Hell is Truth Seen Too Late

Philip Mirowski
University of Notre Dame

July 2017

Draft 2.0

To appear in a special issue of boundary 2.

Abstract: The contemporary literature on neoliberalism has grown so large as to be unwieldy. For some on the left, this has presented an occasion to denounce it altogether. The purpose of this talk is to briefly diagnose some of the possible reasons for the spreading disaffection, and to link that diagnosis to some important developments in current politics. One of the most notable aspects of the literature is its unwillingness to approach neoliberalism first and foremost as a set of epistemological precepts, recruited in service of a political program. Marxists in particular seem to find this proposition an anathema—and there are important reasons this has been repressed in the ensuing discussions. I conclude by suggesting the critical importance of epistemology stands not as some abstract thesis, but has had dire consequences in at least two recent political battles: the post-election fascination with ‘fake news’; and the impending Uberization of modern science under the banner of ‘openness’.
People seem to be getting sick of hearing about neoliberalism, just around the time that the left seems to be suffering dreadful defeats across the board, from the ballot box to the precincts of pop culture. In an earlier talk from 2014, I had attempted to address the qualms of historians in dealing with the political designation of neoliberalism;¹ here I instead take the occasion to engage a different audience interested in rethinking politics in perilous times. It is my impression that the disarray and indecision of how to respond to the pervasive rout of progressive movements in 2016 has been intimately bound up with a widespread lack of willingness to accord the neoliberal movement any responsibility for these defeats. I concede that, simultaneously, many other things are going on – from xenophobia to rampant racism to nostalgia for lost times—but there is nonetheless a distinct pattern to the economic and conceptual chicanery to which so many have fallen prey in the last year or so. Greater clarity in the battles which are coming will be necessary for pushback; for as Thomas Hobbes once wrote, “Hell is Truth Seen too Late.”

I also want to preface what follows with the caveat that the first draft was composed back in February of 2017. At that time, it seemed there was a dearth of analysis concerning the main movements I seek to engage with below—namely, an Accelerationist-style Marxism, so-called ‘fake news’ and the onset of ‘open science’. Yet, either due to participants’ suggestions at the boundary 2 conference, or else simply due to the larger momentum of discussion, I find that I am no longer in the avant-garde when it comes to these issues. In this draft I have attempted to take into account some of the work that appeared in the interim; but inevitably, it remains a document of its specific era.

1. The N-word²

I am heartened to say there have been some extremely insightful contributions to the understanding of neoliberalism and its major precepts in the past few years. Some of the most shrewd and discerning contributions have come from Will Davies (2014), Wendy Brown (2015), Ben Fink (2014), Melinda Cooper (2017) and Ben Jackson (2016). What makes these contributions stand out is that they have managed to have gotten beyond the preliminary stage of – Look here! Neoliberalism really exists! – and consequently begun to explore what makes the

1 See https://www.ineteconomics.org/research/research-papers/the-political-movement-that-dared-not-speak-its-own-name-the-neoliberal-thought-collective-under-erasure

2 I heard Bruce Caldwell make this ‘joke’ when discussing this literature with his comrades at the Mercatus Institute.
various programs tick in particular political settings. They combine an advanced level of
historical research with the hermeneutic chops to detect the operation of political imaginaries in
the dark corners of the body politic. Yet, just as we seemed to be getting somewhere with this
literature, along comes a louder and more fractious faction who have taken to stridently
denouncing the very notion of neoliberalism, and denying that the phenomenon has ever existed.
One rather expected something like this from the Right, since the Neoliberal Thought Collective
has existed under erasure since the 1950s, denying the doctrinal and organizational coherence, all
the while actively pursuing both. 3 What marks the contemporary dispute as pitched beyond the
usual smokescreen is that some of the most insistent denials now appear to come from the Left of
the political spectrum.4 In one of the lesser ironies of our befuddled age, just when the IMF
begins to treat the political concept as befitting (muted) criticism, left-wing activists choose that
precise moment to denounce it.5 In the aftermath of the tremors happening in 2016, from the
political rise of fascist parties throughout Europe, the fallout from Brexit, and the American
election of Donald Trump, it has been difficult not to regard this abnegation as one more
symptom of the widespread disarray on the Left, a flailing out against previous political verities.
Some pundits recklessly asserting that Trump’s takeover marks the ‘death of neoliberalism’ in
various news outlets6 does tend to demoralize those searching for a trustworthy political compass
in a tempestuous world.

In practice, those suspicious of the analytical literature on neoliberalism tend to accuse it
of focusing too intently upon ideas as opposed to old-fashioned economic or political history;
treating the phenomenon as too impossibly monolithic, and therefore resembling a single
juggernaut crushing everything in its path; and suppressing the diversity of individual
conceptions of the politics which enrolls them as participants. I have witnessed more than one
activist suggest that the very notion of such a thing as a Neoliberal Thought Collective [NTC]

3 “Political Movement that Dared Not Speak”, ibid. See also (Shearmur, 2015).
4 See Venugopal (2015); Dunn (2016); Grzanka, Mann & Elliott (2016); O’Neill & Weller in (Springer et al, 2016); Thrift (2016); and Yann
Giraud & Beatrice Cherrier, https://historyofeconomics.wordpress.com/2016/07/25/dr-phil-or-how-i-stopped-worrying-about-economists-and-
embraced-neoliberalism/.
5 Osty et al, (2016).
6 See West (2016) and Fraser (2017) and Aschoff (2017); or Gerard Dumenil at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZPfu5qD_4J8. There is a
tendency to believe that governments with fascist tendencies necessarily abandon neoliberal policies. There is little historical evidence that one
follows from the other. See (Bel, 2010).
strikes such fear in the breast of the impressionable that it shamefully stymies their political action, and should therefore be avoided at all costs. In this case, it seems a strange sort of magical thinking to insist that, just because your own side currently lacks an elaborately articulated and highly connected set of social structures bent on political action and intellectual dissemination, you must therefore believe your opponents are equally bereft in the very same manner. And since when did the Left become the primary expositors of a rigid methodological individualism, where the limited perspective of the individual agent was the only one deemed to be legitimate when it came to political discourse?

To a first approximation, I find it curious that the disaffected rarely confront the fact that similar complaints have been made about any analytical entity dealing with political phenomena, from ‘capitalism’ to ‘liberalism’ to ‘republicanism’ to ‘libertarianism’ and beyond. Each has been multivalent, a mélange of propositions, and subject to multiple interpretations through time. No one is more pathetic than a contemporary American trying to explain what it means to be a ‘liberal’ these days. One suspects that the designation ‘neoliberalism’ attracts surplus disdain of its nominal opponents precisely because it embarrasses so many who were convinced their prior grasp of economic and political currents was so comprehensive and complete that no such movement could have caught them as wrong-footed as did this ideology. I am continually nonplussed that so many supposed activists respond with blank incomprehension when queried whether they know what the Mont Pelèrin Society is, or perhaps have heard of the Atlas Foundation, or the Liberty Fund, or the Mercatus Institute, or Heritage Action, the Ethics and Public Policy Center or the Federalist Society.⁷

Nonetheless, to be fair, mobilization of the term ‘neoliberalism’ has grown uncomfortably sloppy amongst a subset of those on the Left. Broadsides have equated it to laissez-faire economics, market fundamentalism, libertarianism, globalization, biopolitics, financialization, …; thus the category may thus seem a frightful hodgepodge to those encountering it for the first time. But the semantic slippage extends far beyond the precincts of mud-slinging and slander. Even those authors who do make the effort of scholarly study of the NTC and come to understand its activities tend not to describe it in uniform terms, which induces frustration in those in search of simple straightforward definitions. For instance, when Wendy

---

⁷ This borders on unforgivable given the outpouring of good recent work describing these entities. For the Federalist Society, see (Hollis-Brusky, 2017); for the Atlas Foundation see (Djelic & Mousavi, forthcoming).
Brown writes about neoliberals, she highlights their agency in the political suppression and nullification of democracy. Melinda Cooper carefully documents how neoliberals have redefined gender and familial issues as the imposition of marital dependence as a prerequisite for the dismantling of the social welfare state. Illana Gershon has championed the Foucauvian approach to neoliberalism as the elevation of entrepreneurialism of the self, and reveals how it works both online and in job search.\(^8\) Will Davies started out describing neoliberalism as the disenchantment of politics by means of economics; but of late, he has argued that its conception of government has transmogrified from an earlier normative stance to one that is now openly punitive towards the impoverished and other nationalities.\(^9\) Rob van Horn has been indefatigable in his histories of the law and economics literature, and the ways in which neoliberals upended older liberal economic pieties, such as opposition to monopoly and skepticism towards intellectual property.\(^10\)

From an Olympian perspective, none of these characterizations strictly contradicts any of the others; but to an outsider, it may sometimes seem that the n-word ‘neoliberalism’ encountered in these literatures signifies way too many diverse things to too many different people. Many on the left seem not able to shake the suspicion that anything passing as ‘neoliberalism’ must be straightforwardly an economics god masquerading as a political god. This is compounded by pervasive confusions concerning the contents of different schools of economic doctrine, ranging from the conflation of the entire neoclassical school with neoliberalism, to repression of the fact that appeals to the “economy” as prime mover of politics itself must be conditional upon some distinct school of economic theory. Those hostile to the neoliberal concept in favor of a simple alternative appeal to ‘capitalism’ writ large thus unwittingly engage in the very conceptual slovenliness that they seek to pin on their opponents.

I doubt if I could make headway to cajole the hardened Left deniers of the legitimacy of neoliberalism as a political category; but I will try to mitigate the creeping sense of unease by addressing the fundamental worry that ‘Neoliberalism’ is a portmanteologism, a fluffy ragbag of anything the Left wants to stuff into it. As I have suggested, the new scholarly literature is rich and suggestive, but it seems to persistently overlook one major common denominator of the NTC in particular, a fact which I find a little odd. Of the scholars cited above, few have been

---

\(^8\) Brown (2015); Cooper (2017); Gershon (2011a;2011b).
\(^9\) Davies (2014; 2016).
\(^10\) Van Horn (2009); van Horn & Klaes (2011).
willing to fully take on board the notion that neoliberalism is not simply or exclusively an economic doctrine; at a deeper level, it is primarily a philosophical credo, which then gets elaborated through a potpourri of economic and political doctrines depending upon geography and political circumstance.\textsuperscript{11} The unity of the NTC derives primarily from its epistemological convictions and its organizational structures; its apparent diversity comes with the multiplicity of tenets of economics and politics which can be reconciled within it. In the first instance, it is not an epiphenomenon of some crude apologetics for the capitalist class; it turns out to be far more than that.

