Introduction

In much of Europe, the social rights and social protections won in the first post-war decades, by labour movements in particular, have subsequently been seriously eroded, and are further threatened by neoliberal austerity. Efforts to resist have been largely unsuccessful; but is an effective fight-back possible? In this paper I first outline the role of the European Union (EU) as a key driver of the recommodification of labour, through its growing emphasis on market ‘freedoms’ as an overriding priority, and on ‘competitiveness’ as the central policy objective for national governments. I discuss how this orientation has been reinforced by the economic crisis, and the ensuing pursuit of austerity and the imposition of ‘new economic governance’. I then survey a range of forms of protest and opposition: trade union action, ‘new’ social movements and engagement in the formal political arena. I suggest that a nuanced evaluation of success and failure is necessary. In conclusion I propose that the articulation of different forms of resistance – cross-nationally and between different actors – is essential in order to stem the neoliberal hegemony.

The European Union: Increasingly an Agent of Neoliberalism

The dynamic of capitalism involves a persistent tendency towards the expansion of markets. In part this expansion is geographical: the erosion of spatial barriers to trade and exploitation, often through the physical appropriation of territory (or Landnahme, as it is known in German). But also involved is a qualitative process of the growing marketisation of social relations: the transformation of previously non-commercial dimensions of social life into marketable commodities.

Maine (1861) wrote approvingly of an historical movement from ‘status’ to ‘contract’, in which ‘forms of reciprocity in rights and duties’ stemming immutably from social position were replaced by relations based on the ‘free agreement of individuals’. Durkheim (1893) made a somewhat similar analysis of a transition from ‘mechanical’ to ‘organic’ solidarity, though noting that imbalances of economic power could undermine the possibility of ‘free agreement’ – a theme that was of course central to the work of Marx. Subsequently, Polanyi (1944) also stressed the traumatic social consequences of the drive to commodification – and in particular the creation of the ‘fictitious commodities’ of labour, land and money – and argued that these consequences inevitably provoked a ‘counter-movement’ to restore social regulation of economic activity. However, it is evident that the re-regulation of marketised relations is by no means inevitable and indeed faces serious obstacles, that the tension between contract and status is persistent (Streeck 1987), and that neoliberalism has involved a counter-counter-movement to the renewed social control of markets which Polanyi identified.

In the same year that Polanyi’s book appeared, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) adopted its Philadelphia Declaration, proclaiming that ‘labour is not a commodity’ – with the corollary that workers possess rights irrespective of the vagaries of the (im)balance of power in the labour market. In post-war Europe, ‘labour markets’ actually constituted markets only in limited respects: across the countries of what is now the EU, employment regimes (or industrial relations systems) came to represent varieties of institutional structures which ensured that the employer-employee relationship was not primarily determined by market forces. Despite the evident differences between national systems, in much of continental western Europe the frameworks and arrangements which embody
labour policies still contrast substantially with those in the rest of the world. There are important limits to the ways in which labour (power) can be bought and sold, often imposed through elaborate employment protection legislation and reinforced by extensive public welfare systems, as discussed further below. There is broad social and political acceptance that labour possesses distinctive collective interests which need independent representation; from this follows the idea of labour as a ‘social partner’, often with a key role in shaping social policy and administering public welfare. The autonomy of employers is constrained to a degree unknown elsewhere in the world. The governance of the employment relationship is itself diffuse.

This ‘decommodification’ of labour takes a variety of forms. First, legislation prescribes a wide range of substantive employment standards such as minimum wages, holiday entitlements and maximum working hours, as well as extensive provisions regarding health and safety. All such ‘interference’ with the labour market constrains the scope for ‘free agreement’ between employers and workers, and for precisely this reason was strenuously opposed in the heyday of laissez-faire capitalism. Likewise, employment protection legislation restricts the employer’s right to hire and fire, in contrast to the long-established US doctrine of ‘employment at will’. In essence, employment is treated as a status rather than a mere contract, one which can be terminated only for good cause and through due process.

Second, as Esping-Andersen (1990) argued in coining the term ‘decommodification’, the public provision of social welfare (or social security) systems, which support citizens in circumstances of ill-health, injury, unemployment and old age, protects the vulnerable from the vagaries of the labour market. In the view of Marshall, writing four decades earlier, this represented the creation of a ‘social citizenship’ by establishing the right to at least minimum standards of ‘economic welfare and security’ and hence to enjoy ‘the life of a civilised being’ (1950: 10-11). This ‘social safety net’ also served to strengthen all employees in their relationship with the employer, since they were not forced to choose between working or starving and could therefore exert greater bargaining power. One may also note that state action, through progressive taxation and/or the provision of universal social benefits and services, modifies the unequal outcomes which may otherwise be expected from the ‘free’ operation of labour markets characterised by inequalities of power and resources.

Third, labour is recognised as a collective ‘stakeholder’ with rights analogous to those of the share-holders. Public policy typically encourages collective bargaining, and collective agreements usually have priority over individual employment contracts, further limiting the ‘freedom’ of individual labour market actors. Moreover, centralised agreements and in some countries legal extension mechanisms result in high levels of bargaining coverage (even when union density is low). And almost universally, there are standardised national systems of workplace representation at least partially independent of management (underwritten by law or peak-level agreement, or both): a reflection of the principle that a company is not simply the private property of its owners, that employment by a firm entails membership of a workplace community and requires a form of ‘industrial citizenship’ of a democratic character.

Where do workers’ rights come from? It would be a serious mistake to assume that national labour regimes are the outcome of some historical consensus on the architecture of employment regulation. In general, workers’ rights have been established in an uneven, sedimented and contested process, involving long-term incremental adaptation and occasional radical innovation, with reverses as well as advances in decommodification. The systems emerging in each country typically reflected a contingent historical balance of class forces: rights were usually achieved as a negotiated accommodation between class interests or as a set of concessions by those in power to dampen protest from below.

Across Europe, the institutionalisation of workers’ rights – particularly as part of the various ‘post-war compromises’ at a time when the balance of class forces was particularly favourable to labour movements – was a major social achievement. But such institutionalisation has never been sufficient to prevent regression when circumstances change. Part of the reason is that formal rights acquire substance only through a process of
interpretation and application, and the meaning of the rules which embody these rights is constantly reconstructed and renegotiated by those involved. As recent experience demonstrates, it is often easier for those who wish to weaken citizenship rights to erode their practical effect rather than to attack them frontally (Crouch 2004; Streeck 2009).

Is the EU a means to resist such erosion, or on the contrary does it reinforce the recent attacks on the accrued rights and status of labour? The idea of ‘Social Europe’ has been part of the rhetoric of European integration for the past half century. The discourse of the ‘European social model’ presents both an idealised account of reality and an aspirational programme. It can thus be seen, first, as a celebration of the features of employment regimes in which workers are assigned both individual and collective rights and status. Second, the term implies the goal of generalising and extending these rights and protections through the harmonisation and upward standardisation of outcomes across the EU. From the late 1960s this aspiration was symbolised by demands for the generalisation of the rights of worker representation and co-determination which were most strongly established in Germany.

However, the notion of a ‘European social model’ is inherently ambiguous. At its strongest, it may mean an equivalence of the rights of labour and of capital: in effect, a system of dual power. More modestly, it can mean what is known in Germany as soziale Marktwirtschaft or a social market economy. Here, the key question is whether the emphasis is on ‘social’ or ‘market’. When the term was popularised by post-war christian democrats, it was a slogan for ‘free’ markets with limited social regulation; subsequently, more weight was given to the social regulation of markets, and in particular labour markets. At its weakest, the idea of a social model approximates to Polanyi’s dystopia (1944) of a ‘market society’, in which social solidarity is subordinated to market competition.

Given these incompatible meanings of ‘social Europe’, the concept is essentially contested: it possesses iconic status as an abstraction, but there is no consensus on its content. It is possible to endorse the label without signing up to any specific policy outcome. This means that its function is often cosmetic: in recent years, the rhetoric of ‘social Europe’ has often served as a disarming accompaniment to Euro-liberalism (Barbier 2008).

The Ambiguities of European (Economic) Integration

Actually existing European integration poses three interconnected challenges – economic, juridical and ideological – to labour policies which strengthen workers’ rights and status. I discuss these in sequence, before considering how the processes of EU governance tend to reinforce the threats to social regulation which supports employee rights.

Despite the rhetoric of ‘social Europe’, European economic integration, and in particular the single market project, has pointed in a diametrically opposite direction to an extended social dimension. In one sense, Europe represents a particularly strong instance at continental level of ‘globalisation’, involving transnational product market integration, corporate restructuring and financial liberalisation: threatening the traditional basis for autonomously created national socio-economic regimes. Because industrial relations systems are nationally embedded, economic internationalisation alters the preconditions for their functioning and perhaps survival. National systems of employment regulation were constructed when national economies were relatively self-contained and national governments relatively autonomous. Trade liberalisation has substantially increased the openness of markets for both goods and services; cross-national investment flows, mergers and acquisitions, and the rise of multinational companies (MNCs), have likewise externalised key influences on national economies; and the liberalisation of financial markets and the intensification of speculative pressures on individual currencies has subjected governments to new constraints. All this before the global crisis which commenced in 2008, of which more below.

The construction of Euro-capitalism has increasingly transformed the stakeholder models which facilitated decommodification into shareholder-value capitalism. In the new
economic regime, the dominant direction of policy is oriented to eliminating labour market ‘rigidities’ by reducing or removing employment protection legislation and encouraging company-specific regulatory structures, and ‘modernising’ welfare states by curbing the taxation obligations on companies and individualising responsibility for social protection. As Denord and Schwartz (2009: 47) have persuasively argued, ‘from the first steps in its construction, Europe was conceived as an instrument for the liberalisation of trade and of national economies’. What the Treaty of Rome established in 1957 was a European Economic Community. If the central adjective was quietly expunged from official communiqués a quarter of a century later, this was perhaps in embarrassed recognition that the re-launch of European integration (‘completing the single market’) was driven above all by the neoliberal project of eliminating obstacles to free trade within what was by now the Europe of the twelve: winning popular commitment required a more positive social gloss.

Yet the social dimension of European integration has always been at best ‘Janus-faced’ (Barbier and Colomb 2014). ‘The discourse of “social Europe” has as yet had only an insignificant impact on the actual regulation of citizens’ daily lives in terms of work, health, housing, retirement…. Currently, European construction means social destruction’ (Bourdieu 2001: 13-4). As Scharpf (1999) has argued, the preferred mode of Europeanisation has been ‘negative integration’, the elimination of national regulations which constitute obstacles to free movement. Negative integration reflects the priority of economic over social and political integration: a common market can be understood primarily in terms of freedom from regulations which inhibit cross-national exchange, whereas the creation of a social community depends on rights which are entrenched in new regulatory institutions.

Wedderburn (1995: 260) has demonstrated how employment regulation at European level has always owed more to a concern to ensure a ‘level playing field of competition’ for employers in different Member States, than to a concern to protect workers’ rights. The Treaty of Rome established Community competence primarily in market terms; the Single European Act was most mandatory and specific in the field of market-making (with the formalisation of qualified majority voting primarily directed to this end); the Maastricht Treaty, though celebrated by the trade union movement for its social chapter, was most binding in outcome in respect of the notorious deflationary convergence criteria for economic and monetary union (EMU). The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of 1997 strengthened the commitment to budgetary restraint; and the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 reaffirmed neoliberal economic imperatives in unambiguous terms while giving far more diffuse approval to social goals. The ‘Euro-Plus Pact’ of 2011 reinforced an economic regime which is fundamentally hostile to the status of labour. As I discuss in more detail below, this is a continuing dynamic.

Thus there is a ‘constitutional asymmetry’ expressed in a ‘selective Europeanization of policy functions’ (Scharpf, 2002: 647). This asymmetry can be traced back to the Treaty of Rome, with its requirements to eliminate obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour and to freedom of establishment. In retrospect, it is perhaps surprising how long it took for the juridical dimension of EU governance to apply the logic of this liberalising programme. For a significant period, indeed, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was widely regarded as a supporter of employment rights, for example with its creative initiatives regarding gender equality.

More recently, however, the priorities of the CJEU have shifted radically (Alter 1998). ‘Expanded judicial review in the European Union simultaneously has empowered judges, shifted agenda-setting powers away from the member states toward the European Commission, altered the character of discourse over policy reform, transformed the kinds of policy instruments that decision makers prefer to use, and dramatically changed the value of political resources traditionally employed by interest groups’ (Pierson 2004: 109). If in the past the CJEU used its discretionary competence to enhance employment protections, today it is increasingly interpreting the Treaty commitment to market freedoms as overriding national employment protection rules (Höpner and Schäfer 2010). Its landmark decisions in the Viking and Laval cases in 2007 insisted that, irrespective of national law, industrial action which interfered with freedom of movement was legitimate only if it satisfied a strict ‘proportionality’ test. This was followed in 2008 by the Rüffert and Luxembourg cases, which
set severe limits on the extent to which public authorities could prescribe minimum employment standards if these interfered with the freedom to provide services. The tenor of its recent rulings is that EU directives which limit the freedoms of movement or establishment must be minimally interpreted, and that national employment regulations – in some cases pre-dating the Treaty of Rome – which interfere with these freedoms are prima facie unacceptable.

