to men with the same political orientation. The total effect for women in each political group is the sum of the main effect and the interaction term.