2. How Neoliberalism rendered Socialism Impossible

What is the philosophy which holds the neoliberal project together? It is first and foremost an image of mankind as rather slovenly and undependable cognitive agents, who can barely access their own internal principles of ratiocination. This may seem a rather bleak perspective on the human prospect, dating back to the 1920s loss of faith in the rationality of the masses in the social sciences, popularized by journalists and intellectuals such as Walter Lippmann.\textsuperscript{12} The way that many post-WWII social sciences managed to square the circle was to posit the emancipation of men from this state of confusion and superstition by means of ‘science’, and consequently through the instrumentality of the scientific experts that would guide and supplement the polity. This reliance upon the technocratic experts tended to resonate with the ambitions of mid-century socialists, who pictured themselves as imposing a rationality upon the economy through ‘planning’, the premier technique for compelling order in an inherently disorderly world.

The hallmark of the Neoliberal Thought Collective was that they more or less accepted the inherited image of an addled and befuddled populace, but thoroughly rejected any appeals to a scientific technocracy to instill some discipline in the masses. For them, the discombobulated

\textsuperscript{11} This is directly contradictory to the supposedly useful ‘descriptive shell’ of neoliberalism proposed by (Venugopal, 2015, p.182): “A broad indicator of the historical turn in macro-political economy.” When someone on the left suggests neoliberalism is elementary, it is time to put that book down. See (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009).

\textsuperscript{12} See (Purcell, 1973; Lippmann, 1937). Back in those days, it was the pragmatists like John Dewey who battled this tendency. Contemporary Philosophers have been less active in the forefront of modern resistance to neoliberalism, unfortunately. Perhaps this is one reason the modern literature on Foucault has grown so contentious of late.
masses were not a prescription for despair, but rather the necessary compost out of which a spontaneous order might blossom. The primary way this would come to pass was through acknowledgement that “The Market” was an information processor more powerful and more efficacious than any human being was or could ever be. The cretinous and nescient would propose; the market would dispose. In effect, the NTC believed if only the masses could learn to subordinate their ambitions and desires to market dictates, then their deficient understandings and flawed syllogisms could be regarded as convenient expediants smoothing the path to order, rather than as a political obstacle to be overcome, as in the technocratic orientation of postwar social sciences. And, conveniently, the Thought Collective would mobilize numerous institutional structures to nudge it down that path.

This innovation in the definition of the market was unprecedented in intellectual history, and became the bulwark from which the attack on socialism was launched. It cannot be stressed enough that prior to the 1930s markets had been portrayed as many things—police-governed confined areas for merchant activity; pipes through which a liquid ‘value’ sloshed throughout the system; engines for the generation of a generic ‘surplus’; balances between forces of sellers and buyers; and in neoclassical economics, an analog for mechanics—but never before had they been defined primarily as an engine for epistemic truth. The impact of this innovation only began to revise the microeconomic core of economic doctrines later, with a substantial lag.13

Although the NTC was composed of a diversity of thinkers, this key redefinition of the market explains why Friedrich Hayek is still treated as *primus inter pares* among the cognoscenti. It was Hayek who was first to seriously promote the market as information processor; and he was first to realize this would provide a refutation of socialism that would handily fit on a 3x5 card. For him, socialist planning presupposed the planner knew more than the market; since that was impossible, so, too was socialist economics. It was this first commandment which spawned many of the other attitudes of the NTC, such as its uninhibited contempt for intellectuals (Hayek’s “second hand dealers in ideas”), ridicule of experts, and disparagement of education in general. Others chimed in, after their own fashion. For instance, few remember that the single cause Milton Friedman felt so passionately about that he bequeathed his entire fortune to support it, was the privatization and debasement of public schools. Much of George Stigler’s work was based upon a notion of optimal ignorance of the

---

13 For more on this, see (Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017).
masses. Milton Friedman, as usual, dumbed down the Hayekian message for those with limited attention spans:

Businessmen, who may be bankrupted if they refuse to face facts, are one of the few groups that develop the habit of doing so. That is why, I have discovered repeatedly, the successful businessman is more open to new ideas… than the academic intellectual who prides himself on his alleged independence of thought.

I can understand why those on the Left might be more fascinated by neoliberal structures of governmentality, or neoliberalism’s impact upon identity politics involving gender or race, or its conception of the entrepreneurial self; however, if you leave this root ‘political epistemology’ out of your account, basically, you have omitted the essence of the neoliberal project. Another key MPS member, James Buchanan, was quite explicit about this when addressing his brethren:

Professionally, economists have dominated the membership of the [MPS] Society from its founding, but the whole thrust of the Society, as initially expressed in its founding documents, has been toward elaborating the philosophical ideas without which a free society cannot exist. That is to say, political philosophy is what this Society has been, is, and ought to be all about.

This tendency on the Left, to avoid confrontation with the foundational nature of philosophy in the architecture of the NTC, and consequently, to foster a predisposition to become mired in a general disinclination to understand the fundamental principles of an explicitly neoliberal economics, has led to the general dissatisfaction with the very notion of a neoliberal political project. That is, the antipathy towards neoliberalism on the Left is due to a bad case of epistemology aversion. If opponents had instead come equipped to have been more attuned to its central significance, they might have come to appreciate viscerally why socialism no longer seems a viable project in contemporary society. Such an appreciation would start with an acknowledgement that the main motive behind the socialist imperative in its many guises was to impose ‘rationality’ upon a putatively irrational and destructive market system. From Robert Owen to Sismondi through Marx and thence through the Labor Party, the Social Democrats and the various Internationales, and well into the 20th century with Christian socialists like Karl

---

14 For Friedman, see the Milton Friedman Foundation, which recently changed its name to EdChoice: https://www.edchoice.org/. For Stigler, see (Nik-Khah, 2015; Mirowski, 2013, pp.76 et seq.)
15 (Friedman, 1978, pp. xi, xiii).
16 James Buchanan, Address to the 1984 MPS meeting, pp.1-2; copy in the Liberaal Archief, Ghent Belgium. Buchanan’s attitudes are further discussed in (MacLean, 2017).
Polanyi, the argument was generally based upon an Enlightenment conviction that markets produced debilitating consequences that could only be rectified by intelligent planning and intervention.\textsuperscript{17} The nature of those interventions, of course, were all over the map—from ‘market socialists’ tinkering around the edges to restore markets to their ‘true’ functions, to political defense of real wages, to full socialization of the means of production and their operation by some state entity—but what held them all together was the conviction that human intentionality and quest for the truth would underwrite the Kantian assumption of rational self-determination of the populace. They conjectured that brutish and depraved suppression of the masses would give way before enlightened policies, in the fullness of time. Socialism was thus enshrined as the principle of autonomy and liberty writ large.

The neoliberal philosophy developed over the decades since the 1940s constituted a profound break from this entire tradition, with the divorce leaving Enlightenment conceptions of reform stranded, hollow and ineffectual. Neoliberals came to hive ‘liberty’ off from autonomy and Kantian self-determination; and the way they achieved this was to shift the center of gravity of epistemology. The decisive move was to question whether people legitimately could tell if they were ‘free’. If, as already suggested, the vast mass of people were deemed not cognitively capable of rational self-determination,\textsuperscript{18} then the only arbiter of dependable knowledge in a neoliberal world devolves to the market. Furthermore, older attempts to offset any such cognitive debility by means of state-supported education, public libraries and broadcast outlets, were to be dismantled and debased into privatized get-rich-quick schemes. The notion that one might strive to take the future in hand and bend it to your will was treated as a species of delusion that had to be wrung out of the population (although, significantly, not out of the card-carrying members of the NTC itself). Hayek himself loudly and repeatedly sought to banish the ‘rationalist’ element from earlier liberalism. Instead, the planner was to be supplanted by the figure of the entrepreneur, relegated to bask in the unknowable risk of a chaotic future, prostrating himself before the inscrutable Market with its Delphic valuations. Education, culture, and the whole panoply of signifying gestures no longer were thought to have any political function in a

\textsuperscript{17} See, for instance, (Landauer, 1959). The history of different notions of rationality leading to different political programs, written from the vantage point of a Frankfurt School orientation, see (Jay, 2016).

\textsuperscript{18} “Learning from experience among men no less than among animals is a process not primarily of reasoning but of the observance, spreading, transmission and development of practices.” (Hayek, 1973, p.18).
democracy, and so became demoted to little more than meaningless diversions in the marketplace of ideas, lumps of ‘human capital’ (or infotainment) that might or might not be indifferently purchased. ‘Freedom’ thus was forced onto the Procrustean Bed of market activity; ‘truth’ became unmoored from argumentation.

It was a mistake to claim that socialism had been empirically refuted in such a world, since ‘facts’ could no longer be taken for granted, at least when it came to the neoliberals. (Political failure was a different matter.) What happened instead was that socialism was stripped of any rational philosophical basis; the erstwhile ambitions of socialist political movements no longer made any sense in the brave new neoliberal framework. It would be one thing if socialist intervention failed provisionally due to a lack of understanding of fundamentally knowable social structures; it would be a different washout altogether if it failed due to *hubris*, in seeking to comprehend something that could never be fully known to *homo sapiens*. From this perspective, socialism has nothing to accomplish, and can be dismissed as relic from an earlier era in which magical powers of ratiocination were thought to be the natural endowment of all humankind.

I hope my readers can begin to see that, once such a world view began to enjoy a beachhead in modern culture, then the next fortification to fall was older notions of ‘truth’. While one might explore this consequence from many perspectives, it might serve to set the current inquiry in motion by accessing the standard Philosophy 101 definition as “justified true belief”. For a neoliberal, any notions of ‘justification’ based upon internal cognition of the agent in question would be undependable at minimum, and superfluous in most cases. As we have already observed, Milton Friedman was convinced truth as correspondence to a mind-independent reality was more or less absent in those who devoted their life to intellectual pursuits. Hayek propounded a theory of mind where rationality was not the result of conscious self-criticism. In short, when truth came to be defined as “whatever sells”, then it ceases to exert any independent regulatory force in epistemology. It is necessary to insist the neoliberals pioneered this ‘relativism’ long before the advent of postmodernism. However much they might protest that they hearken back to the 18th century in political philosophy, in practice a major consequence of the neoliberal doctrine is a full-throated repudiation of the Enlightenment project. Some on the Left have suggested this in the recent past. Here, for example, is the rueful observation of George Lakoff:
Also, within traditional liberalism you have a history of rational thought that was born out of the Enlightenment: all meanings should be literal, and everything should follow logically. So if you just tell people the facts, that should be enough - the truth shall set you free. All people are fully rational, so if you tell them the truth, they should reach the right conclusions. That, of course, has been a disaster.\(^\text{19}\)

One important consequence of this repudiation is the precept that one should always deal with the political mobilization of the populace governed by the proviso that they are inherently epistemically challenged, and adjust political tactics to make full use of their deficiencies. Given that this is a direct implication of the core doctrines of neoliberalism, it is not merely garden-variety cynical manipulation or an age-old resort to propaganda: rather, it is a direct corollary of the precept that the market is a superior information processor. It took the NTC a while to take this precept to heart;\(^\text{20}\) but now it has proven central to almost all of their political activities. But more importantly, it is a doctrine that it seems the contemporary Left cannot take seriously, much less confront its existence; and this, I believe, is one major motive behind the denial of the very existence of a Neoliberal project. Whatever their political stripe, most of that Left is apparently still locked into the Enlightenment conception of epistemology, and cannot imagine themselves stranded in a world so barren of graspable truth. Only a very few figures opposed to neoliberalism have sought to speculate how one should pursue politics in this kind of cognition-vacated zone. More than a decade ago, George Lakoff, for one, sought to mimic one of the hallmark practices of the NTC by founding a think tank to discuss and evaluate how politics from the Left should respond to a vertiginous world where truth is so slippery. While not endorsing his particular resort to neuropsychology and his ‘moral scripts’ as adequate theoretical resources, it is nonetheless indicative that his attempt to raise the question did not garner any traction amongst the Left: his Rockridge Institute was forced to close in April 2008, due to a lack of funding.