Why has the CJEU only recently come to insist so unambiguously that market freedoms must prevail? To an important extent this must reflect the ideological hegemony of the ‘neoliberal consensus’ (Crouch 1997) which has consolidated in the past three decades. Two key dynamics underlie this hegemony. The first is the exhaustion of the social-democratic and christian-democratic ideologies which inspired the Polanyian ‘counter-movement’ in the third quarter of the twentieth century. Across western Europe, both political traditions pursued the decommodification of labour (though for rather different reasons), and governments were typically associated with one or other of these traditions (or often, with both in coalition). The programmes of collective employment rights and social protection were linked, however, to a context of economic expansion and Keynesian demand management. As stagnation and recession became the norm, neither ideology offered a coherent programmatic response, and parties from both traditions moved towards the recipes of a resurgent neoliberalism. The second key factor is the enlargement of the EU in 2004 to include member states with none of the traditions of social regulation familiar in the west, and often with a passionate commitment to the idea of ‘free’ markets. One should also note that enlargement was reflected in the composition of the CJEU, introducing a cohort of judges without the traditions of west European jurisprudence: ‘especially as a result of enlargement [the CJEU] has changed its practices, its constituency and the problems it is confronted with’ (Kilpatrick 2009: 208).

Economic theory is an instrument of warfare (Schulmeister 2014). What Soros (1998) has called ‘market fundamentalism’ and Dore (2003) the ‘market mindset’ has become part of a growing consensus at the heart of EU governance, constituting a form of class war serving the interests of the corporate elite. Though rhetorical commitment to the European social model persists, there is increasing pressure to redefine this in terms of its opposite, for the mantra of competitiveness allows diminishing legitimate space for employment protection and public welfare, hence requiring the creation of an ‘unsocial Europe’ (Gray 2004). As indicated above, enhancing competition has been a dominant objective of European integration, but the meaning of this principle is ambivalent. It requires opening up national markets for goods and services to external competitors, but – since the dynamics of capitalist concentration and centralisation always tend towards monopolisation – does not entail an increase in producers/providers at continental level: rather, erstwhile national ‘champions’ are commonly forced to the wall or taken over. What does follow, however, is that collective regulation of market outcomes – particularly as concerns employment issues – is regarded as prima facie a restraint on trade. Likewise with government regulation – at national or at EU level – the call is for ‘better regulation’ (now renamed ‘smart’ regulation) which tends to mean minimal statutory regulation in the interests of encouraging ‘entrepreneurship’ (van den Abeele 2009).

Accordingly, EU policy has moved increasingly towards neo-classical economists’ orthodoxy that employment protection is a source of labour market rigidity, creating a dichotomy between privileged ‘insiders’ and the socially excluded. The meaning of ‘flexicurity’ – a concept invented to imply that contradictory policy goals could be reconciled through some technocratic fix (Hyman 2005) – has acquired an increasingly neoliberal character, with the flexibility element unambiguously central. Workers should no longer expect status rights in their existing job but (with luck) may expect to move to another when discarded (De Vos 2009); and for this it is necessary for them to become ‘adaptable’ and ‘employable’. To a large extent this entails an individualisation of responsibility for one’s fate in the labour market. ‘Instead of protecting people from the market, social policy is increasingly seen as helping them adjust to the market’ (Hermann and Hofbauer 2007: 133).
Complementing the maxim that labour law and labour markets must be ‘modernised’ in order to enhance flexibility is the call for the ‘modernisation’ of the welfare state. Here too, individual responsibility assumes priority, entailing a retreat from universal state provision. Also central to this vision is the insistence that the primary justification for social welfare must be its contribution to economic objectives: in effect, a commodification of decommodification. As Streeck comments (2008: 13), in highlighting the economic functionality of social regulation ‘one runs the risk of forgetting how to defend it in the name of social stability and social justice, not as an economic convenience but as a right, and of implying that interventions in the “free play of market forces” that do not happen to serve efficiency – meaning, in other words, that “in reality” they cannot demonstrably be shown to aid rather than impede capital accumulation – are not worth continuing’.

In the dominant neoliberal discourse, the European social model is no longer an alternative to ‘free’ markets but is acceptable if and only if it enhances competitiveness. Otherwise ‘there is no alternative’ to the undermining of social rights; politics is reduced to technical debate on the pace and modalities of the process. The hegemony of this neoliberal ideology has been clearly demonstrated in the aftermath of the crisis which commenced in 2008. Despite the (literal) bankruptcy of neoliberal policies of deregulated markets, the EU institutions far from seeking policy alternatives have asserted even more forcefully the failed recipes of fiscal discipline, budgetary austerity, labour market flexibility, wage curbs and a diminished welfare state, as I discuss below.

Neoliberalism is facilitated by the gravitational pull of the EU constitutional framework. There is a familiar imbalance: the Parliament, the most ‘popular’ (directly elected) element in the decision-making architecture, and the most reliable supporter of an effective social dimension to European integration, is also the most limited in its powers. This is one indicator of the familiar ‘democratic deficit’. As Storey points out (2008: 72), ‘part of the power of the neoliberal EU project has lain in its ability to close itself off from democratic influence and accountability, and to render its decisions and practices non-transparent and immune from mass pressure’. Crucially, the absence of democratic accountability and the dominance of a technocratic, elite mode of governance are mutually reinforcing (Erne 2008).

In part the advance of neoliberalism reflects the imbalance of influence between labour and capital. This is not simply a matter of organizational resources. In many respects, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) is organizationally more robust than the employer counterpart BusinessEurope, though we should not forget the ranks of lobbyists and representatives retained in Brussels by individual companies and national associations, vastly outnumbering the European officials of national trade unions. Far more than veto power is exercised by the European Round Table of Industrialists, which ‘would seem to validate conspiracy theory’ (Gillingham 2003: 238): the single market project of the 1980s was largely the outcome of its strategic initiative, as was the central policy emphasis on ‘benchmarking’ and ‘competitiveness’ in the 1990s and the Lisbon agenda in the 2000s (Balanyà et al. 2003; de la Porte and Pochet 2001; van Apeldoorn 2000).

The Commission has become increasingly dominated by ‘free market’ fanatics. While the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Cohesion (DG EMPL) may be sympathetic to aspirations for social regulation of the labour market, its own influence is subordinate to that of the many others with a primarily market-making mission; for the past quarter century it has almost always been assigned a Commissioner from a ‘peripheral’ country, after the more influential briefs have been carved up amongst the heavyweights. Most prominently, these include DG ECFIN (Economic and Financial Affairs), which has been driving the agenda of fiscal conservatism, budgetary austerity and labour market flexibility; DG MARKT (Internal Market and Services), notoriously headed by Frits Bolkestein until 2004 and firmly committed to liberalisation; DG COMP, responsible for enforcing competition policy; and DG ENTR (Enterprise and Industry), which aims to ‘promote an entrepreneurial culture’ and ‘ensure an open internal market for goods’. Social policy has been ‘colonised... by the concepts and discourse of the employer sector’ (Serrano Pascual and Jepson 2006: 14). The subordination of social to economic policy within the Commission mirrors the (im)balance within most member states, almost irrespective of political coloration,
and is thus matched within the structures of the European Council, increasingly dominated by its Ecofin Council. The Economic Policy Committee (EPC), which links Commission and Council together with the European Central Bank (ECB), has a key role in shaping EU policy ‘on terms that privilege fiscal discipline over social needs and social cohesion’ (de la Porte and Pochet 2001: 299).

**Austerity and the ‘New Economic Governance’**

The synthesis of economic crisis and the ‘new economic governance’ has proved toxic. The authoritarian imposition of austerity – ‘austeritarianism’ – has intensified the structural asymmetries of the European economy, both between and within countries (Lehndorff 2014). The crisis of the euro, and of the whole European economy, reflects a policy regime ‘trapped in wrong theories and bad institutions’ (EuroMemo Group 2015: 9). EMU has ‘revealed itself to be an exercise in insanity’ (Blyth 2013: 78). Well before the current euro crisis erupted, it was widely recognised that the design of monetary union was fundamentally flawed, for a currency union is inherently unstable without accompanying political institutions to overcome macroeconomic imbalances between member states. The euro was ‘the result of a political decision to create a currency union among economically non-homogeneous countries without making any provision for the use of democratically legitimated fiscal transfers to correct asymmetric shocks’ (Armingeon and Baccaro 2012: 254). EMU tied together – without mechanisms for common macroeconomic policies – countries with conflicting trends in the ‘real’ economy while removing classic adaptation mechanisms of devaluation or interest rate adjustment (Mathieu and Sterdyniak 2014). Hancké (2013) demonstrates a key divergence within the eurozone, and thus in real effective exchange rates, between countries – most significantly, Germany – with the institutional capacity to restrain unit labour costs and hence inflation, through wage moderation and/or rapid productivity growth – ‘competitive corporatism’, as Rhodes (2001) terms it – and those lacking such coordinating institutional resources. This division maps broadly against a north-south divide within the EU, and has resulted in radically contrasting effects of the crisis (Bierbaum 2013; Hall 2014).

However, to speak of ‘the crisis’ in the singular is misleading: we may better identify an evolving succession of crises: the initial crisis of the global financial system, the resulting economic crisis and recession, the employment crisis, the sovereign debt crisis and the austerity crisis. Any assessment must also take account of the marked unevenness of the effects, for the timing and severity of the different phases of crisis have varied markedly across countries. Broadly it can be concluded that the countries of southern Europe have been most severely affected, those in the north far less so, with the important exception of Ireland; and apart from the Baltic states, the impact in most of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has been limited (Clasen et al. 2012). To take just one simple but important indicator, unemployment rates: as Table 1 demonstrates, the severity of the impact on national labour markets and the persistence of a labour market crisis have differed markedly across countries. High and persistent unemployment has primarily afflicted the southern countries of western Europe (with Ireland a similarly affected ‘peripheral’ country).

[Table 1 about here]

The sovereign debt and austerity crises have evolved even more unevenly. It is important to note that while pressures from financial markets on countries with an independent currency may compel devaluation, within a currency union the main impact is on interest rates for government bonds. This can easily result in a vicious circle, as higher bond rates increase ‘secondary’ government debt, making it even more difficult to balance the books and in turn increasing speculative pressure. Ireland – with its US-style housing bubble and deregulated financial sector – was the first victim of this process; the cost of rescuing failed banks more than doubled government debt between 2008 and 2010. In
consequence, the government obtained a bail-out in 2010 from the European Central Bank (ECB), followed by a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU) with the ‘Troika’ (the European Commission, ECB and IMF), involving a drastic austerity package. The Greek government was also forced to negotiate a bail-out with the Troika in 2010; the conditions required the country ‘to dismantle most labour market regulation and protection, and reduce the role of collective bargaining (and therefore of trade unions) in setting minimum wages’ (Crouch 2014: 13). Similar conditions were imposed on Portugal in 2011 and Cyprus in 2012. In all cases, extensive privatisation of public utilities was among the bail-out requirements, in line with the Commission’s view that ‘privatisation of public companies contributes to the reduction of public debt [and] also has the potential of increasing the efficiency of companies and, by extension, the competitiveness of the economy as a whole’ (Giudice 2012). In Spain, where as in Ireland the government spent massive sums in supporting the banks, the Eurogroup agreed in 2012 to provide a financial support package. Italy narrowly avoided a similar fate, by introducing austerity measures ‘voluntarily’ (Negrelli and Signoretti 2014), though in line with detailed instructions from the ECB, as noted below. Three non-eurozone countries – Hungary, Latvia and most notably Romania – also required financial assistance, with strings attached.

The sovereign debt crisis was aggravated by, and at the same time reinforced, the embrace of neoclassical fiscal orthodoxy within the institutions of the EU (Fazi 2014). Deflationary macroeconomic priorities date back to the establishment of EMU. The ‘convergence criteria’ defined by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty included inflation no more than 1.5% above the average of the three member states with the lowest rates; budget deficits not exceeding 3% of GDP; and government debt not exceeding 60% of GDP. The SGP gave the Commission new powers to monitor national fiscal and economic policies to enforce the deficit and debt limits; its ‘preventive arm’ entailed budgetary targets for each country, while its ‘corrective arm’ involved requirements to reduce ‘excessive’ deficits and debt levels (as defined by the Maastricht criteria). The economic logic of ‘correction’ was simple: deflation in order to achieve ‘internal devaluation’ as a substitute for the non-available option of currency devaluation. A priority was to attack public sector employment, pay and pensions, and to reduce and privatise public services. The recipe was both socially regressive and – in a context of stagnation or recession – negatively pro-cyclical: ‘austerity fuel[s] recession’ (ETUI 2013: 8). ‘Internal devaluation has appeared most effective where it has reduced domestic demand, deepening and prolonging depression. It is not the key determinant of export performance’ (ETUI 2014: 17). Such anti-Keynesian prescriptions have however been increasingly embedded in legislation at national level, led by Germany (Truger and Will 2013). As a result, cross-national differences between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ have been intensified (Armingeon and Baccaro 2012; Myant and Piasna 2014; Timbeau 2012).