\(^{19}\) George Lakoff in (Powell, 2003). This comment was made almost 15 years ago. See also Matt Taibbi: “A lot of us have this idea that the truth has a kind of magical power, that if the truth is out there it will convince the country to unite behind it. But this isn't so. People can simply decide to not believe a version of events now. They can shop for information the same way they'd shop for everything else, and they pick the reality they find most pleasing.” At: [http://www.vox.com/conversations/2017/2/1/14412450/donald-trump-matt-taibbi-elections-2016-hillary-clinton-media](http://www.vox.com/conversations/2017/2/1/14412450/donald-trump-matt-taibbi-elections-2016-hillary-clinton-media).

\(^{20}\) On early dissention within MPS, see (Mirowski, 2013, pp. 70-72). The development of a conscious policy of agnotology has been documented in the history of science literature as the forging of the ‘tobacco strategy’ in the 1950s, and its later application to issues such as global warming, Star Wars, and much else. On this, see (Oreskes & Conway, 2010).
Strangely, it is the NTC that nurtures a much better appreciation of the relationship of ideas to praxis than the nominal Left. The NTC builds out intercalated organizations to work from central doctrinal principles to targeted specialized interventions, informed by basic philosophical convictions. In other words, they resort to intentional coordination to offset any cognitive deficits within their own ranks. Their alignments of individual components are strong because they depend for funding and support and manpower from the contiguous organizations: for instance, MPS □ Heritage □ Heritage Action □ Fox News, or MPS □ Cato Institute □ Kochpac □ Competitive Enterprise Institute □ Fueling US Forward 21, or The Fed → Harvard Law → Federalist Society → Bush Justice Dept. → Supreme Court, 22 with separate organizations dedicated to searching out new recruits to man the barricades. Organizational interlock produces intellectual consonance. The Left, by contrast, depends upon a few rogue individual intellectual entrepreneurs briefly to concoct free-standing and failing ‘Institutes’ that half-heartedly ‘retail’ this or that idea, with the fickle blessing of one or two rich patrons. They seem to believe in a species of ‘spontaneous order’ in the realm of ideas, which is one reason for their abysmal track record.

Vague denunciations of neoliberalism have proven sadly inadequate in our current Age of Trump. The time has come to explore how neoliberal epistemology has had immediate consequences for political organization on the ground. In this talk, I will cover three possible repercussions for the future of political mobilization: the paralysis of contemporary Marxism; the fortification of fake news in social media; and the degradation of modern science.

3. How Neoliberalism rendered Marxism Untenable

It is no accident that the majority of those on the Left who denounce Neoliberalism as lacking solidity tend to be either avowed Marxists, or lean upon Marxist concepts to underpin their alternative political scenarios. As one might suspect, Marxists are inclined to look down on discussions of philosophy or political theory as dangerously coquetting with idealism; once one understands the basic operations of capitalism, they say, it doesn’t really matter what stories their

21 See (Tabuchi, 2017; Mayer, 2016). Kochpac is the political action committee of Koch Industries.
22 See https://www.biography.com/people/neil-gorsuch-020617
opponents tell. They also affect a rather tough-minded attitude that it only matters how ideas are used tactically, not how they may structure perceptions of reality. In this latter respect, I think we might take them at their word, and ask: just how effective have they been in countering the neoliberal onslaught over the last few decades? With a little bit of background, I believe that we might come to see the residual Marxism of the Left turns out to be a big part of the problem, because anyone committed to Marxist categories cannot in good conscience admit that Neoliberalism really exists, much less mount a serious opposition to it.

The beginning of political wisdom is to appreciate that Neoliberalism as a doctrine was constructed with the intent to be a universal solvent that collapses Marxism from within. While the history of Marxism has been at least as varied as that of neoclassical economics, or indeed neoliberalism itself, it nevertheless depends on a certain common denominator of theoretical categories: “labor” certainly; historical materialism; surplus value; exploitation; class and proletariat; modes of production; and perhaps alienation. While different subsets of Marxists hold varying degrees of allegiance to each individual concept, they are all united behind the existence of laws of the economy, which depend upon the extraction of surplus value from the proletariat in production, and the circulation of value through the market which creates the preconditions for further surplus extraction. Sometimes the labor theory of value is accorded even greater significance, as revealing the mechanism by which capitalism will undermine its own operation. Most Marxists will admit their doctrines were historically rooted in classical political economy, which itself sought laws of value grounded in the production process, also believed in a falling rate of profit, and generally also were predicated upon exclusive economic class distinctions. Some Marxists appeal to the young Marx and notions of alienation to explain the perceptions of the different classes, and most intently, the mindset of the proletariat.

One way to criticize Marxism is to point out that conceptions of value in economics have moved on dramatically since the middle of the 19th century: it is rare for contemporary economists to propound that physical production is the fons et origo of economic value; and

---

23 See, for instance, (Heideman, 2014): “with a theory of capitalism that emphasizes the way the structure of the system makes it both necessary and very difficult for most people to organize to advance their interests, it becomes very easy to explain the persistence of a low level of popular mobilization against neoliberalism in the context of a weakened left.” One might suspect Heideman might at least regret part of his review now: “the Republican Party, while capable of enacting all kinds of sadistic policies on the state level, has remained in a state of disarray on the national level since the 2006 congressional elections.”

24 See (Dunn, 2016). This, of course, abstracts away the work of Gramsci and of the Frankfurt School.
worse still, the very notion that value is a substance that somehow inhabits the commodity in its peregrinations is so obsolete that it is found almost nowhere anymore in modern culture. Another way to criticize Marx is to point out the inconsistencies internal to his system. The roster of logical contradictions is well-known to the point of tedium: the transformation problem; the absence of lockstep progression in the modes of production; the problems of the reproduction of labor power; the indeterminate definition of abstract labor; the flaws in the systems of expanded reproduction, and so forth. All of these complaints have some legitimacy; but that is not the orientation of my current objections. Instead, I want to insist that, once a neoliberal world view takes hold, all the Marxist categories are ruthlessly emptied out of their cogency, and it literally becomes impossible to think like a Marxist.

Let us start with the central term, “labor”. Historically, from Locke onwards, ‘labor’ was the human activity which both created and justified private property, and grounded natural ‘rights’. Hence, in Marx, it is the core precept behind the very notion of ‘exploitation’, that is, an unjust annexation of the fruits of labor. But the neoliberals have utterly repudiated that entire tradition, beginning with MPS member Gary Becker’s concept of ‘human capital’. Human capital obliterates labor by reducing everything a person does to tendentious manifestations of capital, and erases any residuum of the ‘labor process’. Human capital lays waste to classical distinctions between production and circulation to such an extent that there no longer is any marxisant ‘labor process’; all there is left is a fragmented self who is at once the business, the raw material, the product, the clientele and the customer of her own life. There exists nothing more than a jumble of assets to be invested, managed and developed; and an inventory of liabilities to be pruned, outsourced, shorted, and minimized. Indeed, the very human self disappears up its non-existent pilot; not to mention it losing track of distinct boundaries vis-à-vis other selves. Rather than congealed labor, ‘capital’ gets confused with anything that can be

25 In an early work (Mirowski, 1989), I argued that there was an internal contradiction in Marx’s theory of value itself—sometimes it was analytically treated like an embodied substance; and in other instances, as a virtual ‘field’ concept. This did not indict Marx for an oversight, but rather attempted to situate him in a larger cultural transformation of the meaning of value during his lifetime. For a more conventional bill of indictment, see (Howard & King, 1985).

26 Here I refer to Becker’s practice of inscribing the welfare of others in the supposedly individual ‘utility function’. Outside of Becker, this also explains the fondness of orthodox mathematical models for single agent setups.
priced, and is certainly never denominated in ‘hours’. In short, ‘labor’ ceases to exist as a distinct category, leaving the Marxist seriously at sea.27

Neoliberals possess an arsenal of arguments that socialism cannot even exist as a political category; those were covered in the previous section. The strident insistence that no such entity as ‘society’ exists, coupled with the consequent fragmentation of the individual self, renders the very notion of economic or social classes without any identifiable referent.28 In any event, the further innovation of the so-called ‘sharing economy’ makes it very hard for any individual to regard themselves as a member of the proletariat—that is, if they were not already revulsed by the very possibility in the first place. Everyone is just efficiently monetizing their meagre stock of ‘capital’. There appears to be no separate ‘capitalist class’ as such.

But it is the core philosophical tenet of the market as superior information processor that delivers the final coup de grace to any Marxist argument. It is widely understood that Marx was an advocate of a much older (almost Aristotelian) image of the market as a machine that simply moves commodities around to their ‘more natural’ place. It was absolutely central to Marx’s precept that profit was not generated in exchange, only in production. At most, market exchange might shift surplus value around between industries to equalize profit rates in competition (and thus produce the transformation problem); but never actually augment or diminish the total magnitude of value in the system. Without the erstwhile foundational metaphor of the market as big conveyor belt, combined with a separate distinct sphere of production, most of the major theoretical lessons of the Marxist system would be irrevocably lost. There is no such thing as Marxist ‘exploitation’ if profit can be generated de novo by simple exchange.29

Here is where the metamorphosis of the market into information processor sounds the death knell. If the market primarily deals in ‘ideas’ or ‘information’, then Marxism is unceremoniously sidelined, if only because the Marxist tradition has suffered serial insecurity about how to deal with those entities. Believers in historical materialism used to pride themselves in their insistence that most intellectual activity was simply relegated to the

27 ‘Labor and value have become bio-political in the sense that living and producing tend to become indistinguishable… [the biopolitical] undermine all traditional mechanisms of accounting” (Hart & Negri, 2004, p. 148).
28 Wendy Brown (2016) discusses how Foucault’s discussion of neoliberalism directly rules out any Marxian approach to capitalism, particularly with regard to concepts of truth.
29 “today, in the paradigm of immaterial production, the theory of value cannot be conceived in terms of measured quantities of time, and so exploitation cannot be understood in these terms” (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p.150).
‘superstructure’, and as such, was mere artifact of the so-called mode of production of the real economy. Yet, even if they were more catholic than that when it came to matters of the intellect, all sorts of things now dubbed ‘services’ were deemed as existing outside the Marxist laws of the economy; Marx himself in *Capital* treated all manner of processes of circulation, accounting, finance and so forth as ‘unproductive’ of value. The very notion of a market engaged in the conveyance, and god forbid, validation of ideas, was never even remotely considered an option in this frame. After all, what would be the ‘labor value’ of a spurious idea, either in hours or more abstract labor? Keep in mind this was not to be determined by its use value, but rather, the amount of labor that went into its conception.

The portrait of the market as information processor, with its attendant notions of the “knowledge economy”, turned out to be antipathetic to any Marxist framing of the market. Thus it follows that once Neoliberals came to dominate the cultural discourse about the nature of the market, which had solidified by the turn of the millennium, some Marxists finally registered that their entire world view was under attack. A few of the more famous, such as Michael Hart and Antonio Negri, admitted that in this new world, “the temporal unity of labor as the basic measure of value today makes no sense,” 30 and then proceeded to theorize something they and many in the Autonomist Marxist movement call “cognitive capitalism”. 31 This involved positing a novel type of ‘mode of production’ never before imagined in Marx, with almost all of the key Marxist terms such as ‘exploitation’ and ‘capital’ revised beyond all recognition. This, in turn, has given rise to a large literature, which I shall not attempt to summarize here.

An intellectual historian realizes that all schools of thought perforce attempt accommodations to changing circumstances. That is not the substance of the current complaint. The points I would like to make about these particular developments are: [1] The felt need to theorize a ‘cognitive capitalism’ was a direct response to the acid impact of neoliberalism upon the heritage of an older Marxism; [2] by all evidence, the Autonomist movement and their fellow travelers did not fully understand the fundamental role of neoliberalism in their discomfort, compounding an earlier doctrinal disconnect; and therefore [3] ended up in an uninformed attempt to graft various neoliberal theoretical concepts (‘information economy’, ‘rent-seeking’) onto a prior Marxist tradition, with almost no appreciation of the havoc they wrought upon the

31 See (Hart & Negri, 2004; Moulier-Boutang, 2012; Wark, 2015) and for critique (Caffentzis, 2013).
very economic logic of the Marxian theory; which in turn led to [4] a largely directionless literature of critique of such revisionism, which has misunderstood what is at stake in its quest to ‘save’ Marxism from the Autonomist wave. One wonders, for instance, if they even realize their flirtation with theories of ‘rent-seeking’ are pale echoes of the original Virginia School of the NTC\(^{32}\). Or worse, can they appreciate the perilous consequences of their naive appeals to ‘openness’: “One approach to understanding the democracy of the multitude, then, is as an open source society.”\(^ {33}\) The rather sad maxim drawn from this sequence of events is that, when critics of the literature on neoliberalism simply presume that Marxism constitutes a viable alternative account of recent economic developments, they need to get in touch with the Bigger Picture of intellectual history before they rest content in their complacency.

4. The Rise of Fake News

After the election of Donald Trump, both bloggers and the legacy media underwent a paroxysm of anguish and distress over the existence of something they started calling ‘fake news’. In the scrum of post-election commentary, any number of individuals and newspapers took up the term and then attempted to impose their own idiosyncratic definition, all the while suggesting that something profound had just been discovered. For some, it was shorthand for the capacities of the nefarious Russians interfering with the election; for others, it was a symptom of the final collapse of the mainstream media, which had been festering for a decade or so; for others, it signified the advent of a ‘post-truth’ era brought about by social media;\(^ {34}\) for yet others, there was the glimmer that something about the Internet had changed the very way that people encountered the news and its interpretations. Almost no one framed this as a crisis in epistemology; but none of the just-in-time journalists and bloggers should be expected to engage the topic at that level of sophistication.

We shall shortly return to the problem of definition, but before that, it will be instructive to note, just as in the case of neoliberalism itself, a number of self-identified Left writers jumped in the fray to insist that this sinister entity ‘fake news’ did not really exist. I quote a few representative instances below.

---

\(^{32}\) See, for instance, (Buchanan, 2001, p.60).


\(^{34}\) See (Ball, 2017; boyd, 2017; Bolotnikova, 2016). And that is just the ‘B’s.
I think this discussion about fake news is largely a bunch of bullshit. It’s become this category, nobody knows exactly what it means, and it’s become applied to everything from stuff that’s intentionally deceptive to stuff where people are trying to get the answer right but they get something wrong. …I never use the term ‘fake news’.  

[Left writers] also don’t seem to know how we entered this post-fact world or when the factual age, which must have preceded it, ended. Was it in the 2000s, when the whole world debated imaginary weapons of mass destruction before being conned into war? Or was it in the 1990s, when the Lewinsky scandal dominated newspapers, and the United States panicked over superpredators and crack babies? Perhaps it was really Reagan’s 1980s, with its secret, Central American wars, the Iran-Contra scandal, and the denial of the AIDS epidemic. Or maybe we need to go back even further: to Nixon’s not-a-crook 1970s, to George Wallace’s law-and-order 1960s, or to McCarthy’s red baiting 1950s. As it happens, the facts simply don’t support the diagnosis that we have suddenly entered a post-factual landscape. Reactionary panics, collective hysteria, and political manipulation have been with us for a long time, and we should be skeptical of claims about the epidemic of Russian-backed fake news or the idea that social media lost Hillary the election. In fact, liberals’ nostalgia for factual politics seems designed to mask their own fraught relationship with the truth. 

Does the reader begin to appreciate the parallels to previous sections? Something seems to crop up that appears to unnerve and wrong-foot the political Left; and the response forthcoming is to deny that the phenomenon ‘really’ exists, and opine that, “Fake news is but one symptom of a shift back to historical norms, and recent hyperventilating mimics reactions from the past.” The similarities of Left reactions to neoliberalism and fake news as real phenomena are doubly intriguing, because the repetition explicitly concerns the weaknesses of their own Enlightenment epistemology that so many are so loathe to address. And to top it off, once the members of the NTC smell blood, so they jump right in and agree with this Left sentiment, exposing them to further embarrassment: “Fake news is just another fake excuse for their failed agenda.” Donald Trump, quick on the social media uptake, in his January 11th 2017 news conference, accused CNN of being “fake news”. Since then, the ‘fake news’ epithet has originated increasingly from the Right, while those on the left dither and deny.

It has long been standard operating practice that the Right appropriates terminology from their opponents to quickly turn it around in a tu quoque launched as reproach, in part to distract

---

36 (Stahl & Hansen, 2016).
37 (Uberti, 2016).
38 Laura Ingraham, quoted in (Peters, 2016).
attention from their original sins. It happened with the term ‘political correctness’, and with ‘identity politics,’ and now it has happened with “fake news.” The fact they have been nimble in the expropriation of epithets does not discount the fact that there may nonetheless be something here that is revealing about the core beliefs of the Neoliberal Thought Collective.

I will here advocate that the way to escape this rather uninformative free-for-all is to situate the phenomenon of fake news squarely within the Neoliberal project, propose that the solution to the imbroglio is not a redoubled dose of more so-called ‘fact-checking’, but rather analysis of how organizational structures meld with their characteristic reification of the market as superior information processor to produce a weaponized version of discombobulation. One can only agree with the founder of the dedicated fact-checking website Snopes, who has said, “Fake news was [originally] a term specifically about people who purposely fabricated stories for clicks and revenue. Now it includes bad reporting, slanted journalism and outright propaganda. And I think we’re doing a disservice to lump all those things together.” 39

Recall that Neoliberalism is predicated upon the observation that most humans are one or two bottles shy of a sixpack, when it comes to rational thought. Hence, anyone who had read Hayek, such as Cass Sunstein, long ago projected that the Internet would promote the isolation of people within their own filter bubbles, and that this might have implications for the way politics would play out in the future. 40 Sunstein’s reading of the situation was characteristically superficial, leading to his own prescription that people might be ‘nudged’ toward certain political activities without realizing that they were being manipulated by their political overlords. Others, starting from the same premise, took the position that the Internet just naturally tended to degenerate into dreck, especially because so much of it came to depend upon ‘user generated content [UCG]’. 41 Neoliberals don’t mind blaming any debilitating epistemic fallout on the agents themselves, because it reinforces the message that the market just gives the masses whatever they want. But here is where some on the left attempt to push back. Evgeny Morozov, for one, insists that the onus should be placed squarely on the economic organization of the platforms that structure Internet activity. While this points us in a promising direction to understand the neoliberal character of fake news, the indictment may still be misleading: Is the

39 David Mikkelson, quoted in (Peters, 2016). This seems also the position of (Ball, 2017).
40 See, for example, (Sunstein, 2007).
41 See (Feldman, 2016a).
dumbing down of the populace a mere unintended natural consequence of the pursuit of profit, an unfortunate by-product of progress, or is it something else?

The documentary-maker Adam Curtis has been warning us that something much larger and more pervasive has been going on well before the contemporary moment of frenzy over post-truth; as he puts it, "We live with a constant vaudeville of contradictory stories that makes it impossible for any real opposition to emerge, because they can't counter it with a coherent narrative of their own." Curtis finds one incisive theoretical discussion of the new regime in the work of the Russian Vladimir Surkov:

[The pervasive] defeatist response has become a central part of a new system of political control - and to understand how this is happening you have to look to Russia and to a man called Vladislav Surkov who is a hero of our time. Surkov is one of President Putin's advisors and has helped him maintain his power for fifteen years, but he has done it in a very new way. He came originally from the avant-garde art world, and those who have studied his career say that what Surkov has done is import ideas from conceptual art into the very heart of politics.

His aim is to undermine people's perception of the world so they never know what is really happening. Surkov turned Russian politics into a bewildering, constantly-changing piece of theatre: he sponsored all kinds of groups, from Neo-Nazi skin-heads to liberal human rights groups, he even backed parties that were opposed to President Putin. But the key thing was that Surkov then let it be known that this was what he was doing, which meant that no one was sure what was real or fake.