The ‘new EU economic governance’, launched as part of the Europe 2020 agenda in 2010, marginalised ‘social Europe’ even further within the EU policy agenda (Bieler and Erne 2014; Degryse 2012; Jolivet et al. 2013; Pochet 2010). It institutionalised the ‘European semester’ whereby member states are required to submit draft budgetary plans which are assessed for compliance with the requirements of the SGP, leading to ‘country-specific recommendations’ (CSRs) for both economic and structural ‘reforms’. In a further turn of the screw, the Council in March 2011 adopted the ‘Euro-Plus Pact’, a more stringent successor to the SGP (Barnard 2012; Degryse and Pochet 2011; Pochet 2010). This was followed by the ‘Six Pack’ of new laws at the end of 2011, tightening budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance procedures. Even more radical was the ‘Fiscal Compact’ endorsed by all member states except the UK and the Czech Republic in December 2011; this provided that the EU institutions could impose austerity measures on member states with ‘structural deficits’ – a concept for which no objective definition exists – of over 0.5% of GDP (Corporate Europe Observatory 2012; Rocha 2014)). This was given legal status in 2013 in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). In the same year further legislation, known as the ‘Two Pack,’ reinforced the Commission’s monitoring powers and imposed stricter requirements for countries in economic difficulties. The effect was ‘a continuing shift of power away from national [level] as well as the European Parliament to
the European Council [and] expert groups, which have no political legitimiation’ (Pühringer 2014: 9). In particular, the Compact and TSCG include the principle of ‘reverse qualified majority voting’: sanctions against a member state deemed in breach of the requirements can be prevented only by roughly three-quarters of the weighted votes in the Council.

With the ‘new economic governance’, the remoteness of EU policy from democratic accountability has been radically accentuated. The Economic Policy Committee (EPC), set up by Council decision in the 1970s, has no formal status within the EU Treaties but has become increasingly central to policy formation. Even more remote is the Troika, which has no constitutional foundation whatsoever for its existence. In the case of the ECB, the Treaty (Article 130) explicitly prescribes that it should be remote from democratic influence. Its influence was revealed by the leaking of secret letters sent to the governments of Spain and Italy in August 2011 (Kilpatrick and De Witte 2014: 3; Meardi 2012a: 65), requiring austerity measures, decentralisation of collective bargaining, labour market deregulation and privatisation as the price of ECB support for government bonds.

EU Austeritarianism in Action

The increasingly authoritarian governance architecture is directed, in particular, to fostering ‘competitiveness’, for which downwards pressure on unit labour costs is deemed essential; and to facilitate this process, changes to industrial relations institutions are prescribed. As the Euro-Plus Pact insisted, in its Annex 1, ‘to ensure that growth is balanced and widespread in the whole euro area, specific instruments and common initiatives will be envisaged to foster productivity in regions lagging behind’. In consequence, member states were expected to give ‘particular attention’ to such measures as ‘review[ing] the wage setting arrangements, and, where necessary, the degree of centralisation in the bargaining process, and the indexation mechanisms, while maintaining the autonomy of the social partners in the collective bargaining process; [and] ensur[ing] that wages settlements in the public sector support the competitiveness efforts in the private sector (bearing in mind the important signalling effect of public sector wages)’. In addition, measures were mandated to secure the ‘sustainability of pensions, health care and social benefits’.

As Schulten (2013) elucidates, DG ECFIN itemised in 2012 what it regarded as ‘employment friendly reforms’. These included a general decentralisation of wage setting and collective bargaining; the creation or enlargement of scope for companies to derogate from industry-level agreements; limitation or abolition of the ‘favourability principle’ preventing decentralised negotiations from undercutting of terms and conditions negotiated at sectoral level; and limitations on extension mechanisms which require non-signatory employers to follow the terms of sectoral agreements. DG ECFIN specifically called for measures to ‘decrease bargaining coverage’ and to ‘reduce the wage-setting power of trade unions’ as an ‘employment-friendly reform’. In many respects, such developments represent a breach of core labour standards as defined by the ILO (Schömann 2015).

While such prescriptions have been required particularly stringently in the ‘programme countries’ in receipt of bail-outs, all member state budgets have become subject to increasing surveillance and prescription, and the CSRs have been framed by the philosophy outlined by DG ECFIN (Clauwaert 2013). Typically, fiscal ‘sustainability’ translates into pressures for pensions cuts, wage restraint and backcuts in social protection and public services (Stamati and Baeten 2015). This includes pressures to marketise health services: as Greer (2014: 13) concludes, ‘health care and policies in the EU are now incorporated into a new system of fiscal governance that is deliberately stacked in favor of fiscal objectives and finance ministries’. In addition, ‘modernisation’ of collective bargaining has become ‘a widely used euphemism that, in practical terms, points to a higher political pressure [for] wage restraint and... more decentralized wage-setting mechanisms’ (Rocha 2014: 15). The result, as Oberndorfer (2013) has termed it, has been ‘a Troika for everyone’.
When analysing recent changes in industrial relations and social policy, it is not fully possible to disentangle EU pressures from the initiatives of national governments of a neoliberal inclination, and the continuation of longer-term trends from the impact of the crisis. In the Mediterranean countries in particular, however, external imposition in the context of crisis is obvious (Monastiriotis et al. 2013). As Meardi has commented (2012a: 75), ‘in a few months, the European Commission and the ECB achieved what Spanish and Italian employers and rightwing government had not even dared to ask. Labour resistance, which had previously had some success, is now in a weaker position when fighting a more elusive opponent, uninterested in local political exchange and unaffected by general strikes.’ In Greece, a particularly serious legal change was the authorisation of ‘associations of persons’ with no necessary independence from the employer to sign collective agreements at enterprise level.

In the programme countries more generally, ‘the combined effect of more governmental unilateralism and decentralisation of collective bargaining led to less [multi-employer bargaining] and a drop in collective bargaining coverage.... One is tempted to tag this process as “East-Europeanisation” of industrial relations in times of crisis’ (Curtarelli et al. 2014: 14). Most of these countries have seen moves to decentralise collective bargaining, restrict extension mechanisms, undermine the favourability principle and weaken provisions for expiring agreements to remain in force until renegotiated (Marginson 2014). Table 2 shows that there have also been significant changes to dilute minimum wage legislation and to end cost-of-living indexation; but while concentrated in the Mediterranean countries, such developments have been far more widespread. As the ETUI indicated (2013: 91), in the 2012-13 CSRs ‘16 out of 27 member states [were] advised to rework their wage-setting systems in order to allow alignment with productivity development and/or to review their wage indexation system’; in Belgium and Sweden, governments were asked to reduce their minimum wages.

[Table 2 about here]

More generally, the growing dominance of DG ECFIN over Commission policy in the social field, and its negative view of both public provision and employment protection, have made the crisis the occasion for attacks on established workers’ rights. Many governments, not only in the programme countries, have weakened statutory protections for standard employment contracts and encouraged the spread of precarious contracts (Heyes and Lewis 2014). Closely linked has been the erosion of mechanisms of social concertation between governments, unions and employers which were previously widely acclaimed as a source of consensual adaptation to economic challenges. ‘Prior to the “great recession”, the process of involving organized labour in the making of social pacts was conceived as one of the most likely strategies for successfully mobilizing societal support for challenging reforms.... In the past 5 years, however, trade unions have been notable by their absence from reform initiatives’ (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012). ‘National governments, regardless of partisanship, have actively rejected a process of negotiated adjustment that includes unions. Furthermore, the core actors of the Eurozone are encouraging member-states to establish governments capable of acting without trade union support’ (Culpepper and Regan 2014: 724). In Cyprus, for example, ‘the onset of the economic crisis and the austerity policies that [had] begun in 2011 and intensified in 2012–2013 effectively undermined... the previously celebrated institution of the “social dialogue”. Austerity policies were imposed by the government [and] the parliament in the prequel and sequel of the Memorandum with the Troika, sometimes without even keeping the pretences’ (Ioannou and Sonan 2014: 15). The rejection of social dialogue in part reflects the increased weakness of trade unions, but also a belief that governments which impose radical change in the face of trade union resistance are more likely to win the ‘confidence’ of speculators, bond markets and ratings agencies.

The outcome is by now well documented. In many countries there has been a substantial decline in collective bargaining coverage: most dramatically in Portugal, where the number of workers covered by collective agreements fell from 1.9 million in 2008 to 0.3
million in 2012 and 0.2 million in 2013 (Rocha and Stoleroff 2014: 168). The impact of ‘structural reforms’ has seen in many countries a rapid growth of a low-wage sector with weak unionisation and little or no collective bargaining. Not surprisingly, inequality increased between 2008 and 2012 in the majority of EU member states (ETUI 2014: 46), intensifying the risks of continuing recession and increasing the proportion of the population at risk of poverty or social exclusion – whether through unemployment, in-work poverty caused by ‘atypical’ employment contracts or loss of social benefits and services for those outside the labour market. In the eurozone, those at persistent risk of poverty increased from 8.8% in 2008 to 10.1% in 2012, and those suffering severe material deprivation from 5.9% to 7.7% of the population (European Commission 2015: 300). In particular, loss of affordable healthcare services has been a major source of poverty for those in employment and outside employment alike (ETUI 2014: 51).

What Options for Resistance?

‘Is resistance futile?’, asks Bailey (2014). His answer is, in effect: not necessarily. However, it is inadequate to rely on traditional repertoires of action. To fight back against the odds requires strategic imagination, new alliances and transnational learning and solidarity. In this respect, the resources of modern information technology have created new opportunities. But the crisis, and neoliberalism which provoked it, also creates a dilemma. As the current Greek finance minister has put it (Varoufakis 2015), ‘the question that arises for radicals is this: should we welcome this crisis of European capitalism as an opportunity to replace it with a better system? Or should we be so worried about it as to embark upon a campaign for stabilising European capitalism?’ To me, the answer is clear. Europe’s crisis is far less likely to give birth to a better alternative to capitalism than it is to unleash dangerously regressive forces that have the capacity to cause a humanitarian bloodbath, while extinguishing the hope for any progressive moves for generations to come.’ This ‘pessimistic’ assessment certainly conditions and constricts many reactions, as I indicate below.

In the next three sections, I consider first trade union responses, then the initiatives of newer social movements and spontaneous protests, and finally the experience of action in the political arena. I also argue, and develop in my conclusions, that the boundaries between these categories are increasingly fluid, and indeed that effective resistance requires their close interaction.

Trade Unions: Between Opposition and Damage Limitation

With often depleted resources as a result of a long-term loss of membership, unions at national level have not been well placed to respond to the crisis: ‘generally they have been in disarray when confronted by a historical process in which they no longer feel involved’ (Dufresne and Pernot 2013: 14). There is evidence both of radical or conflictual initiatives, and of a reinforcement of cooperation and partnership; and often the two types of response have been paradoxically interconnected, as I indicate below. Radical actions, whether company-level conflicts or national general strikes – most notably in Greece and Spain – have often been defensive in objectives. This does not mean, however, that such radical actions have been unsuccessful, even though Deppe (2013: 10) refers to the ‘impotence’ of such mass protests. As Hamann et al. have shown in a series of publications (2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2015), general strikes have tended to force concessions from governments, for whom they also often have adverse electoral consequences. However, much of their data derive from the period before the crisis; as suggested above, governments seeking to impress international creditors may welcome confrontation with trade unions as a demonstration of fiscal rectitude. Conversely, efforts to seek consensual solutions through social dialogue have confronted an intensified opposition of class interests (who will pay for the crisis?) and diminished space for positive-sum outcomes.
‘There can be no return to business as usual’ was an almost unanimous trade union reaction when the crisis first hit. Yet historically, trade unions almost universally have consolidated their institutional status as pragmatic negotiators, and their predominant aim has seemed to be to negotiate with those wielding political and economic power for a tighter regulatory architecture for financialised capitalism, rather than leading an oppositional movement for an alternative socio-economic order. Two familiar and intersecting contradictions of union action have been evident. One – articulated by Varoufakis in the remarks quoted above – is the dilemma of short-term imperatives versus long-term objectives. A Belgian union leader commented: ‘it is easy to say: we need to change the balance of forces. But that does not tell us how to proceed…. Our members expect us to look after their immediate interests.’ An Italian leader made a rather similar point. ‘Right now it is difficult to discuss strategy, insofar as we are bound to react to situations of crisis…. As the first priority we have demanded an end to dismissals, then the application of every means of income maintenance, after which we can develop general analyses of industrial reconversion’ (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013: 124-5).

The second contradiction is between a global economic crisis and trade union action that is essentially national or indeed sub-national in character. In many respects the crisis has reinforced ‘economic patriotism’ (Clift and Woll 2012; Fetzer 2012); while the supranational trade union organisations – the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) at global level, and the ETUC – were largely consigned by the unexpected crisis to the role primarily of spectators, with little impact on the evolving policy responses at national and supranational levels. Both produced sound analyses of the economic roots of the crisis and proposals for expansionary policy responses. In the case of the ETUC, this involved a frontal critique of the ‘new economic governance’ introduced by the EU. In a statement entitled Solidarity in the Crisis (2011) it denounced the EU policies as ‘totally unacceptable to the trade unions of Europe’ and called for a radical reversal. This was followed by an analytically impressive call for a ‘social compact for Europe’, adopted in 2012. However, as a Belgian union leader commented at a meeting of the ETUC Steering Committee in April 2012, ‘our alternatives would not be applied if there was no “rapport de force”.’ On the contrary, the crisis and its aftermath have brought a radical shift in the balance of forces, gravely weakening trade unions. Indeed the dominant response at national level has been to defend and enhance competitiveness, meaning a struggle of country against country, workplace against workplace, intensifying the downwards pressure on wages and conditions.