As one journalist put it, "It's a strategy of power that keeps any opposition constantly confused, a ceaseless shape-shifting that is unstoppable because its indefinable," which is exactly what Surkov is alleged to have done in the Ukraine this year. In typical fashion as the war began Surkov published a short story about something he called Non-Linear War, a war where you never know what the enemy are really up to or even who they are. The underlying aim Surkov says is not to win the war but to use the conflict to create a constant state of destabilized perception in order to manage and control.

Here Curtis suggests the approach derives from the traditions of 1980s conceptual art; but in his earlier films, he had sought the inspirations in political developments of neoliberalism. While one sector of recent punditry (at least in the US in 2017) seeks to pin the practice of ‘fake

---

42 The quote comes from his most recent film “Hypernormalization”, which can be found in the archive of his films at thoughtmaybe.com.
43 Transcript from Adam Curtis’ film “Oh Dearism”. For more on Surkov, see (Pomerantsev, 2014). Surkov likes to invoke the new postmodern texts just translated into Russian, “the breakdown of grand narratives, the impossibility of truth, how everything is only “simulacrum” and “simulacra”... and then in the next moment he says how he despises relativism and loves conservatism, before quoting Allen Ginsberg’s “Sunflower Sutra,” in English and by heart.”
44 See, in particular “the Trap” (2007) and “The Century of the Self” (2005).
news’ on the Russians, in a manner similar to Curtis, it may be more precise and more comprehensive to regard its advent as a distinctly global phenomenon, with earlier roots.\textsuperscript{45} Of course, falsehoods, propaganda and misinformation have been with us since time immemorial; but what Curtis and others point towards is something far more insidious than Orwell’s Ministry of Truth. Once the neoliberal image of the market as both means of conveyance and validation of ideas took hold, then it consequently shaped and informed changes in the very means and conduct of argumentation in general. Befuddlement became an active political strategy very different from the top-down broadcast model of early 20\textsuperscript{th} century ‘propaganda’. The recent fondness for Orwell’s 1984 turns out to be another red herring. Rather, these days, disinformation is predicated upon the creation of a fog of confusion and disillusion, and less directly promoted by straightforward media manipulation (the bugaboo of the nostalgic left) than the harvesting through social media of the inchoate folderol of the general populace, subsequently feeding it back to the masses through social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter and new model ‘journalism’. Dissimulation has been channeled to become its own special ‘spontaneous disorder’.

While there have been technological developments which fostered this innovation, it is far more important to understand the political theory which underpins this New World Disorder. Conveniently, discussions of what the adherence to their doctrine of a marketplace of ideas would mean for public media and the provision of news and entertainment happened to have been topics of deep concern for many members of the early Mont Pelèrin Society. Here I will just briefly give a taste of four such deliberations, to suggest the possible continuities between the NTC and more recent developments in social media. I shall briefly touch on the work of Leo Strauss, Ronald Coase, James Buchanan and George Stigler.

Strauss was not a member of the MPS, but did have substantial interactions with Hayek and other neoliberals during his tenure at Chicago.\textsuperscript{46} The shared presuppositions of Strauss and someone like Hayek do seem substantial, at first glance. As Edward Banfield wrote, “It was evident to Strauss that men have not become wiser than they were in the past and that no amount of enlightenment can ever bridge the natural gulf between the wise and the unwise.”\textsuperscript{47} This was

\textsuperscript{45} For a similar argument, see (Mejias & Vokuev, 2017).
\textsuperscript{46} His importance for the neoliberals is suggested in my “Political Movement that Dared not Speak,” op cit.
\textsuperscript{47} (Banfield, 1991, p.496).
the epistemic position of many members of the MPS, such as the later Hayek, or George Stigler. Strauss was deeply concerned that liberalism had great trouble in justifying its own normative commitments, a worry he shared with Hayek, Buchanan and other MPS members. Strauss was suspicious of grounding politics in scientific knowledge, as had been Hayek in his wartime work *The Counter-revolution of Science* (1952). But more to the point, Strauss was deeply pessimistic concerning the self-sufficiency of human reason to guarantee political progress.

The most notorious doctrine of Strauss, and the one clearly relevant to our concern with fake news, is his claims about the place of esotericism in the theory of politics. Strauss started out reading ancient authors such as Maimonides and Spinoza in the late 1930s, considering the conflict between the dictates of revelation and the claims of reason in political thought. In his key essays collected together as *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (1952), he argued that when reading these pre-modern thinkers, it is necessary to read between the lines. He argued those writers were concerned with the conflict between the quest for truth and the strictures of society; they may seem to argue for one thing sanctioned by law and culture, but in fact expect a second more attuned set of readers to take away a different message, sometimes the opposite of what appears to be the thesis. Thus the majority will take away one message, while simultaneously a specially prepared philosophical elite may be able to glean a different, esoteric message, a secret teaching. In the case of Maimonides, it was actual persecution of Jews which summoned forth the need for resort to a double meaning in textual expression; but he later extended the demands of esoteric knowledge to all those who dealt with the philosophy of law. In effect, the exterior literal meaning of the law serves to sustain a political community which requires fealty to particular forms of behavior and belief, whereas a different esoteric meaning of the law is a matter of philosophical exegesis only for those capable to handle such speculation responsibly. Multiple contradictory messages serve to strengthen the polity, according to Strauss.

Ronald Coase, an economist and MPS member, went on the attack of the British Broadcasting Corporation rather early in his career, well before he became famous for his argument that public goods do not really exist. As might be expected, Coase was deeply offended by the attempt of the BBC to set standards of discourse in the public sphere in Britain, and thus resorted to techniques of red-baiting to disparage the very existence of the public broadcasting system:
Coase was convinced that the masses should be provided with as much of the “shoddy, the vulgar and the sensational” as they could stomach, and then some. The notion that some entity like the state might curate the quality of what was available through a public channel, in the interest of setting standards for public discourse and political debate, was regarded as an anathema: the market would more capably sort out what people could and should know all by itself.

A third significant figure was the economist and MPS member James Buchanan. Buchanan was not much concerned with the shape of the media to the extent of Coase; but he did offer one response to the question that tormented all the MPS members: If their understanding of the correct way forward is correct, then why don’t the intellectuals and vast mass of the public simply acknowledge that fact? Ultimately, said Buchanan, the Achilles Heel of their project was the ingrained cognitive deficiencies of the great mass of humanity: “The monumental scientific error that socialism embodied would never have attained its practical successes without the acquiescent support that was grounded in ascientific and unreasoned public attitudes.”

This conviction that people are leaky untrustworthy vessels was widespread amongst the NTC in the later 20th century; but the pressing question was how to reconcile this unfortunate fact with their core doctrine that the marketplace of ideas gives everyone whatever they want and what they deserve. Some, like Milton Friedman, opted for wishful thinking: supposedly, if someone with the debating skills of Milton patiently explained to people the error of their ways, then they would just naturally come round to the neoliberal position in the fullness of time. Others, such as MPS member George Stigler, was attuned to the inconsistency of this position, and argued for a different type of response.

Stigler believed that there was nothing to be done about the debased and vulgar predispositions of the populace; one must simply take them as given. “I cannot believe that any amount of economic training would wholly eliminate the instinctive dislike of a system of

---

48 In (Coase, 1950, p.190).
49 (Buchanan, 2001, p.269).
organizing economic life through the search for profits.”  

Markets simply pandered to the lowest common denominator, and in fact, this should only be encouraged. The way forward was instead to convene a small elite of like-minded thinkers, not to give the people more of the dreck that they wanted, but to anticipate what their rich patrons would need to think in the future, and produce these doctrines avant la lettre in order to bring about the society that would eventually voluntarily support the ideal market. Folderol and vulgar sensationalism should be promoted for the masses; cabalistic wisdom for a small haute monde; Leo Strauss for economists. Stigler could never bring himself to admit this would implicitly involve manipulating the desires of their target population; but his followers proved more than willing to run roughshod over that scruple.  

Note well that the epistemic evolution of the Neoliberal Thought Collective eventually took its fundamental inspiration from Stigler’s vision, and not that of (say) Milton Friedman.  

That brings us back to the modern frenzy over fake news. They could not have anticipated it back in the 1960s, but the marketization of the Internet turned out to be the culmination of Stigler’s vision of an ecology of mass attention. Basically, the political project is not to directly convince anyone of the superiority of the market for society in any didactic sense; it is rather to use the market as an amplifier to recycle the vulgarity, twaddle, gibberish and overall noise back into the public that generates it in the first place, in a cybernetic feedback loop, to such an extent that they have no clue what is actually going on in their own world. As the neoliberal journalist Jeffrey Lord was quoted in 2016: “I honestly don't think this fact-checking business — as we're all into this — is anything more than, you know, one more sort of out-of-touch, elitist, media-type thing. I don't think people out here in America care. What they care about are what the candidates say.”  

The aim is not nihilism for the hell of it, but rather, represents the pursuit of two objectives dear to the NTC: [1] The transformation of the endless befuddlement of the masses into a lucrative source of recurrent profit; and simultaneously, [2] the rendering of the populace
more docile in the face of neoliberal takeover of the government.\textsuperscript{53} These same objectives are pursued whether they occurred in the East Bloc or the West. Instead of ignorance presenting an obstacle to the neoliberal project, as Buchanan had worried, the marketplace as information processor transforms it into one of the primary instruments of neoliberal dominance. A telling example of this dynamic is the widely reported case of Macedonian teenagers concocting all manner of fake news concerning Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, and in the process milking the automated system of advertising allocation to collect tens of thousands of dollars. \textsuperscript{54} As one of the perpetrators admits, “There’s nothing much to do around here. We’re doing this out of boredom… and to make money.” They had been making up fake news for a while, but the appearance of Donald Trump revealed a bottomless ‘demand’ for scurrilous fabrications. Another example was a Republican political operative named Cameron Harris, who, once outed in the New York Times as the sole proprietor of a notorious website called “ChristianTimes Newspaper”, bragged about how he could make $1000 and hour off made-up stories with headlines about ‘tens of thousands of fraudulent votes found in Ohio warehouse’ and ‘Hilary Clinton files for divorce in New York courts.’ Follow-up journalism revealed he had simultaneously been tweeting that MSNBC and Buzzfeed were propagating fake news.\textsuperscript{55} Shameless projection is one of the simplest defenses in the world of fake news.