The onset of the crisis provoked a variety of conflictual responses at workplace level, including a spate of sit-ins against job cuts and plant closures, reminiscent of the struggles of the 1970s. France in 2009 saw a number of episodes of ‘boss-napping’, when senior managers were held hostage by workers; in three cases, workers threatened to blow up their factories with gas cylinders. This radicalism, however, was consistent with ‘the presence of a strong, generalised cultural acceptance of direct action in labour issues’ (Hayes 2012: 190), which can be traced back to the French revolutionary tradition. Such actions were typically spontaneous initiatives from below, not coordinated and often not supported by the official national unions. Nor did radical forms of action imply similar radicalism of objectives. In most cases, such workplace struggles seemed gestures of defiance and despair, with little belief that they would prevent announced closures or job losses. Rather, the aim was commonly to limit the number of dismissals or to achieve improved redundancy packages. For this reason, such disputes were usually relatively easy to resolve.

A widely publicised British dispute against job losses began in 2009 at the Lindsey oil refinery in Lincolnshire, owned by the French multinational Total. The company subcontracted a construction project to an Italian firm employing only foreign labour – displacing existing workers – on terms inferior to those specified in the British collective agreement for the sector. An unofficial strike quickly escalated, with sympathy action across the country. Though widely depicted as a xenophobic incident, the strike is better regarded as a (largely successful) effort to defend collectively agreed conditions against attempts by a
foreign service provider to use ‘free movement’ to undercut these (Barnard 2009; Meardi 2012b).

In a survey of responses to the crisis, Glassner and Galgóczi (2009) found widespread agreements on ‘partial unemployment’ or short-time working, often buttressed by partial pay compensation from public funds as well as by company negotiations to enhance compensation above statutory levels. In Germany, though more systematic job-saving measures were pursued, in many companies (often with at least tacit union approval) the protection of the core workforce was at the expense of temporary workers; the same occurred in Austria. In Denmark, badly affected by the crisis, numerous company agreements provided for work-sharing. The Dutch government subsidised short-time working and temporary lay-offs for firms in difficulties; while in Belgium, a substantial recovery package included funding for ‘technical unemployment’ and special provisions for short-time working and temporary lay-offs. In France too, the government funded a programme of ‘partial unemployment’ (chômage partiel); nevertheless temporary workers bore the brunt of the crisis. In Italy, a long established system of lay-off pay (cassa integrazione guadagni) was widely used to cushion job losses. Another demand pursued successfully in some countries, primarily at company level, was for temporary periods of slack demand to be used for vocational (re)training rather than resorting to lay-offs. Again, this was facilitated in some countries by state subsidies. However, where such damage limitation could be agreed, transnational responses to crisis were subordinated to purely national strategies (Bernaciak 2013).

One outcome of the crisis has been a widespread reinforcement of wage moderation, with employers in some cases pressing for downwards renegotiation of existing pay agreements. Negotiations over restructuring and job reductions, with the aim of agreeing some form of ‘social plan’, were common across most countries. Even in parallel with symbolic protest action, unions have often endeavoured to manage the crisis through peak-level social dialogue: what Urban (2012) has called ‘crisis corporatism’. Most unions have accepted, tacitly or explicitly, the dictates of national ‘competitiveness’ (Marginson and Welz 2014), becoming ‘responsible co-designers of austerity’ (Bohle 2011: 100). As noted above, this has intensified downwards pressures on wages and conditions.

Crisis corporatism is inevitably antipathetic to cross-national solidarity. It may also erode within-country solidarity: the most forceful resistance has typically involved public sector unions, whose members have borne the brunt of austerity but have often been deprived of private sector support. In Ireland, for example, there was barely concealed antagonism between public and private sector unions. In Italy and Portugal, there were major divisions between the main confederations. To a lesser extent, the same has been true in Belgium. In the Netherlands, the main confederation FNV was almost torn apart by conflicts over the raising of the pension age. Italy has seen a number of coordinated national strikes and protest actions, but in most cases these have not involved cooperation between all three main confederations.

The Contradictions of Crisis Corporatism

The contradiction between national conceptions of economic self-interest and a politically informed rhetoric of cross-border solidarity has been very apparent in the aftermath of the crisis. Despite official awareness at national level that (at least in the medium term) ‘European policy is national policy’ (Foglar 2011: 8), short-term preoccupation with challenges at national level has assumed priority. Beyond largely ineffectual protests, there has been little coordinated cross-national response. ‘Since 2008-2009, increasingly massive mobilisations have essentially been organised at national level without taking account of the timetable proposed by the ETUC… and most often lack a transnational dimension’ (Dufresne and Pernot 2013: 21). Hence resistance to austerity has tended to involve a ‘patchwork of often uncoordinated action’ with ‘no thought-through strategic plan for getting mass support to bring down the plans of the Commission’, in the words of the secretary of the (then) European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) (Scherrer 2011: 36). As noted above, there has
been a contradiction between a global economic crisis on the one hand, and trade union action that framed at national or sub-national level. Lemb and Urban (2014: 50-1) conclude that while unions attempt ‘in especially crisis-torn countries to brace themselves against the economically, politically, and socially disastrous crisis policy... there is little sign of a broad Europe-wide trade union resistance’. In Germany, ‘the European crisis and the far-reaching economic, social, and political dislocations that neoliberal austerity policy has unleashed appears from those employed here as problems occurring far away [and] a solidary management of the crisis in Europe is less important or unimportant’. This is despite the efforts of most northern trade union movements, including those in Germany, to express their support for their counterparts in the south: a solidaristic response articulated, for example, in a powerful resolution adopted by the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) in May 2010 and its appeal to support the new Greek government in February 2015. In a Europe dominated by the hegemony of neoliberalism, however, unions have been largely unable to win over public opinion by highlighting the common ‘risk community’ and pointing to progressive, solidaristic solutions.

This reflects a more general failure of trade unions to win the battle of ideas. In general, Eurobarometer surveys show a rather low level of trust in trade unions, and overall the level has deteriorated since the crisis. Figure 1 shows the net trust expressed in the six largest EU countries, together with Greece: negative in most countries before the crisis, in most this has become accentuated; only in Germany does trust remain positive, and indeed has increased; the countries worst affected by the crisis have tended to show the greatest decline.

Three caveats are however in order. First, there is a general and increasing distrust of most national institutions. For example in the autumn 2010 Eurobarometer (which appears to be the last when respondents were asked about trust in national institutions including trade unions), across the EU 27 net trust in unions was -11, but in political parties was -65, in national government -39, the national parliament -31, big business -29 and religious institutions -10. Second, the meaning of the survey results may be questioned. In some waves of the Eurobarometer, a different question is asked: do various concepts bring to mind something positive or negative? Here, as Figure 2 indicates, a rather different pattern emerges: in most countries the responses regarding trade unions are positive, though indeed the crisis countries stand out as more negative, and positive views have sharply declined. This illustrates the familiar point that relatively minor differences in survey questions can evoke strikingly different findings, and also that political attitudes are often inchoate and contradictory. (In autumn 2014, 70% of respondents reacted positively to the idea of free trade, and 37% to the idea of protectionism; likewise, 50% to flexibility and 60% to security.) Third, it is unclear why respondents distrust trade unions: is it because their militancy is blamed for the crisis, or because they are regarded as not militant enough in defending the victims of the crisis? In some of the worst affected countries, the latter is a plausible explanation.

This is a particularly important issue because those worst affected by the crisis – in particular young people, those with precarious contracts, women, immigrants – are least likely to be unionised, as indicated in Table 3. However, in many countries trade unions have made serious efforts in recent years to recruit such groups and to represent their interests (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013; Pedersini 2010). To give just one example: at the 2011 congress of the German metalworkers’ union IG Metall its president, Berthold Huber, made youth policies the first item in his address, declaring that ‘IG Metall with over 200,000 young members is the biggest youth organization in Germany’. Temporary agency work, which has grown very rapidly among new workers in German metal-working, has been a
major union theme since 2008, with a campaign for equal pay and for transition to permanent employment. Another initiative, launched in 2009, was *Operation Übernahme*, in response to the declining opportunities for apprentices to secure permanent jobs at the end of their training: young members themselves devised the campaign themes, materials and actions. The demand for them to be ‘taken on’ into permanent employment was a key issue in the 2012 bargaining round, and achieved at least partial success. As a result of these initiatives, young workers’ membership seems to have stabilized or even increased (Dobbert 2010), and the union as a whole is once more growing.

Despite a widespread assumption that young people see trade unions as conservative, boring and old-fashioned, and prefer the greater spontaneity and openness of other forms of social action, hard evidence is limited. Recent Eurobarometer data set out in Table 4 suggest that while young people (age 15-24) are considerably more likely than others to consider demonstrations an effective means of making their views felt, they are also more likely to consider strikes effective; they are less likely to think that voting makes a difference, but no less likely to think it useful to join a political party; and while somewhat more likely to consider joining a non-governmental organisation (NGO) an effective step, they are roughly average in thinking the same of joining a union. Of course, there is a gap between attitudes and actions. But this points to an openness in perspectives, and also implies that there is no clear dichotomy between being pro-union and pro-NGO. Indeed a key question is how far trade unionism and other forms of collective action and protest may interact. This is one of the themes I consider next.

New Social Movements, New Social Protests?

As noted above, it is common to contrast trade unions, with their elaborate formal decision-making structures and in many countries with a status as recognised ‘social partners’ within a system of elite policy formation, and more spontaneous, often activist-led social movements and NGOs. As I have suggested, such a dichotomy is questionable. Almost universally, unions emerged historically as social movements which challenged key principles of the prevailing social and economic order, depending for their effectiveness on their ability to persuade, first their own constituents but also the broader community, of the legitimacy of their vision and their objectives. With time, however, unions became increasingly dependent for their survival on institutionalised internal routines and formalised external relationships with employers and governments. As Gramsci noted (1977), negotiation with external interlocutors could yield an ‘industrial legality’ which could bring organisational (and material) advantages, yet could also weaken the organic, ideational resonance with those whose aspirations unions sought to voice. Trade unions are themselves – or at least should be – ‘non-governmental’ organisations; and there is a considerable literature which insists, as did Herberg (1943: 406) long ago, that any trade union is at one and the same time ‘a businesslike service organization, operating a variety of agencies under a complicated system of industrial relations’ and ‘an expression and vehicle of the historical movement of the submerged laboring masses for social recognition and democratic self-determination.... The union, as an institution, is thus in the grip of a very real contradiction.’ Or one may recall Mills’ analysis of the dialectic of mobilisation and routinisation of workers’ action (1948: 8): ‘the labor leader is a manager of discontent’. The task of sustaining collective commitment and organisational effectiveness – within the limits imposed by a hostile environment – required a delicate alternation between encouraging militancy and containing it. Much recent debate on the prospects and character of ‘social
movement unionism’ (Moody 2007; Waterman 1993) is precisely an effort to identify a progressive reconciliation of this contradiction.

One should also note that an analogous tension applies to all NGOs. McIlroy (2000: 3) highlights a distinction in the literature ‘between insider and outsider groups. Insider groups are accepted as legitimate by government and regularly consulted over policy.... Insiders feel pressure to distance themselves from direct action and may become prisoner groups, dependent upon government. Outsider groups, in contrast, have no wish to become involved in routinised relations or are unable to achieve recognition by government. They may lack the skills and resources to take the inside track or eschew it because of radical ideology and objectives. Outsider groups rely on mass protest and strikes or civil disobedience.’ Trade unions in many countries shifted from primarily outsider status to an insider role in the twentieth century (though this became jeopardised under neoliberalism), but many other NGOs have followed a similar trajectory. At European level, a domestication of contention was extended beyond trade unions to other representatives of ‘civil society’ through the ‘civil dialogue’ launched in 1994: in part a project to gain the EU some of the legitimacy of popular social movements drawn into ‘partnership’, while diminishing the latter’s spontaneity and accentuating their bureaucratic aspects. Just as in trade unions, a shift to insider status has provoked internal conflict, with battles (as among the German Greens in the 1980s) between ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘realists’.

A notable feature of the crisis has been the emergence of a range of new ‘outsider’ movements, particularly in the worst affected countries, generating a form of ‘subterranean politics’ (Pianta and Gerbaudo 2014). The actions have tended to display a high participation of young people, often with a focus on the predicament of the ‘precarious generation’ worst affected by the crisis.

Certainly the best known example is constituted by the Spanish Indignados or Movimiento 15-M, which developed from demonstrations on 15 May 2011, organised largely through social media. The most notable were the occupations of the Puerta del Sol in Madrid and the Plaza Catalunya in Barcelona (Castañeda 2012), but these spread rapidly to many other Spanish cities. The Indignados have been described as ‘a movement with two souls’ (Taibo 2012): one comprising activists with a background in the alter-globalisation campaigns (as in many other European countries, supporters of ATTAC were prominent in the protests) or in demonstrations against the Iraq war (of which the right-wing Spanish government was a strong supporter); the other young people, mainly highly educated and with little or no background in political activism, whose hopes of a comfortable career had been dashed. Even in 2005, before the crisis, a young graduate coined the label mileurista (Alguacil 2005), lamenting that despite a string of qualifications and some years of work experience it was only possible to earn €1000 (mil euros) a month. A decade later, when Spanish youth unemployment was almost 60% and almost two-thirds of those employed had temporary contracts (Mascherini et al. 2014), a commentator (Montoya 2014) noted wryly that most young people with similar qualifications could now only dream of earning mil euros; the label now was Generación nimileurista (Pérez-Lanzac 2012). The group Juventud Sin Futuro (Youth with No Future), formed in early 2011 from a variety of student groups protesting against the dire labour market situation, played an important role in M-15.

An important component of the movement was the group ¡Democracia Real YA! (Real Democracy NOW!), also formed at the beginning of 2011 to contest widespread corruption and the evident ineffectiveness of formal democratic institutions. National political decision-making had become seen as impotent under the yoke of the international financial institutions (IFIs); while the two main parties – the conservative Partido Popular (PP) and the social-democratic Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) – had converged so far in their policies that their initials were combined contemptuously as PPSOE. This demand for ‘real democracy’ has been a broader international phenomenon (Ortiz et al. 2013).

A particularly important issue in Spain (though also evident elsewhere) has been the impact of the crisis on families previously encouraged to take out mortgages to buy their homes but no longer able to sustain repayments on properties the value of which had collapsed. The Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH, Platform of Mortgage
Victims), created in 2009 in Barcelona, soon became a nation-wide movement, in particular organising occupations of vacant properties for those made homeless by the banks (García Lamarca 2014). Another development which overlapped with the M-15 movement was the formation of different coloured ‘tides’ of public employees and users of their services, such as the Marea Blanca in the health sector and the Marea Verde in education: the colours worn in mass on demonstrations against cuts and privatisation.

Spanish trade unionism is numerically weak by west European standards (density around 15%) but the two main confederations, Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO) and Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), became entrenched in public policy-making after the fall of the dictatorship in the 1970s. For many Indignados, they were as much part of the problem as were the mainstream political parties: at best negotiating the terms of austerity rather than leading forceful opposition. Los políticos nos roban, los sindicatos nos venden, la patronal nos esclaviza, los bancos nos estafan y la prensa nos miente, ran one slogan (‘the politicians rob us, the unions sell us, the employers enslave us, the banks swindle us and the press lies to us’). Yet ‘the divide between the world of trade union activists and that of the Indignados was less clear-cut than claimed by some’ (Béroud 2014: 29), and by 2012 there were signs of a growing rapprochement. Key sections of M-15 decided to support the general strikes called by the main confederations in that year (though certainly working more closely with smaller, radical or anarchist unions), while the confederations for their part began to play an important role in the Mareas. The Indignados in turn helped enlarge the repertoire of trade union action, calling for ‘inclusive’ strikes in which the unemployed, students, precarious workers and other citizens could participate (Cerillo Vidal 2013: 43).

In Portugal, as in Spain, ‘trade unions have been involved in organizing mass protest action, although their capacity for mobilization was surpassed on various occasions by more spontaneous demonstrations of protest’ (Rocha and Stoleroff 2014: 152). In particular, the two main confederation CGTP (Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses) and UGT (União Geral de Trabalhadores), unlike their Spanish counterparts, have been fundamentally divided. While the former has maintained ‘all-out opposition to the MoU’, the latter ‘has been more cautious’ and was willing to negotiate the terms of austerity (Rocha and Stoleroff 2014: 172).

Union division increased the space for other vectors of resistance. Though unemployment has been less severe than in Spain, over half of young Portuguese workers had temporary contracts even before the crisis. In 2007 the movement Precários Inflexíveis (PI, Precarious but Inflexible) emerged as a virtual association of unemployed and precarious workers, and played an important part in highlighting the problems confronting young and often highly educated entrants to the labour market. Other groups were formed at the same time with a focus on specific sections of precarious workers. A key aim was to develop a ‘cyber-cultural politics’ which recognised precarious workers as a distinct group with common interests and a common identity (Fonseca 2011). Following the runaway success of a pop song Parva que sou (‘How stupid I am’), which mocked the passivity of young people enduring precarious work and low pay despite their academic qualifications, mass protest was initiated by a call on Facebook, with the slogan Geração à Rasca (Generation that Struggles to Survive, or Desperate Generation); several hundred thousand protestors took over the streets of Lisbon and other cities on 12 March 2011. This was one of the biggest demonstrations since the Portuguese revolution of 1974 (Estanque et al. 2013). The initiative helped inspire the May protests in Spain, which was in turn followed by the occupation of the Praça do Rossio in May, in part in solidarity with the Spanish Indignados (Baumgarten 2013). Created in June 2012 (with a strong involvement of activists from the CGTP and the Partido Comunista Português), the movement Que se lixe a troika! Queremos as nossas vidas! (Fuck the Troika, We Want Our Lives Back) has since played a major role in challenging externally imposed austerity, often coordinating protest demonstrations with the CGTP (Campos Lima and Martin Artiles 2014).

Though most initial protests occurred independently of the trade unions, as in Spain there has been some subsequent convergence. PI cooperated with the CGTP in anti-government protests in October 2012, and helped mobilise for the general strike in the
following month. In its Manifesto, PI insists that trade unions remain the most representative associations of workers, but adds that the world of work has changed and that trade union structures must change to accommodate temporary workers, those forced into dependent self-employment and the unemployed. ‘Insisting on an antagonism between those who, for various reasons, are remote from experience of organisation and the world of trade unionism helps nobody and weakens the working class as a whole.’ And indeed, Accornero and Ramos Pinto (2015: 501) conclude from their study of protest events that ‘contrary to the emphasis on “new new” movements, labour has remained throughout the most significant protest actor’.

In Greece, resistance to Troika-imposed austerity was strongly influenced by the Spanish example, with Amesi Dimokratia Tora! (Direct Democracy Now!) formed in May 2011 and helping initiate a mass occupation of Plateia Syntagma (Constitution Square, in front of the parliament) as a forum for direct discussion and debate. The label Aganaktismeni was soon applied as a direct equivalent of Indignados.

As in Portugal and Spain, Greek trade unions are weak in terms of membership, particularly in the private sector. Traditionally, they have had little financial need for members because of payments received from the welfare fund (ergatiki estia) to which all private sector workers are required to contribute. Formally, there is a cohesive structure of trade unionism, with two main confederations, GSEE for the private sector and nationalised enterprises, and ADEDY for civil servants, and the two cooperate closely. But unity is superficial. First, the confederations are highly factionalised, with formal internal groupings linked to the various political parties. Second, trade unionism is in practice highly decentralised, with ‘primary’ organisations at workplace or occupational level constituting the building blocks for higher-level structures. These features contribute to a pattern of ritualised mass militancy and limited strategic capacity.

As in Spain, those resisting austerity often dismissed the unions as components of the established institutional structure; but there also developed a certain rapprochement. Thus the unions ‘were obliged… to invent new repertoires of collective action and to mobilise new power resources. Within this framework, more radical types of demand and new alliances have emerged’ (Karakioulafis 2015).

One form of resistance which has often involved coalitions of trade unions and other social actors has been the mounting of legal challenges – in constitutional courts or supranational bodies – to austerity measures. Kilpatrick and De Witte (2014: 5) suggest that ‘Greek unions and worker-pensioner associations have adopted the most active and multi-pronged approach to fundamental rights challenges’. This has included a complaint to the ILO by the main union confederations, which resulted in an implicitly critical report (ETUI 2014: 65; ILO 2011). The Greek unions also submitted a successful complaint to the European Committee of Social Rights (an institution of the Council of Europe, a body completely separate from the EU), on the grounds that some of the legal changes were incompatible with its European Social Charter. Kilpatrick and De Witte (2014: 5) add that – in a broader European perspective – ‘the dominance of trade unions and associations of pensioners (former workers) in taking legal challenges has meant that work rights and occupational pensions have been central to many challenges whilst there are few traces of challenges to health and education cuts’. However, in Portugal and Spain, constitutional review mechanisms have been used in response to ‘cuts (or reduced coverage) of welfare benefits and health care services. Housing was a special focus of legal mobilisation in Spain.’ In Portugal in particular, legal challenges have successfully blocked a number of austerity measures (Rocha and Stoleroff 2014).

One iconic Greek example of resistance was provided by the workers at the construction materials manufacturer Vio.Me in Thessaloniki, which was closed by its owners in May 2011. Many of its workers, members of a militant ‘primary’ union, occupied the factory in order to prevent the employers from selling the machinery when the workers were owed nearly €1.5 million in wages and redundancy payments. A nation-wide (and international) solidarity movement was created, and in February 2013 the workers re-started production under self-management. One of their first initiatives was to develop a new range of
environmentally-friendly cleaning products that was easy to finance and was produced using local and natural ingredients. In April 2014, Vio.Me attained the legal status of a cooperative, operating on a non-profit basis, with any surpluses to return to the wider community (Andritsos and Velegakis 2014; Karyotis 2014).

In Italy, almost 30% of workers aged 15-24 are unemployed and almost 40% of those in work are on temporary contracts. A range of ‘atypical’ contracts, including the proliferation of dependent self-employment, was facilitated by legislative changes, in particular the ‘Biagi law’ of 2003. Most new labour market entrants can obtain short-term contracts at best. This has posed special problems for Italian unions, given their exceptional age profile (half their members being pensioners) and the fact that older employees who dominate union structures are likely to possess permanent contracts: unions risk being regarded by younger workers as organizations of the older generations, primarily committed to defending their distinctive interests (Molina and Rhodes 2007). Perhaps for this reason, all three main confederations established special unions for precarious workers in the late 1990s (Burroni and Carriero 2011; Leonardi 2001). Such initiatives were however double-edged: while offering a dedicated structure for mainly young workers with non-standard contracts, they risked segregating such workers from the unions ‘core’ membership (Murgia and Selmi 2012).

Some of the most prominent actions on behalf of these workers, however, have occurred outside the formal framework of trade unionism. The San Precario movement, named after the fictitious ‘patron saint’ of temporary workers, was created in 2004 to highlight the issue of labour market insecurity, in similar ways to PI in Portugal. But the methods were distinctive: mimicking Italian religiosity, activists carried effigies of San Precario on their demonstrations, invented the prayer of San Precario and combined street theatre with political campaigning. ‘We are eco-activists and media-activists, we are the libertarians of the Net and the metroradicals of urban spaces, we are the transgender mutations of global feminism, we are the hackers of the terrible real’, declared one of their manifestos. ‘We are the agitators of precariat and the insurgents of cognitariat. We are anarchosocialists and post-socialist. We are all migrants looking for a better life’ (Tari and Vanni 2005). The dual objective has been to help construct a common identity and self-confidence among precarious workers, and to engage in a form of cultural subversion which challenges taken-for-granted understandings of economy and society.

Italy has been an important locus of resistance to the EU privatisation agenda. A long process of creeping privatisation of municipal water supplies provoked a number of local initiatives, which led to the formation in Florence in 2003 of the Forum Alternatif Mondial de l’Eau (FAME, Alternative World Water Forum). The Forum Italiano dei Movimenti per l’Acqua (FIMA, Italian Forum of Water Movements) was established three years later, as an unusually broad alliance of local groups, NGOs, trade unions and religious organisations. When the Berlusconi government in 2009 adopted a law requiring municipalities to put water provision out to private tender, the movement used its constitutional right to organise a referendum, calling for a campaign of ‘civil obedience’ to overturn the legislation. The result of the vote in June 2011 was a 95% majority against privatisation on a 57% turnout (Berlusconi had hoped that abstentions by his supporters would prevent the required 50% threshold being met). Displaying its contempt for democratic process, the ECB in its ‘secret letter’ two months later effectively called on Berlusconi to ignore the result, demanding ‘the full liberalisation of local public services... through large-scale privatisation’ as a condition of a rescue package; but with the change of government the plans were dropped, after the constitutional court ruled against regulations designed to circumvent the popular vote.

The Italian achievement, it has been said – with only a degree of hyperbole – ‘really shook the whole of Europe’ (Fattori 2013a: 378). In 2012, the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) launched a campaign for a European Citizens’ Initiative – a mechanism introduced in the Lisbon Treaty, which took effect in 2009 – on the right to water (Fattori 2013b). Right2Water, a broad coalition of unions and NGOs, was established to manage the campaign, and succeeded in obtaining almost double the number of one million citizens necessary for demands to be discussed by the European Parliament (EP). In part,
this initiative can be seen as a part of a longer-term struggle to defend public services (Marcon and Zola 2007), from the mobilisations against the ‘Bolkestein Directive’ for the liberalisation of services in 2005-6 to the current fight against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). But the principle of ‘water as a human right’ acquired particular sensitivity, and the Italian experience has been replicated elsewhere. The Troika bail-out packages included a requirement, in the case of Portugal, to privatise the state-owned water company, Águas do Portugal; and in Greece, to sell off a large number of public assets, including the water companies for Athens and Thessaloniki. In the first case, a major campaign, Água de todos (Water for All), gathered 40,000 signatures, and achieved a parliamentary debate in October 2014. In Thessaloniki, a referendum was organised despite government attempts to block it; EPSU took a lead in coordinating financial support and volunteers to help as international observers. The referendum took place in May 2014, at the same time as local elections, and achieved a 97% vote against privatisation.