That begins to reveal the neoliberal pecuniary and intellectual justification for fake news; but it would not have materialized without an attendant technological transformation in the

\textsuperscript{53} See Ronald Beiner’s description of Steve Bannon and Donald Trump: “Bannon and Trump are ruthless operators, playing the political game in a hyper-Machiavellian fashion. Words are not used primarily to express political intentions or to articulate a sincerely-held political vision. To a much greater extent, they serve to keep people guessing or to provide active smokescreens for their real designs (or maybe it’s just a question of getting a “buzz” from knowing that millions of people are getting stirred up by one’s words and images – hence the Riefenstahl fixation). The political activist Bannon casts “crony capitalists” as the root of all evil, yet the Trump cabinet nominations (surely with Bannon’s encouragement) exhibit no shortage of crony capitalists – on the contrary, they seem to predominate. “Globalism” is supposedly the enemy, but that seems not to rule out appointing Goldman Sachs and ExxonMobil executives to positions of consummate power.” At: http://crookedtimber.org/2017/01/11/the-political-thought-of-stephen-k-bannon/.

\textsuperscript{54} Consider the amusing reporting on these entrepreneurs by Britain’s Channel 4 news: ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZusgWUNFG4. It is also discussed in (Ball, 2017).

\textsuperscript{55} See (Shane, 2017) and http://www.vocativ.com/394546/christian-times-newspaper-fake-news-cameron-harris-fired/.
means of communication. This phase of the story is much better known, particularly in media studies, so we can present the outlines in a telegraphed format. Due to convenience and a host of factors, the Internet has been eroding

**Figure 1**

**Newspaper circulation declines for second consecutive year in 2015**

% change in average weekday and Sunday circulation

- Weekday
- Sunday

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Weekday</th>
<th>Sunday</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-12%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-7.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-10.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-11.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-6.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Due to a change in AAM’s reporting period, comparisons from 2003 to 2014 are based on six-month averages for the period ending Sept. 30, while comparisons for 2014-15 are based on three-month averages for the period ending Dec. 31. Data do not include affiliated publications. Weekday circulation only includes those publications reporting a five-day average. 2015 analysis incorporates weekday circulation from 282 publications and Sunday circulation from 517 publications.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of Alliance for Audited Media data.

“State of the News Media 2016”

**Figure 2**

**The number of daily newspapers has decreased by more than 100 since 2004**

Total number of newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Weekday</th>
<th>Sunday</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1457</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1387</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1331</td>
<td>923</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data for each year came from the next year’s edition.

Source: Editor & Publisher Newspaper DataBook.

“State of the News Media 2016”
people are purchasing fewer newspapers, and consequently, print advertising revenue has fallen dramatically, as demonstrated by Figures 1, 2 and 3 for the US, taken from Pew Center reports on the State of the Media.\textsuperscript{56} Although the data on macroscopic internet usage is less reliable, by most accounts, much of the attention span of the nation has been shifting towards online sites built by legacy media, or else newly launched digital news media. This is illustrated in Table 1, also from the Pew Center.

Table 1

\textsuperscript{56} The source for all the following data is (Pew Research Center, 2016).
As the potential reach of news outlets shifts from the local to the transnational, different sorts of metrics begin to be required to gauge the substitution in news venues. And here, from the BBC, we have a more detailed breakdown of the online sources for news by platforms across 26 countries.

**Figure 4**
The portrait painted here is of a fairly dramatic shift away from more conventional curated news sources, and towards news provided online by social media and other platforms dedicated to content aggregation and personalized communications. The British MailOnline, reputedly the world’s largest news site outside China, reaches roughly 15 million users per day; Facebook, by contrast, enjoyed 1.2 billion users per day. As ad revenue has been diverted from legacy print formats like newspapers and towards digital formats, there has been obvious restructuring of the ways in which news is gathered and written. While the NTC have been in no way directly responsible for these grand structural deformations, neoliberal attitudes towards knowledge have begun to interact with social media to produce a Brave New World of fake news. This has occurred in three rough stages.

The first stage has been the deskilling of the journalist population. Unlike legacy newspapers, online news sites judge they have less need for regular representatives to cover ‘beats’, and therefore far less need for trained and qualified reporters. The neoliberal solution to all labor problems is to fragment, divide and conquer, from Uber to TaskRabbit, and this works according to similar principles. Instead of years devoted to covering (say) the Pharma industry, today’s journalists have been trained to be flexible in their choice of topics, and above all, assiduously monitor the rate of clicks from one short article to the next. You don’t need much expertise to craft clickbait. Furthermore, at a temp wage, those student loans would never get paid off in any plausible time frame. The consequence has been that digital providers are increasingly loathe to nurture a deep bench, or even pay for an in-house capacity to sufficiently understand context to recognize what qualifies as ‘real news’.

The obverse of the mandate to deskill and minimize the labor of reportage is the conviction on the part of new media entrepreneurs is that dependence upon automated algorithms is deemed the optimal way to curate and present news. This constituted the second stage of ‘creative destruction’ of the news; and here the neoliberals did have some direct input. For instance, there was a notorious instance in May 2016 when a poorly sourced anonymous ‘insider’ claimed that the human editors who curated the ‘Trending’ box on Facebook were biased and routinely suppressed so-called conservative websites. One of the accusations was that, “Stories covered by conservative outlets (like Breitbart, Washington Examiner, and

57 (Ball, 2017). Its more if you count mobile phone access: https://www.omnicoreagency.com/facebook-statistics/
Newsmax) that were trending enough to be picked up by Facebook’s algorithm were excluded unless mainstream sites like the New York Times, the BBC, and CNN covered the same stories.” In other words, someone at a neoliberal think tank was miffed that Facebook would actually take into account the credibility of the source like Breitbart before listing it to a generic news feed. Gizmodo and the neoliberal echo chamber blew this up into a cause célèbre, crying censorship, and Mark Zuckerberg was forced to grovel before some right wing media celebrities; three months later, the human editors monitoring the trending box were fired, and it was claimed by Facebook that algorithms could do a better and more balanced job instead.

Immediately thereafter, the amount of fake news stories on the Trending news feed began to explode.59 The bitter lesson should be that algorithms will more unerringly extract fake news for distribution, and disseminate it far more widely than generally might happen under human editorial supervision. So much for banishing ‘bias’. Facebook harbors an optimistic attitude that in aggregate people will naturally home in on and share truth, one endorsed and promoted by the orthodox economists it hires,60 but recent experience increasingly says the exact opposite is happening on a massive scale. The fact that Facebook’s own Trending algorithm keeps spreading and promoting fake news is the strongest bit of evidence that this kind of content overperforms on Facebook’s automated scheme. After denying there was a problem with their Trending box after the election, Facebook executed an about-face in early 2017 by doubling down on the premise that more automated code could stifle fake news; it sought to repress some of the ‘personalization’ of the previous Trending function, while adding more abstract conditions on the number of news sites publishing concerning the topic.61 There is as yet no solid evidence that the problem has been rectified.

Automation corrupts the entire epistemic process, far beyond the obvious question of how to winnow down the news actually presented through the instrumentality of Facebook and other social media sites.62 The lifeblood of social media is advertising; and algorithms have come

---


60 See (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2008; Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017).

61 See (Griswold, 2017).

62 Internal disputes within Facebook over the means by which to automate their advertising from 2011-2014 is covered in a somewhat snarky way in (Martinez, 2016).
to dominate that arena as well. Nothing is more automated than the markets which direct specific ads to specific sites, tot up the clicks, and end up funding the Macedonians and Cameron Harrises of the world in their duplicitous activities. The important consideration is that advertisers cannot be bothered to actually have an acquaintance with the platforms that display their ads; so according to good neoliberal principles, they depend upon automated auctions to slip that banner into the otherwise anonymous web site.

Much online advertising capitalizes on the lure of the so-called long tail of the internet — sites that draw relatively small but attractive audiences, like blogs for new parents or forums for truck enthusiasts. Advertising on those sites costs a fraction of what it does on more prominent online destinations, which typically deal directly with advertisers. Money is funneled to smaller sites through a complex system of agencies and third-party networks, which can resemble a stock exchange. This system, known as programmatic advertising, allows brands to collect many millions of impressions — an industry term that generally indicates that an ad has been displayed and can be viewed.

Joe Marchese, president of advertising products for the Fox Networks Group, said the system, set up to reward clicks and impressions, had fueled the growth of low-quality sites well beyond those focused on made-up political news. “Honestly, the long tail is to advertising what subprime was to mortgages,” he said. “No one knows what’s in it, but it helps people believe that there is a mysterious tonnage of impressions that are really low cost.”

Most of the time, the advertisers don’t even know what manner of dreck they are supporting, because they have left all that to opaque market algorithms, which neoliberal doctrine tells them are better than any human being in sorting out the truth. But what is fascinating, and this is the third phase of creative destruction, is that automation, once introduced, has the tendency to undermine the very social process that the platform was nominally dedicated to promote.

Quite simply, if you are going to take the trouble to automate the curation and dissemination of news, and then proceed to automate the means of paying for all that content through the instrumentality of advertisements, then it is a short but dramatic step to automate the audience itself. As Samuel Wooley and Philip Howard have pointed out, it has become widespread practice for some political entities to make use of technical proxies in the form of semi-automated bots to explicitly manipulate public opinion. They define political bots as algorithms designed to operate over social media, able to ‘learn’ from and mimic real people so as to create misleading impressions concerning the nature of internet interactions. Political bots

---

63 (Maheshwari, 2016).
64 (Woolley & Howard, 2016) and (Pasquale, 2017).
are deployed to boost follower numbers and retweet the messages of politicians or other celebrities on Twitter, to attack and mislead political opponents on Facebook and the discussion sections of news sites, or drown out activist conversations on Reddit and elsewhere. Bots can utterly falsify the number of clicks that accrue to a story, and consequently, thoroughly distend the metrics of ad funding. It is estimated by Woolley and Howard that bots comprise nearly 50% of all online traffic; on Twitter, approximately 30 million active accounts are bot driven. In a separate study, a sample of election-related tweets from 16 September to 21 October 2016 revealed an estimate of 400,000 Twitter accounts were in fact bots, and that bots comprised nearly 19% of the total conversations. Political bots do not just imitate human users of social media, but also collect reams of data which can be mobilized to create a blitz of fake news. Thus, fake news is no longer the product of a small coterie of young bored Macedonians; it has come to alter the very nature of agency in cyberspace.