Meanwhile in Italy, FIMA has helped coordinate a series of successful initiatives at local level to maintain water as a public service and in some cases to re-municipalise privatised provision. Most notably, a long campaign backed by a popular petition in the region of Lazio (which includes Rome) succeeded in March 2014 when the regional government approved a law declaring water a service of public interest, and thus not subject to compulsory competitive tendering. Italian campaigns to sustain water as a ‘common good’ can also be seen as expressions of broader eco-activism (Mattei 2013). A major example is the NoTAV campaign against the projected high-speed rail link between Lyon and Turin, which would have caused considerable environmental damage (Zucchetti 2013). Initially opposed by most trade unions which saw the project as a source of employment, No-TAV has subsequently won the support of the main confederation, Confederazione generale italiana del lavoro (CGIL).

A particular issue for young labour market entrants in Ireland has been the severe cutback in benefit payments to the unemployed aged under 25, coupled with pressure by the authorities to emigrate. This provoked a movement ‘We’re Not Leaving’, which has developed into a wide-ranging campaigning movement, working in conjunction with the Union of Students and the youth sections of a number of trade unions. As one of its organisers commented (Murphy 2013), ‘despite the name, it is not just a campaign against forced emigration. We chose that phrase because it is defiant. We’re here to stay, so things need to be fixed. We have to solve all the problems that are driving so many out – precarious work, internship culture, third-level grant cuts and fee hikes, mental health, housing and youth unemployment.’

In France, as in the other countries discussed, labour market insecurity is a particular problem for young workers, with 23% unemployed in 2011 and 55% of those employed having temporary contracts. The term Génération précaire (‘precarious generation’) was coined by a young, minority ethnic worker in the fast-food sector, in a book describing his efforts to build collective action and organisation among fellow workers (Mabrouki 2004). Somewhat ironically, however, the label was adopted in the following year by graduates and university students protesting against the abuse of internships, often paid at a fraction of the minimum wage or else unpaid. ‘We have work but not employment’, they declared, and attempted to organise strike action by interns and demanded legislative reforms, with some success.

This indicates a feature evident in most countries: labour market insecurity does not create a homogeneous ‘precariat’ (Standing 2011) but affects in different ways social groups with contrasting capacities for collective mobilisation. In France, there is a history of institutionalised student organisation and often ritualised protest, analogous to the impressive demonstrative actions of the numerically weak trade unions and at times undertaken jointly. If the tactics have sometimes been innovative, in the main the protests of the highly educated but precariously employed have addressed familiar interlocutors through traditional channels. In some ways, suggest Béroud and Yon (2012: 175), the closest French
equivalent to the outrage of the *Indignados* has been the violent rioting in the impoverished banlieues, ‘where the protests unfold outside the customary frameworks of collective action’.

**Social Protest in Comparative Perspective**

Social protests have of course been a global phenomenon. Ortiz et al. (2013) document 843 events between 2006 and mid-2013, with an upwards trajectory. They also find a disproportionate prevalence in ‘high-income countries’; their data indicate that among these countries the protests are dominated by Europe, with the majority of the largest taking place in France, Italy, Portugal and Spain (Ortiz et al. 2013: 34). Understandably, protest has been greatest in countries particularly affected by austerity. One notable early example was in Iceland, not a member of the EU but the first European casualty of the global financial crisis, with the collapse in 2008 of the three main private – and deregulated – banks, and a devaluation of the króna by some 50% against the euro. Mass protests, with demonstrators banging pots and pans outside parliament (a tactic pioneered in Latin America), led to the resignation of the government; and a grassroots movement emerged, known as *Maurapúfan* (the anthill), which convened an assembly of citizens chosen mainly at random but also containing representatives of organisations, to draft a new constitution (Castells 2012: 31-43). A campaign also ensured that in two referendums, in 2010 and 2011, voters rejected proposals to repay British and Dutch banks which had lost reserves invested (at unrealistic interest rates) in Iceland.

Ortiz et al. attempt to classify the reasons for protest (though to my mind their categories not altogether helpful). In the high-income countries, five broad but related issues predominate: inequality and the demand for fiscal justice; cuts in public services and pensions, and privatisation; corporate power and deregulation; the power of the IFIs, including the ECB; and the absence of ‘real democracy’. Protests are most often directed against governments, but also the IFIs, the EU, corporations and employers and the politico-economic system as a whole. Though trade unions, NGOs political parties and established community groups are prominent in many of the protests, so are ‘new agents for change’, and ‘mass middle-class involvement in protest indicates a new dynamic’ (Ortiz et al 2013: 31). Nevertheless, as suggested above, it would be wrong to assume a simple dichotomy between ‘old’ and ‘new’ agents of protest: ‘at least in part, the agenda and the objectives of the newly emerged social movements and the trade unions coincide’ (Campos Lima and Martin Artiles 2014: 142).

From a cross-national comparative perspective, a number of themes can be addressed. The first is the complex interconnection between national and supranational dynamics. On the one hand, there has been a rapid process of mutual learning across frontiers. The ‘Arab Spring’ provided an inspiration for many of the mass protests from 2011 onwards. ‘Occupy Wall Street’ informed the Blockupy actions against the ECB in Frankfurt and those of UK Uncut in London. The *Indignados* were emulated across southern Europe: there was ‘a kind of contagion effect, suggesting the presence of learning processes and the modular character of the mobilization’ (Fonseca 2014: 47). Yet ‘on the other hand, institutional differences, different traditions of political and social participation and the degree of trust in the political institutions help explain some of the marked differences of the protests in European countries, in particular as to their relationship to conventional channels such as political parties and trade unions’ (Campos Lima and Martin Artiles 2014: 145). The national embeddedness of most protest activity has meant that there has been only limited coordination at EU level, where the key decisions underlying austerity are taken (Pianta and Gerbaudo 2014). But there are exceptions: notably, the campaigns against water privatisation mentioned above; the increasingly international character of the Blockupy protests, in particular that in March 2015 against the opening of the lavish new ECB building in Frankfurt; and the efforts to organise a pan-European ‘social strike’, in which representatives of youth groups from some ten countries have been involved (Coalizione dei Laboratori dello Sciopero sociale 2015).
A second key theme is the central role of social media in the ‘new’ forms of protest and resistance (Estanque and Fonseca 2014; Loader et al. 2014). Such media provide a channel for discussing grievances, formulating demands and coordinating action, and for disseminating the initiatives – and any incidents of repression by the authorities – to a mass public. For some, such as Castells (2012) or Mason (2013), the new means of communication – taken for granted by the generation which is worst affected by austerity – permit autonomy rather than authority, explosive spontaneity rather than the routines of traditional organised negotiation with governments and employers. However, Gerbaudo cautions against uncritical ‘techno-optimism’. Social media, in themselves, are fragmented and individualised, and do not automatically generate collective identities and collective action. Large-scale collective action, argues Gerbaudo (2012: 12), requires a ‘choreography of assembly’ which functions in ‘directing people towards specific protest events, in providing participants with suggestions and instructions about how to act, and in the construction of an emotional narration to sustain their coming together in a public space’. Such choreography is typically undertaken by often invisible and perhaps reluctant core activists who provide a form of ‘soft’ leadership.

The ‘choreography of assembly’ involves, third, reclaiming public spaces as arenas for discussion and debate as well as demonstration. Drawing from the example of Tahrir in January 2011, the ‘movements of the squares’ in southern Europe claimed a space for new forms of participative democracy (Dhaliwal 2012; Gerbaudo 2014). While the first actions were directed against governments (national but also supranational), it was a logical step to target the financial institutions which both initiated the crisis and drove the authoritarian response. Occupy Wall Street in September 2011 achieved echoes not only across North America but also in Europe, with the first Blockupy protest in Frankfurt in May 2012. In London, an occupation began in October 2011 outside St Paul’s Cathedral, the nearest location to the Stock Exchange that protestors could use. Another British initiative, commencing a year earlier, was the occupation of premises of companies accused of evading UK tax: as the name UK Uncut indicated, the explicit link was made between public sector cuts on the one hand and loss of tax revenues on the other (Gledhill 2012; Mason 2012: 54-57). This initiative was followed in other European countries.

A fourth, but related aspect of the protests is the ‘defence of the commons’. As outlined above, this has involved, most obviously, resistance to privatisation, particularly when imposed by the Troika. But there is also a less defensive dimension, as proposed in the series of World and European Social Forums since 2001, to ‘reinvent the world’. The link between the quality of work, of living and the environment is made explicit: neoliberal global capital destroys nature as it destroys workers. Also involved in such protests is a demand for what Fattori (2013a: 385) calls ‘commonification: the introduction of elements of self-government of the good by the citizens’. This accords with the spirit of many of the ‘new’ forms of protest, in seeking to assert elements of participative democracy which in some ways are novel but in others can be traced back to ancient traditions.

Fifth, the notion of ‘commonification’ links in some respects to the idea of a ‘social and solidarity economy’. This concept is sometimes used primarily to encompass producer and consumer cooperatives, which have a very long history (ILO 2010). But the newer understanding of économie solidaire or economia solidária points to a more specifically political strategy to resist neoliberal globalisation (Draperi 2007; Laville 2007). Neamtan (2002: 7) defines the ‘social and solidarity economy’ as ‘an integral part of the movement for an alternative globalisation’, with production for use rather than profit under democratic, participative control. As an example, Buglione and Schlüter (2010: 25-27) describe the Libera Terra movement in Sicily, through which land confiscated from the Mafia is used collectively to create employment, build community cohesion and develop organic products. More generally, this can be seen as an example of a process where those who have lost their jobs seek to reclaim an identity as workers rather than as welfare recipients, as Boffo et al. (2014) describe in the case of Naples.

The crisis and austerity have generated a range of grassroots initiatives in response to the dual effects of the loss of jobs and income, and cutbacks in public services. ‘One of
the most curious aspects of the current economic crisis is that although so many people who are unemployed, have no income and have little opportunity to earn income, they somehow still get by and still get many of the basic things they need.... Many people get by through networks of solidarity – friends of friends or total strangers who provide them with essentials. People regularly give each other food, provide essential services, and provide each other with shelter – all for free. It seems to be a very large non-economy, but because it is so informal it eludes the spectator’ (Maeckelbergh 2013: 109). Such solidarity networks are not simply spontaneous: often the activism of protest embraces such a non-economy. This has been evident, for example, in Spain, but most notable perhaps in Greece. Sotiropoulos and Bourikos (2014) describe a rich variety of ‘exchange and distribution networks’, involving not only ‘social groceries’ but also networks of non-monetary distribution and exchange and informal healthcare networks providing ‘make-shift clinics’ and a range of other social services. Most notably, the SYRIZA party, which I discuss in more detail in the next section, took a strategic decision to focus on developing such networks. Its leader, Alexis Tsipras, declared (Dericquebourg 2013) that ‘in these times of crisis, resistance and solidarity are both necessary, but solidarity is more important’, and the party directed its efforts to the collective provision of food, medicine and housing. SYRIZA created an initiative entitled Solidarity4all (2013), which was in part an appeal for international support but also explained in detail how the party was helping build self-organised collectives covering pharmacies, social kitchens, social groceries, evening classes, cultural clubs and legal support teams.

A sixth feature common to all the movements is the need to build cohesion out of diversity. Mason (2012: 66-79) identifies the social roots of the revolts as ‘the graduate with no future’ and ‘the Jacobin with a laptop’. Yet as already noted, the constituencies of deprivation and anger are more heterogeneous. They include the young unskilled and poorly educated whose protests in some countries have been particularly violent but with no clear political focus. Also important are older workers who are victims of workplace closures or public sector job cuts, and who in most countries no longer have trade union representation once unemployed (Faniel 2012). As Andritsos and Velegarakis argue (2014: 1), in Greece the ‘struggles have their origins in different social strata, geographical scales, political views and perspectives’. For example, in the Syntagma protests the participants in the lower square tended to be highly politicised, with leftist and anarchist groups prominent; in the upper square, however, there was ‘a mosaic of individuals that can broadly be seen as easily susceptible to populist / “patriotic” themes’ (Karamichas 2012: 4). In their comparative overview, Campos Lima and Martin Artiles (2014) identify four groups of protestors: highly qualified employees, often in the public sector; less qualified, primarily manual workers; students and the young unemployed; and older, predominantly male, less educated workers, many of them unemployed. The first and fourth groups, but not the second and third, mainly comprised trade union members or former members; and the proportions of each cluster involved in protests differed considerably across countries.

Such diversity results in obvious problems of aggregation of interests and objectives. In this context, Gerbaudo (2014: 2) argues that a distinctive feature of recent mass protests has been the effort to reclaim ‘the ancient belief that there is such a thing as “the people”, and that this collective actor is the ultimate source of sovereignty and legitimate power’. The slogan ‘we are the 99%’ coined by the Occupy movement similarly expresses a thesis that might be termed progressive populism. Yet clearly the oppositions underlying crisis and austerity are more complex than 99% versus 1%. A substantial proportion of the population, even in the worst affected countries, see themselves – not altogether wrongly – as at least partial beneficiaries of the existing system, whatever its irrationalities and degradations; or at least believe that they have more to lose than to gain in contesting it. At best, the notion of the 99% can be considered a Sorelian myth, inspiring self-confidence and solidarity which might eventually make the slogan self-fulfilling. Yet the downside, as Juris et al. point out (2012: 436), is that ‘the Occupy movements with their majoritarian populist impulse and organizational logic of massing large numbers of individuals in concrete physical spaces have had difficulty recognizing and addressing internal specificity and difference’. Hence the significance of divisions and potential conflicts of interest according to class, gender and
politics can easily be suppressed, whereas a genuinely popular movement needs to admit and negotiate these. I return to this issue in the conclusions.

Can mass protest overcome austerity? Depressingly, waves of protest fade, either because of repression by the authorities or protest fatigue among the participants, or often both. On the basis of Portuguese experience, Accornero and Ramos Pinto (2015: 508-509) emphasise the potential of the developing cooperation between ‘old old’ and ‘new new’ movements of resistance. ‘Time will tell, but we would emphasise two aspects: it is evident that neither the massive demonstrations, nor the multiplication of the general strikes, nor the months-long strike of the dockworkers seem to have had much effect in reversing the application of austerity measures. The weapons of anti-austerity mobilisation are, at first sight, blunt. Yet intriguing synergies have emerged from the participation of these two types of actor in anti-austerity protests.’ From a broader perspective, Ortiz et al. (2013: 36-37) conclude that some two-thirds of the protests examined ‘achieved neither their intended demands (when demands are stated) nor results toward alleviating the expressed grievances’. Yet this implies that the other one-third do achieve some success; as Bailey (2014: 8) suggests, ‘elites tend to view elite-oriented forms of contention as less challenging and less disruptive and are therefore less willing to accede to their demands (especially in cases where pressure to reject demands are high). In contrast, the less malleable and containable nature of innovative, elite-challenging forms of contention – provided they are carried out by sufficiently large number of participants to avoid straightforward repression – are more likely to prompt concessions from policy makers seeking to maintain or bolster their own governing capacity.’ Moreover, Ortiz et al. add that ‘many of the protests are engaged with long-term structural issues that may yield results in time, while incremental, short-term or symbolic achievements may prove to be precursors to a comprehensive shift in power structures’. Indeed, the aim of many of the mobilisations has been to shift the political agenda by redefining the discourse of crisis to demonstrate that there is indeed an alternative to austerity. I return to this point also in the conclusions.

The State of Politics and the Politics of the State

Despite widespread public contempt for politicians and the political process, and scepticism that the outcome of elections no longer determines government policy to any significant degree, surveys show that voting in elections is overwhelmingly seen – by all age groups – as the most effective way of influencing policy-makers, as Table 4 showed. Hence resistance to austerity cannot ignore the conventional political arena.

Throughout Europe, for more than a century trade unionism and politics have been intimately linked: hence the very concept of labour movements. Most often the linkage has been with social democracy, but in some cases with christian democracy, with communism or with anarcho-syndicalism. The rationale has been obvious (at least to Europeans): to advance the interests of workers (and the broader working class), engagement with the state is unavoidable. Taylor (1989: xiv) insists succinctly ‘that unions are inevitably political, whether they or politicians like it; that within capitalist industrial states they are relatively powerless; and that unions are primarily reactive and defensive in their political behaviour’. As I have previously written (Hyman 2001: 13-15): ‘regulating the labour market involves political issues.... The state is not only the ultimate guarantor of contracts, including employment contracts; whether by active intervention or by default, it underwrites a particular (im)balance between different participants in market relations. At a very minimum, unions have to influence the ways in which the state shapes the rules of the game in the labour market, including their own right to exist, to bargain collectively and to mobilise collective action.’ Following the Keynesian transformation of economic theory and economic policy, unions universally recognise that the parameters of supply and demand, and hence the whole terrain of collective bargaining, are subject to the influence of government intervention. Workers, moreover, are not simply concerned with their nominal wages or salaries: their interest extends to the real wage, taking account of price movements; the net
wage after taxation; and the ‘social wage’ constituted by transfers and services provided by the welfare state. In countries with institutions and traditions of peak-level tripartite bargaining, all of these elements are part of a composite agenda involving complex trade-offs – ‘political exchange’ (Pizzorno 1978) – and even in the absence of these institutional arrangements, unions everywhere attempt to influence welfare and taxation policies. Finally, unions which represent public sector employees – who today, almost universally, comprise the majority of members – must inevitably address the policies of the state.

Hence unions are inescapably both economic and political actors; yet the relationship between the two roles is complex and contradictory, and the priority assigned to each varies across countries and over time. In many European countries, trade unionism was an offshoot of an emergent working-class movement in which political radicalism shaped union identity and action: the task was to challenge capitalism, not to seek modest reforms within it. Where more moderate, social- or christian-democratic trade unionism prevailed, a focus was still on societal change. Ideologies inherited from the formative period of trade unions have proved persistent. This has been most evident in the re-orientation of (former) communist unions in southern Europe: the increased priority assigned to collective bargaining has often provoked substantial resistance from ‘traditionalists’.

In order to give priority to collective bargaining, at least if their membership is in the private sector, unions typically require relatively high membership density and the financial resources to sustain prolonged disputes where necessary. If such resources are modest, mobilisation on the streets may be easier than sustained strike action, which is a component of bargaining power, even if not its only source. As an extreme example, the fragmented French trade unions with minimal density have virtually lost the capacity to organise strikes in the private sector.

In Europe as a whole, economic crisis has made the state a key interlocutor, even for unions which traditionally drew a line between ‘economic’ and ‘political’ action, and even if many governments – as noted above – have diminishing willingness to engage with unions. Financial assistance to struggling employers, special subsidies to maintain income in cases of short-time working and extensions to active labour market policies – all widespread trade union demands – required engagement in the political arena. Conversely, government attempts to tackle budget deficits through attacks on public sector jobs, pay and pensions, and more general assaults on the welfare state, have forced even reluctant unions into sharp political conflicts.

Historically, unions in most of Europe emerged with a close and often subordinate relationship to political parties, whether social-democratic, communist or christian-democratic; but over time, the links have generally been weakened, or abandoned altogether (though formal separation may still permit close informal interlinkages).

Three key developments have affected all European countries though to differing degrees. The first is cultural and ideological. Secularisation has undermined the identities of formerly christian-democratic unionism: the only significant exceptions are the Belgian ACV/CSC (Algemeen Christelijk Vakverbond / Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens), the much smaller Dutch CNV (Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond), and Travail Suisse in Switzerland (perhaps also Solidarność in Poland). An analogous process occurred in countries with mass communist parties and satellite trade unions. In southern Europe, where communist parties once dominated the left, there has been a drastic decline. Social democracy has proved electorally more robust, but in most countries is far weaker than a few decades ago. Indeed in a post-Keynesian world, there is no clear consensus on what social democracy stands for.

The second crucial change is structural. Traditionally, both unions and left-oriented parties found their core support among manual workers in cohesive industrial communities. The decline of old industries, the growth in white-collar and professional occupations and, more generally, rising educational levels have posed challenges for both unions and parties. Social-democratic parties for their part have tended to take their dwindling traditional working-class base for granted while targeting the ‘median voter’, resulting in a policy convergence with their opponents to the right.
The third major shift is the advance of neoliberalism. The pursuit of national competitiveness, efforts to contain public finances, loss of faith in Keynesianism and conversion to ‘lean government’ have become as much the hallmarks of centre-left as of right-wing governments. Neoliberal restructuring places inevitable pressures on the party-union nexus: electoral expediency, or simply the limited room for manœuvre in the management of national economies within global economic disorder, places social-democratic parties on a collision course with union movements whose own commitments include the defence of workers’ incomes and the social achievements of past decades. Little is left of a social-democratic ‘project’ to inspire either parties or unions and to bind them together.

The picture in CEE countries is evidently distinctive (Bernaciak et al. 2014). Under the previous regimes, unions did not act as autonomous organisations but were dominated by communist parties. By and large, their role was to discipline workers at state-owned enterprises and familiarise them with party decisions and policy plans; they also performed certain social functions. Hence, in contrast to west European countries, there was no tradition of mutual interdependence and beneficial exchanges between unions and political parties. After the pre-1989 system collapsed, links between political groupings and organised labour emerged, but involving much less mutual loyalty than in the west. Political parties, which in most CEE countries were stronger than their union partners, would default on their promises and pursue policies that went against workers’ interests. They would also include union leaders in party structures and decision-making processes, which not only hindered unions’ mobilising capacity but also stirred considerable controversy among rank-and-file members, especially when the policies that followed involved painful restructuring measures. All in all, party-union links forged in the transition period have weakened labour rather than boosting employee rights (Avdagić 2004).

Examples abound. In Poland, Solidarność activists assumed important positions in the early centre-right governments and created their own party before the 1997 elections, while the former ‘official’ Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych (OPZZ) sided with the ex-communist social democrats. However, this did not prevent the latter undertaking ‘shock therapy’ policy measures. In the mid-2000s, Hungary’s ‘reformed’ unions were excluded from discussions on major liberalisation initiatives despite their formal alliance with the ex-communist Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSzP, Hungarian Socialist Party). More generally, even if labour-friendly regulations were enacted, there was no guarantee that they would be preserved. Slovak labour laws, for instance, would reflect union preferences whenever left-wing parties were in power, just to be reversed by centre-right cabinets. On the other hand, experience in Slovenia shows that party-union links can be effective if power resources of the two actors are roughly equal. Unions in the former Yugoslav republic constituted sizeable interest groups with large pools of voters, thus could not easily be ignored by politicians.

Until the late twentieth century, social democrats dominated national politics in Scandinavia and often led governments in all the largest EU countries. Today their electoral appeal is much diminished, as Table 5 indicates. Indeed they are still a significant factor in European politics. However, they head national government in only ten of the 28 EU member states. In both Denmark and Sweden they lead precarious minority administrations, while social democrats have absolute majorities only in Malta and Slovakia. In five other member states, they have a minority role in coalition governments. To a certain degree the current position is exceptional, since in most countries worst affected by the financial crisis, incumbent parties were punished by the electorate. This was the case for the socialists in Portugal, Spain and Greece – where PASOK (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima, Panhellenic Socialist Movement) has been almost destroyed; MSzP in Hungary has suffered a similar fate. Right-wing governments in office when the crisis hit have faced similar losses, as in Italy and Romania.

[Table 5 about here]
To a degree, the secular decline in social-democratic support has been mirrored on the centre-right, with the consequence that politics in much of Europe has become increasingly fragmented and unstable: a process facilitated by the proportional representation voting systems which exist in most countries. Such fragmentation is particularly apparent in elections for the EP, often seen as an opportunity for protest voting, partly because the outcome is widely regarded as irrelevant to national politics and partly because turnout is often very low. In 2014, 212 of the 751 seats were won by ‘ Eurosceptic’ parties which ‘advocated radical reforms of the EU [or] campaigned for an exit of their countries from the EU’ (Treib 2014: 1542-1543).

To a significant extent, such voting was a reaction against austeritarianism. To some degree, parties to the left of social democracy – which might better be defined as ‘alter-European’ than as Eurosceptic – were beneficiaries, as Table 5 indicates. The left group in the EP (GUE-NGL, Gauche unitaire européenne/Nordic Green Left) increased from 35 to 52 seats. Most notable was the rise of SYRIZA (Synaspismós Rizospastikis Aristerás, Coalition of the Radical Left), an alliance of mainly eurocommunists, trotskists and maoists: it came top of the Greek poll for the EP and went on to win the national elections in February 2015, as I discuss below. Also impressive was the performance of Podemos in Spain, founded a few months before the elections as one of the outcomes of the M-15 movement: it won 8% of the votes. Since then it has been registering 25-30% in opinion polls, ahead of the national elections which will be held in December 2015 at the latest. In Italy, the inheritors of the previously substantial Rifondista Comunista (Communist Refoundation) failed to capitalise significantly on the discontent – even though the primarily ex-eurocommunist Partito Democratico (Democratic Party) was in government and is pursuing an austerity programme together with labour market deregulation; while in Portugal the ex-communist Coligação Democrática Unitária (Unitary Democratic Coalition) gained 14% and the ‘new left’ Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc) only 5%. In Ireland, 20% of the votes were won by Sinn Féin, which is the inheritor of republican nationalism but now defines itself as the Workers’ Party.

The GUE/NGL encompasses a disparate range of parties (Janssen 2013), ranging from largely unreconstructed communists to newer groupings of the radical left and longer established red-green coalitions, primarily in Scandinavia. Green parties, most of which are affiliated to a separate group in the EP, have also in many cases adopted a strong anti-austerity position, but overall have derived no electoral benefit: indeed they lost seats in the 2014 EP elections.

Conversely, the primary beneficiaries of popular discontent have been parties to the far right, typically combining an anti-establishment and anti-EU stance with virulent opposition to immigration. The Front National topped the polls in France, as did the Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark. The polls in Britain were headed by the UK Independence Party, which combines anti-immigrant rhetoric with neoliberal economic policies. In Hungary, the neo-nazi Jobbik came second; while its Greek counterpart, Chrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn), which before 2012 had attracted only a few thousand voters, came third with almost 10%. Elsewhere, there were significant increases in the votes for parties ‘espousing nationalist EU-scepticism, thinly-veiled xenophobia and a populist critique of the political class’ (Bischoff et al. 2014). One consequence has been a growing shift towards nationalist, anti-immigrant policies on the part of mainstream centre-right and centre-left parties.