Nothing is better tuned to induce despair in the populace concerning democracy than to trick unsuspecting humans into engaging in political discourse with soulless robots. Not only are they bamboozled into a generalized ignorance about almost everything they encounter online; but now, they can’t tell political discourse from a video game. The very notion of a deliberative democracy becomes a bitter joke. What contemporaries need to wake up to is the realization that some groups want this to happen, contrary to those such as Morozov, who view it as an unintended byproduct of digital capitalism. For instance, the only party in the German elections of 2017 who refused to refrain from use of political bots was the Alternativ fur Deutchland.66

6. The Neoliberal campaign of ‘Open science’

There is very little news to feel heartened about as a scientist these days; so it is all the more noteworthy that the new new thing in science policy circles is an open infatuation with ‘open science’. The whole thing kicked off in the later 2000s, with rumors of something called Science 2.0. The New York Times then had the good sense to rebrand this imaginary utopia as “open science” in January 2012.67 The British Royal Society intervened close on its heels in
2012, with a public relations document entitled *Science as an Open Enterprise*.\(^68\) Subsequently, this was rapidly followed by a popularizing book, succeeded by a plethora of government white papers and policy documents.\(^69\) All sorts of obscure institutes and think tanks (the Ronin Institute, Center for Open Science, openscienceASAP, UK Open Data Institute, PCORI, Laura and John Arnold Foundation) then sprouted across the landscape, dedicated to propounding the virtues of ‘open science’ for all and sundry. The NIH even teamed up with the Wellcome Trust and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute to offer a much ballyhooed “Open Science Prize” consisting of six awards to various teams of the not-very-princely sum of $80K with which to launch (?) their prototypes.\(^70\) In 2013, the G8 Science Ministers formally endorsed a policy of encouraging open science.\(^71\) Perhaps displaying some of the same panache which has lately graced politics in the European Union, the EU Competitiveness Council in May 2016 issued a mission statement that all scientific articles should be ‘freely accessible’ by 2020.\(^72\) “The time for talking about Open Access is now past. With these agreements, we are going to achieve it in practice,” the Dutch state secretary for education, culture, and science, Sander Dekker, added in a statement. Lord knows, the last thing an EU bureaucrat has patience with is talking about something that is not at all well understood.

Many people have the impression ‘open science’ is primarily about lay access to gated scientific papers published by large for-profit firms; but in fact, that is a sideshow in the greater project to ‘open up’ science. As we might anticipate, the neoliberal attitude is to wrest the very conduct of science away from its putative untrustworthy experts, and subject it to a bracing market discipline. This is proposed as a panacea for whatever ails science: lack of democracy, public distrust of science, a suspected slowdown in scientific productivity, the corruption of modern scientific journals, the crisis of replicability in scientific journals, and much else.

---

68 https://royalsociety.org/~/media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/projects/sape/2012-06-20-SAOE.pdf
69 See (Nielsen, 2012; OECD, 2015; Vuorikari & Punie, 2015;
70 www.openscienceprize.org The six teams further engage in further competition for a single prize of $230K, which hardly matches more conventional big science grant amounts. The final winner will be announced in March 2017.
71 See http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/science/130613-science.html; including the ominous statement, “To ensure successful adoption by scientific communities, open scientific research data principles will need to be underpinned by an appropriate policy environment, including recognition of researchers fulfilling these principles, and appropriate digital infrastructure.”
72 (Enserink, 2016). A Dutch infomercial promoting open science is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fHmi5omlj4
Thus it has come to pass that one consequence of the reverberating debates over the depth of these crises is to shift the terms of the remedies to different *business models* covering not only publication, but the peer review process as well. The entrepreneurial visions of a different configuration of science often evoke the magic of the marketplace to displace centuries-old practices of science:

You don’t have to reinvent the system, just nudge it a bit…. If you do it in an efficient way, people will do it… Open science funders get a higher return on investment.\(^{73}\)

Michael Nielsen, perhaps the major publicist making the case for Open Science, similarly sings the praises of a commercial approach to reform: “One of humanity’s most powerful tools for amplifying collective intelligence is the market system.”\(^{74}\) Since many scientists are attracted to the Open Science movement believing it to be a renunciation of older commercial models, it is of paramount importance to understand precisely what the advocates of Open Science imagine will replace the current system of science organization.\(^{75}\)

It seems in the current climate, the favorite panacea for the replication crisis, and indeed everything else that ails science, is the watchword of more ‘transparency’ imposed through the regimentation of a social-media style Internet platform. Sometimes its advocates hint such platforms will displace journals gradually, while others imagine a world without any old-fashioned journals at all. For instance, Mike Eisen, one of the pioneers of e-Biomed and PLOS has in fact explicitly proposed that we should eventually just do away with journals and convert to a complete open preprint plus post-publication peer review system.\(^{76}\) Others have yet even larger ambitions. Some early entrepreneurs openly advocated a “Facebook for Science”, which begins to reveal how the scramble to produce platforms is informed by earlier developments in social media.\(^{77}\) The modern Open Science movement trends towards an entirely public re-engineering of science,

Table 2

---

\(^{73}\) Brian Nosek, in Q&A session (Effective Altruism Global, 2016).

\(^{74}\) (Nielsen, 2012, p.37)

\(^{75}\) For some sources, see: (Lehrer, 2010; Lin, 2012; Nielsen, 2012; Trask & Lawrence, 2016; Hammarfelt et al, 2016; Oransky & Marcus, 2016; …

\(^{76}\) See [http://asapbio.org/coupling-pppr](http://asapbio.org/coupling-pppr).

\(^{77}\) See (Lin, 2012; Hearn, 2016). Long after I had begun this research project, I was shocked to discover one of these projects as my own university: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=enohoM6cBww](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=enohoM6cBww).
from the earliest inchoate preparatory stages of a research project to the final dissemination and evaluation of the results. As summarized in Table 2, this imagines every aspect of the project happening online, from the earliest preliminary reading regimen as a survey of the literature, to recourse to Open Data sets, produced either by the researcher themselves or else by some other scientist, to real-time commentary by others on the research protocols, to drafts of reports uploaded to preprint servers, to quasi-journal publications online, to extensive peer review continuing well after the final draft is posted online. Back in 2010, one might have imagined this happening piecemeal, with, say, a stand-alone preprint server like arXiv performing one function, while a separate website – perhaps like PubPeer – might foster critical commentary linked to specific papers, combined in a sort of free-for-all semi-peer-review. So far, there seemed to be no whiff of markets. But no one would believe any such cobbled-together system would work without the reassurance of a political ideology to fortify their ambitions.

The most important aspect of this Brave New World is to come to understand why it’s champions would believe that such a sloppy unintegrated bottom-up system beset by waves of ignorant kibitzers would produce anything but white noise. The paladins of Science 2.0 love to quote the injunction “With enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”; but that presumes that all science is merely an instrumental task, similar to the building of software. Here one has to re-inject a modicum of context, as well as insist upon the dominant narrative of a political ontology which renders this revolutionary project plausible. And here is where a comprehension of the philosophical aspect of neoliberalism is indispensable.

There may be abundant dissatisfaction with the state of science in the modern university, but as I have explained in detail in my *ScienceMart*, much of this current distress derives from
the concerted political project to wean the university sector away from the state over the last three decades, and to render both instruction and research more responsive to market incentives, thus doing away with older Humboldtian rationales of bildung and the preservation of the cultural values of civilization. This, in turn, has been motivated by the political project of Neoliberalism, which takes as its first commandment that The Market is the most superior information processor known to mankind. For their acolytes, no human can or ever will match the Wisdom of the Market. The knowledge held by any individual is (in this construction) of a weak and deceptive sort; no human being can ever comprehend the amount of information embodied in a market price; therefore, experts (and scientists) should not be accorded much respect, since the Market ultimately reduces them to the same epistemic plane as rank amateurs. This is glossed in some quarters as the ‘wisdom of crowds’. Neoliberals propose a democratization of knowledge, but in a curious sense: everyone should equally prostrate themselves before a Market, which will then supply them with Truth in the fullness of time.

The crises of modern science, curiously enough, were largely brought about by neoliberal initiatives in the first place. First off, it was the neoliberal think tanks that first stoked the fires of science distrust amongst the populace that have led to the current predicament. It was neoliberals who provided the justification for the strengthening of intellectual property; it was the neoliberals who drove a wedge between state funding of research and state provision of findings of universities for the public good; it was neoliberal administrators who began to fragment the university into ‘cash cows’ and loss leader disciplines; it was neoliberal corporate officers who sought to wrest clinical trials away from academic health centers and towards contract research organizations to better control the disclosure or nondisclosure of the data generated. In some universities, students now have to sign nondisclosure agreements if they want initiation into the mysteries of faculty startups. It is no longer a matter of what you know; rather success these days is your ability to position yourself with regard to the gatekeepers of what is known. Knowledge is everywhere hedged round with walls, legal prohibitions, and high market barriers breached only by those blessed with riches required to be enrolled into the elect circles of modern science. Further, belief in the Market as ultimate arbiter of truth has served to loosen the fetters of more conscious vetting of knowledge through promulgation of negative results and the need to reprise research protocols. No wonder replication turns out to be so daunting. One can understand the desire to cast off these fetters and let the Market do the work for us.
The irony of the situation is that although this petrification of the scientific enterprise could largely be attributed to previous neoliberal ‘reforms’ in the first instance, the remedy proposed is to double down on neoliberal policies, now under the rubric of ‘open science’. Rather than simply foster ‘participation’, modern science is choc-a-block with proprietary websites that aim to utterly re-engineer the research process from the ground up. Internet startups are thick on the Web, befitting the early stages of a push to engross and capture new electronic real estate. Academia.edu, Mendeley and ResearchGate seek to foster artificial research communities to attract far-flung kibitzers to discuss and criticize the early-stage search for topics in which to become engaged in research. CERN has built Zendor in order to standardize the sharing of early-state research products. Open Notebook and Open Collaborate (and Microsoft’s failed myExperiment.org) are platforms to organize the early stages of research out in the open, even to the extent of conducting ‘virtual experiments’; while sites like Kickstarter offer alternative modes of seeking out research support. There are purported ‘citizen science’ sites which entice non-scientists to perform remote labor for aspects of data processing which can be Taylorized and automated—SETI@home and Foldit are oft-cited examples. There are a plethora of platforms for publication management and controlled revision by multiple ‘authors’, although most of them are proprietary and closely held, in contrast with something like the physics pre-publication site arXiv.org. Indeed, in clinical trials, most CROs are built around such proprietary platforms. A burgeoning field of startups foster post-publication platforms to evaluate and otherwise rank papers in various fields using what are dubbed AltMetrics, sometimes combined with collated unpaid reviews, as on the site Faculty of 1000. Firms like Science Exchange, Transcripotic and Emerald Cloud Lab attempt to automate actual (mainly biochemical or clinical) lab procedures online, to better to outsource and fragment the research process, and nominally, to render replication relatively effortless. While different platforms aim to apply the concepts of social media to some restricted subset of the research process—say, the blog-like character of unfocused searching around for topics; early-stage establishment of research protocols; the arrangement of funding; the virtualization of the laboratory; the intermediate stage of manuscript composition and revision; or post-publication evaluation—it does not take much imagination to anticipate that once the market shakes itself out, and one platform eventually comes to dominate its competitors within key segments of certain sciences, Google or some similar corporate entity will come along with its deep pockets, and integrate each segment into one grand proprietary
Science 2.0 platform. Who would not then want to own the obligatory online passage point for the bulk of modern scientific research? The science entrepreneur Vitek Trask has already sketched the outlines of one completely integrated online research platform;\(^{78}\) the aptly-named ‘Ronin Institute’ has proposed another, arguing, “Open Access and Open Data will make so much more of a difference if we had the same kind of dynamism in the academic and nonprofit sector as we have in the for-profit start-up sector.”\(^{79}\) As many of the entrepreneurial protagonists of the reorganization of science admit, Facebook is their lode star and inspiration.