Impossible to classify in conventional terms is the MoVimento Cinque Stelle (M5S, Five Star Movement), founded in 2009, which attained second place in Italy. It appeals to media-savvy younger voters, attacks corruption, adopts a radical anti-EU stance and advocates direct participatory democracy and environmentalism: all features which align it with many of the ‘movements of the squares’. Yet it has no clear economic programme, and in the EP has joined the right-wing Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) group.

A New Left Politics?
One of the key debates among the Indignados involved their attitudes to electoral politics, with municipal elections taking place in May 2011 and parliamentary elections in November. Three options were discussed: abstention, casting a blank or spoiled ballot, or voting for one of the left-wing parties. The outcome indicated that these options were followed to some extent by the electorate. The abstention rate and the number of blank ballots both increased. The main left-wing party, Izquierda Unida (United Left, primarily ex-communist), almost doubled its vote but still gained only 7% – less than the share lost by PSOE. The outcome, however, was a right-wing government pursuing far more radical austerity measures than it indicated before the election or than required by the EU authorities.

In this context, more active engagement with state politics has become seen as an essential component of resistance to austeritarianism, but informed by the new (or rather, old) themes of participative rather than representative democracy. As seen above, SYRIZA has turned deliberately to community activism as a basis for its popular appeal. In this respect, activismin from ‘old’ left-wing politics have assimilated key ideas from the ‘new’ social movements.

Though Podemos has certainly been influenced by the rise of SYRIZA and likewise combines populism with elements of classic left politics to present a post-marxist left-populist response to the European crisis (Ehrke 2015), there are obvious differences. The elected leader of Podemos, Pablo Iglesias – unlike Tsipras of SYRIZA – is an academic and television presenter who despite a background in communist politics had not previously held significant political office. Though in few other respects, there is a parallel with Beppe Grillo, founder of M5S, who also acquired a public reputation through his television performances. Both SYRIZA and Podemos face two key issues, long familiar in left-wing politics. The first is the tension between policy consistency and strategic direction on the one hand, participative democracy on the other, particularly sensitive given the direct-democratic principles of the movements from which both parties derive much of their support. ‘The “political party” and the “state” are back in play as the main front of political resistance in Greece today, with SYRIZA being the main expression of this tendency’, wrote one critic (Oikonomakis 2013). ‘Many leftists in Europe and North America look to SYRIZA with hope and amazement. But is it really a good sign that a political party has “stolen the show” of the movements and usurped their energy? Should we not be worried that the horizontal and direct democratic experiment of the squares has largely given way to the old hierarchical forms of representation and electoral politics? Should we not be concerned that the Popular Assemblies have been replaced with the speeches of a party leader in Parliament?’. Very similar concerns have been voiced in respect of Podemos, with allegations of a ‘personality cult’ and the displacement of deliberative democracy by a Leninist leadership model (Ehrke 2015), and suggestions that ‘the utopia of horizontal leadership is perhaps already past’ (Rodríguez Yebra 2014).

The second issue is the difficulty, in the event of electoral success, of translating radical programmes into performance in government. The obstacles are partly domestic but, in an era of neoliberal globalisation, also include the risks of capital flight and the pressures of the IFIs and the EU apparatus itself. Compromises and concessions not only threaten to undermine the initial project, eroding popular support, but also threaten internal division, as SYRIZA has already discovered. Indeed the Greek electoral regime, allowing SYRIZA almost an absolute parliamentary majority despite only 36% of the popular vote, provides office without the majority popular support which radical change requires. If Podemos should emerge from the forthcoming elections as the largest party, it can attain government only through an overt or tacit coalition with the PSOE which it was created to oppose.

One implication is clear: more than ever, ‘socialism in one country’ – or indeed in a group of ‘peripheral’ countries – is not viable in itself. If radical left politics is to succeed, it must be internationally contagious.

Conclusion: The Variable Geometry of Resistance
A number of conclusions stem from the discussion that has preceded. First, to return to the last point, while resistance to austeritarianism occurs in nationally specific contexts, its focus must unavoidably be international. This is one of the central arguments developed in recent decades by the alter-globalisation movements. Trade unionisms have their own, more institutionalised international structures, but internationalism is far less embedded in everyday trade union action. Generalising international solidarities – I use the plural deliberately – has to be a priority. And internationalism means little if it is purely a concern of ‘international experts’: it must be built into the routine discourse and practice of labour movements.

Second, building solidarity is also a challenging task within countries. As already argued, different social and economic groups have been affected in significantly different ways by crisis and austerity. An understanding of mutuality, of a common fate and common interests, is not objectively given but is an objective requiring a difficult struggle. Unity cannot be built by a linguistic sleight-of-hand – ‘the people united’ – but requires sustained dialogue and debate, otherwise the interests of the weakest are easily submerged beneath a spurious conception of commonality.

Third, it follows that the construction of solidarities at both national and international levels involves vital cognitive and discursive elements. In this context, della Porta (2012: 276) notes that ‘the proposals and practices of the indignados and occupying movement – as well as those spread in and by the Arab Spring – resonate in fact with (more traditional) participatory visions, but also with new deliberative conceptions that underline the importance of creating multiple public spaces, egalitarian but plural’. For Melucci (1989), the creation of a collective identity is a process of negotiation over time which contains three aspects: shaping a cognitive framework within which the environment is understood and goals and tactics are formulated; fostering social relationships among participants; and stimulating an emotional dynamic among those involved. Such processes are somewhat alien to most trade unionisms (or have been lost over time), but have been vital for many of the ‘new’ social movements. Hence developing synergies between the organisational capacity of the ‘old’ and the imaginative spontaneity of the ‘new’, drawing on the strengths of each, is an important means to building effective resistance to austeritarianism.

Fourth, it is necessary to address the systemic nature of the crisis, but in comprehensible terms. A century ago, Rosa Luxemburg wrote that ‘bourgeois society stands at the crossroads, either transition to socialism or regression into barbarism’. The lineaments of the second alternative – economic subjugation, political oppression, environmental devastation, military aggression – are today even starker than when she wrote. Movements of resistance must embrace the principle that ‘capitalism is the reality, but not our perspective’ (Urban 2014: 41). To be effective, different modes of resistance must be mutually supportive, and informed by a vision of an alternative. The challenge, as always for those pursuing a different socio-economic order, is to formulate alternatives which are concrete, comprehensible and attractive. Iglesias of Podemos said recently: ‘this is what the enemy expects of us, that we use words that nobody can understand, that we remain a minority in the shelter of our traditional symbols. This way we would pose no threat’ (Lambert 2015). The issue is partly one of language, to simplify without trivialising; but it is also to provide concrete examples of economic solidarity outside the market. Some of these examples were discussed above.

Finally, today’s barbarians rely on the demoralisation of their victims. Resistance may well draw its inspiration from anger, but to be translated into constructive action it requires self-confidence in the capacity to initiate change. ‘Hope is coming!’ was SYRIZA’s election slogan. In dark times, to build hope is perhaps the most difficult challenge, and not only because hopes can so easily be disappointed. But fatalism and surrender should not be the only options. Another world – and another Europe – is possible.

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Table 1: Harmonised Unemployment Rates, Selected European Countries (Q4, %), by regional groupings

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<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
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</table>

Source: OECD.Stat

Table 2: Impact of the Crisis and EU Pressure on Industrial Relations Processes

- Bargaining decentralisation: AT, BG, CY, DE, EL, ES, HU, IE, IT, LT, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK
- Changes to minimum pay setting: DK, EL, HU, IE, PL, RO
- Cuts or freezes in minimum wages: CZ, DK, EE, EL, FR, HU, IE, LT, LV, RO, PL, PT, SI, UK
- Changes to wage indexation: BE, CY, ES, LU, MT
- Changes to extension mechanisms: EL, ES, IE, PT, SK
- Opening clauses: AT, BG, DE, EL, ES, HU, IT, SE, SI
- Changes to ‘automatic’ continuation: EE, EL, ES, PT
- Changed dispute resolution processes: BG, EL, ES, IE, SI, UK

Table 3. Disaggregated union density statistics, by country group (%)

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<tr>
<td>Fixed-term</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>Permanent</td>
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<td>86</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>Foreign-born</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Native-born</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<td>35-54</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>55-64</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>35</td>
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Source: Gorodzeisky and Richards 2013 for foreign- and native-born workers, derived from European Social Surveys 2002-08; most remaining data based on Ebbinghaus et al. 2008, derived from European Social Survey 2002. Note however that the figures given for Italy differ substantially from those generally accepted; I have therefore, not wholly arbitrarily, adjusted these upwards by 50%. Figures in italics from ICTWSS database for 2008-09, based on national sources (Visser 2011).

Table 4. Which two of the following do you think are the best ways of ensuring one’s voice is heard by decision-makers? (%)

<table>
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<th>Age groups</th>
<th>15-24</th>
<th>25-34</th>
<th>35-44</th>
<th>45-54</th>
<th>55-64</th>
<th>65-74</th>
<th>75+</th>
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<td>Voting in elections</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>Going on strike</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Signing a petition</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Participating in internet debates</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Joining or supporting an NGO</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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Source: Horvath and Paolini (2014), based on Eurobarometer 77 (Spring 2012)
Table 5. ‘Left’ Seats in Most Recent National a and European b Elections (Regional Groups)

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Seats Available</th>
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<th>Other Left  c</th>
<th>Greens  c</th>
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<td>DK</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>179 (13)</td>
<td>44 (3)</td>
<td>28 d (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>200 (13)</td>
<td>42 (2)</td>
<td>14 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7 e</td>
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<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>349 (20)</td>
<td>113 (6)</td>
<td>21 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>183 (18)</td>
<td>53 (5)</td>
<td>24 (3)</td>
</tr>
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<td>BE</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>150 (21)</td>
<td>36 (4)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
</tr>
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<td>CH</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>631 (96)</td>
<td>193 (27)</td>
<td>64 (7)</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>60 (6)</td>
<td>13 (3)</td>
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<td>2012</td>
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<td>38 (3)</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>617 (73)</td>
<td>292 9 (31)</td>
<td>48 9 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>69 (6)</td>
<td>39 (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>226 (21)</td>
<td>74 (8)</td>
<td>22 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>166 (11)</td>
<td>37 (1)</td>
<td>20 1 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>650 (73)</td>
<td>258 (20)</td>
<td>11 1 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>240 (17)</td>
<td>50 (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>200 (21)</td>
<td>50 (4)</td>
<td>23 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>101 (6)</td>
<td>19 (1)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>199 (21)</td>
<td>33 (4)</td>
<td>9 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>151 (11)</td>
<td>61 (3)</td>
<td>6 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>140 (11)</td>
<td>38 (2)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>100 (8)</td>
<td>24 (1)</td>
<td>21 1 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>460 (51)</td>
<td>27 (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
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<td>158 (16)</td>
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<td>SK</td>
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<td>150 (13)</td>
<td>83 (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>90 (8)</td>
<td>6 (1)</td>
<td>6 (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


c All these categories are inevitably somewhat arbitrary: for example, neither the Italian Partito Democratico (PD) nor the British Labour Party labels itself socialist or social-democratic; the boundaries of ‘other left’ parties are imprecise; the Green/EFAs group in the EP includes representatives of regionalist parties which are neither environmentalist nor left-oriented, and some parties which I have here categorised as ‘Other Left’. Conversely, the German Tierschutzpartei and the Dutch Partij voor de Dieren sit with the GUE-NGL (Left) group in the EP but are classed here as Green. In Portugal, the Partido Social Democrata is a centre-right party, while the Partido Socialista is social-democratic and is listed accordingly here.

d The Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten) won 12 seats, here listed as ‘Other Left’.

e The Left-Green Movement (Vinstrihreyfingin – grønt frambod) is here classed as ‘Other Left’.

f Under Greek electoral law, 250 seats are directly elected while the largest party receives an additional 50 seats.

h Italian election law provides additional seats to ensure a majority in the lower house for the largest party bloc; the PD-led bloc actually gained only 29.5% of the popular vote.

i The Green-Left alliance (Sinistra ecologia e libertà) is here classed as ‘Other Left’. The Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), an anti-establishment movement which won over 20% of the vote in recent elections and on some issues adopts a leftist position (such as opposition to austerity), is not included here. It sits with the (largely far-right) EFDD group in the EP.

j Including the Irish nationalist Sinn Féin, which is on the left in terms of labour policies and sits with the Left group in the EP; it won 14 seats in the national elections and 3 European seats.
Including the Welsh nationalist *Plaid Cymru*, I have categorised this party as ‘Other Left’, though it sits with the Greens in the EP; and *Sinn Féin*, which won 5 seats in Northern Ireland in the national elections and 1 European seat. Not including the Scottish National Party, which sits with the Greens in the EP. This classification is problematic. The Union of Greens and Farmers (*Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība*) is a combination of two separate parties and is environmentally oriented but otherwise has no clear political identity. Curiously, its MEP elected in 2014 joined the right-wing EFDD group but then became an independent. Conversely, the Latvian Russian Union (*Latvijas Krievu savienība* or *Русский союз Латвии*) is an ex-communist, pro-Russian party, though its MEP sits with the Green/EFA group. Since 2010 it has held no seat in the national parliament.
Figure 1. Net Trust in Trade Unions (Tend to Trust - Tend Not to Trust)

Source: Eurobarometer 64, 68 and 74

Figure 2. Net Positive Connotation of ‘Trade Union’ (Positive - Negative)

Source: Eurobarometer 67, 72 and 82