Readers of Michel Foucault will realize that the key to the process of spreading neoliberalism into everyday life involves recasting the individual into an entrepreneur of the self. Technologies such as Facebook already foster neoliberal notions of what it means to be human amongst teenagers who have never read a page of Hayek or political theory in their lives.\(^{80}\) Novel open science platforms inject neoliberal images of the marketplace of ideas into the scientific community, which equally may not have paid much attention to contemporary political economy. For instance, the programs are all besotted with the notion of complete identification of the individual as the locus of knowledge production, to the extent of imposing a unique online identifier for each participant, which links records across the platform and modular projects. The communal character of scientific research is summarily banished. The scientist is introduced to a quasi-market that constantly monitors their ‘net worth’ through a range of metrics, scores and indicators: h-index, Impact Factors, peer contacts, network affiliations, and the like. Regular email notifications keep nagging you to internalize these validations, and learn how to game them to your advantage. No direct managerial presence is required, because one automatically learns to internalize these seemingly objective market-like valuations, rather than (say) tenacious belief in a set of ideas, or a particular research program. All it takes is a little nudge from your friendly online robot.

There is another curious aspect concerning the Open Science movement which is illuminated by a more general understanding of the neoliberal project. As I have explained elsewhere, Neoliberalism is beset with a brace of inherent ‘double truths’:\(^{81}\) ‘openness’ is never

\(^{78}\) Trask & Lawrence, 2016.


\(^{80}\) I discuss this further in (Mirowski, 2013, chap. 3).

\(^{81}\) (Mirowski, 2013, pp.68-83).
really ‘open’; ‘spontaneous order’ is brought about by strict political regimentation; a movement which extols rationality actively promotes ignorance. The first of these double truths has already been highlighted for the early versions of the OS movement by some perceptive work in science studies.\textsuperscript{82} The physics prepublication service arXiv is often praised as a proof of concept for Open Science; but that just ignores its actual history of conflict and unresolved problems. Founded in 1991, arXiv rapidly became the website of choice, to the extent of receiving 75,000 new texts each year, and providing roughly 1 million full-text downloads to about 400,000 distinct users every week.\textsuperscript{83} The growth in arXiv has been linear, attracting papers in mathematics, astrophysics and computer science, demonstrated in Figure 5.

\textbf{Figure 5}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.png}
\caption{Digital Pioneers Lead the Way to Sharing Research Online}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{82} (Ritson, 2016).

\textsuperscript{83} (Ginsparg, 2011).
What has been omitted from this litany of success is the extent to which arXiv has not been altogether ‘open’. The problems were only hinted at in Ginsparg’s retrospective:

Again, because of cost and labour overheads, arXiv would not be able to implement conventional peer review. Even the minimal filtering of incoming preprints to maintain basic quality control involves significant daily administrative activity. Incoming abstracts are given a cursory glance by volunteer external moderators for appropriateness to their subject areas; and various automated filters, including a text classifier, flag problem submissions… Moderators, tasked with determining what is of potential interest to their communities, are sometimes forced to ascertain ‘what is science?’ At this point arXiv unintentionally becomes an accrediting agency for researchers, much as the Science Citation Index became an accrediting agency for journals, by formulating criteria for their inclusion.84

Although Ginsparg tries to dismiss this as a mere matter of logistical housekeeping, arXiv has been continually roiled by pressure to act as a validator of legitimate knowledge: that is, to reign in its nominal ‘openness’. This problem broke out into the open during the so-called ‘string theory wars’ in 2005-2007. In short, arXiv introduced a ‘trackback’ function in 2005 which enabled authors of blog posts to insert a link for the post on the paper abstract page in arXiv. Note well, this is the beginning of integration of arXiv into a larger OS platform, linking archive functions to evaluation of ideas. The physics community found itself up in arms to deny this capability to ‘crackpots’, revealing a fear of integration of blogs into the permanent body of scholarly communication. In effect, there was no acceptable standard to distinguish those who had the right to comment from those who needed to be excluded. The problem was only exacerbated by differing research communities allowing different attitudes to the forms and protocols of debate. There have been repeated attempts to severely restrict the trackback function to prevent the turning of arXiv into a central component of a larger Open Science platform. The Neoliberal response would be: it is not the place of the disciplinary community to decide where openness ‘ends’.

What exactly is neoliberal about the incipient electronic manifestation of Science 2.0? Let us survey the possibilities. First off, the proliferation of open research platforms is primarily subordinate to the project of breaking up the research process into relatively separable component segments, in pursuit of their rationalization, which means first and foremost, cost-cutting. This happens through the intermediary of deskilling some of the tasks performed

84 (Ginsparg, 2011, p.147).
(‘citizen science’) and automating others (AltMetrics, rendering Big Data accessible to Web crawlers). Capturing freely donated labor which can later be turned into proprietary knowledge products is the analog to capturing freely provided personal data. Thus Science 2.0 constitutes the removal of autonomy from the research scientist. Neoliberal science disparages scientists who remain in the rut of their own chosen disciplinary specialty or intellectual inspiration; what is required these days are flexible workers who can drop a research project at a moment’s notice, and turn on an interdisciplinary dime, in response to signals from the Market. The short-term nature of science funding, as embodied in Kickstarter or recent innovations by the NIH, simply expresses this imperative. Secondly, the selling point of many of these platforms is not just providing direct services to the scientist involved; at every stage of research, they provide external third parties with the capacities for evaluation, validation, branding and monitoring of research program. Their nominal ‘openness’ constitutes the ideal setup for near real-time surveillance of the research process, a Panopticon of Science, something which can be turned around and sold in the very same sense that Facebook provides real-time surveillance of consumer behavior. Third, the paladins of Science 2.0 have moved far beyond quotidian concerns of appropriation of individual bits of intellectual property, like patents. What they have learned (similar to Microsoft, similar to Google, similar to Uber) is that the company that controls the platform is the company that eventually comes to dominate the industry. Microsoft has learned to live with Open Source; Amazon leases out cloud computing, Google ‘gives away’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By whom</th>
<th>Getting interested</th>
<th>preparatory</th>
<th>Research protocols</th>
<th>writeup</th>
<th>publication</th>
<th>Post-_pub</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal scientist</td>
<td>Blogs, Research Gate</td>
<td>Open notebook; Mendeley</td>
<td>Emerald Cloud Lab</td>
<td>arXiv</td>
<td>Pay to play eJournals PeerJ</td>
<td>Academia Edu; Peer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funders</td>
<td>Kickstarter</td>
<td>NIH grant Open source</td>
<td>Zenodo;Pub manage-ment</td>
<td>AltMetrics</td>
<td>Open access journ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competing scientists</td>
<td>Research Gate</td>
<td>Open notebook; Mendeley</td>
<td>Open data</td>
<td>Zenodo</td>
<td>Trial by twitter</td>
<td>Fac of 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spectator scientists</td>
<td>Blogs</td>
<td>Open collaborate</td>
<td>Virtual labs</td>
<td>Open access</td>
<td>Blogs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outsider citizens</td>
<td>SETI@hom Foldit</td>
<td>DIY bio</td>
<td>Publication managers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibitzers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Open source soft</td>
<td></td>
<td>Blogs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Google Scholar. The future king of Science 2.0 will not be a mere patent troll, living as a parasite off companies who actually work the patents; it will not be perturbed by a few mandatory Open Data archives here and there. Instead, it will be the obligatory passage point for any commercial entity who wants to know where the research front of any particular science is right now, and whom must be paid to influence and control that front.

This race to be the King of Platforms that controls the future of Open Science is already happening.

This dream of an Uberization of science is much further along than I believe most people realize. While some academics spin their visions of sugarplum in the air, various big players are positioning themselves to package together all the functions in Figure 7 into one big proprietary platform. On August 30, 2016 the US Patent Office issued US Patent #9430468 entitled, “Online peer review and method”. The owner of the patent is none other than the for-profit mega-publisher Elsevier. The essential gist of the patent is to describe the process of a peer review being organized and effectuated on a computer program, as in Figure 7.

Figure 7
Of course, it would be the height of hubris to expect to appropriate the entire concept of peer review as intellectual property; but perhaps that was not really the aim of Elsevier. The Patent Office rejected this patent at least three times, but under the unlimited do-over rule in US law, Elsevier kept narrowing the claims until the stipulation passed muster. It does include an automated ‘waterfall process’ in which the rejected paper is immediately turned around to be submitted to another journal in a recommended sequence. It is also plug-compatible with a variety of different formats of ‘reviewer’ inputs.

In the brave new world of open science, this input might take many forms. Some researchers are already exploring automated peer review: using a natural language generator to produce plausible research reports, using some more unconventional evaluation inputs. One of the inputs has been constructed with an eye toward the crisis of replicability: taking standardized datasets and research protocols and conducting automated replication with robot labs. Far from being science fiction, there are already two for-profit firms, Transcriptic and Emerald Cloud Lab, positioning themselves to provide this service in a more automated and streamlined Open Science platform.

---

85 (Bartoli et al, 2016).
86 (Wykstra, 2016)
Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to insist that awareness of the philosophical core of Neoliberalism, namely, the epistemic superiority of the market in all things, was a necessary prerequisite to understanding some of the most crucial developments in modern politics, contrary to those on the Left who disparage the very idea of any coherence whatsoever to neoliberal doctrine and practice. Neoliberalism has corroded Marxism as a serious intellectual proposition, but it has also congealed into the very architecture of platforms like Facebook, Zenodo and Mendeley.

References


online: http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/05/dramatic-statement-european-leaders-call-immediate-open-access-all-scientific-papers


Grzanka, Patrick; Mann, Emily; & Elliott, Sinikka. (2016). “The Neoliberalism Wars, or Notes on the Persistence of Neoliberalism,” *Sexuality Research and Social Policy,*


Ritson, Sophie. 2016. “Crackpots and Active Researchers: the controversy over links between arXiv and the blogosphere,” Social Studies of Science, (**)