The Price of a Vote Evidence from France, 1993-2014

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Introduction

- Is democracy about the median voter or does money make a difference?
 - Grossman and Helpman (1996, 2001): interest groups make campaign contributions to affect the likelihood that a candidate is elected.
- There is growing concern that, with rising inequality, money may increasingly corrupt politics.
- Different dimensions :
 - Political power increasingly conditioned upon wealth.
 - Firms' and individuals' donations to politicians / political parties : potential influence of contributors over legislators.
 - Extent to which preferences of the well-off are more reflected in government policy that those of poor or middle-income citizens (Gilens, 2012; Gilens and Page, 2014; Bartels, 2015).

This paper: campaign spending and financing in France

- Focus on local (municipal and legislative) elections from 1993 to 2014.
- Exploit changes in legislations.
- Distinguish between different sources of funding.
 - Private donations;
 - Party contributions;
 - etc.

This paper

- 2 main objectives :
 - Occument the long-run evolution of campaign resources and spending (and changes in legislation).
 - 2 Study the causal impact of spending on probability of being elected.
- Main empirical challenges :
 - Multiparty electoral system. ⇒ OLS model inappropriate.
 - Endogeneity of spending.

This paper

- Why France?
 - France has enacted since 1988 important reforms providing public funds for campaigns and parties.
 - ⇒ We develop a new identification strategy exploiting a change in legislation.
 - Data availability: not only on spending and electoral results, but also detailed information on sources of revenues (e.g. private contributions vs. donations) and on candidates' characteristics.
- Multiparty electoral system: like the vast majority of democracies around the globe.
 - Focus of the literature : mainly (two-party system) US.
 - Lessons can be drawn from the French case for other countries.

Preview of the results

- Large positive impact of spending on votes, both for municipal and legislative elections.
 - Price of a vote : around 6 euros.
 - Without spending limit, private money can easily change the election results.
- Effect mainly driven by private donations and personal contributions.
 - Party contributions do not matter.
- Additional result : spending increases turnout (mobilization effect).

Literature review

- Literature documenting the sources and amounts of campaign contributions: Ansolabehere et al. (2003) on the US.
 - This paper : provide new evidence on France.
 - Research agenda: extend it in the future to other European countries.
- Literature on the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes.
- This paper: first attempt at estimating the causal impact of spending with multiparty electoral data.

Literature review

- Literature documenting the sources and amounts of campaign contributions : Ansolabehere et al. (2003) on the US.
- Literature on the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes.
 - Cross-sectional analyses: Palda and Palda (1998) on 1993 French legislative elections; Foucault and François (2005) on 1997 French legislative elections;
 - US Congressional elections: Jacobson (1978, 1980, 1985, 1990, 2006),
 Abramowitz (1988), Green & Krasno (1988), Levitt (1994), Gerber (1998), Ferguson et al. (2016), etc.
- This paper: first attempt at estimating the causal impact of spending with multiparty electoral data.
 - Heterogeneity of the effects: depending on the political parties, and depending on the sources of funding.

- Introduction
- 2 Historical background and campaign finance rules
- Oata & Descriptive statistics
 - Electoral results data
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- Results : Fully Contested Districts
 - Legislative elections
 - Depending on sources of funding
 - Robustness & Additional results
- 6 IV using change in legislation
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Local elections in France

- Municipal (mayoral) elections.
 - Two-round list system with proportional representation.
 - Data for 1995, 2001, 2008 & 2014 for all electoral districts with more than 9,000 inhabitants.
 - 950-1, 050 districts.

Legislative elections.

- Two-round system; single-member constituencies (577 constituencies).
- Data for 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007 & 2012 for all electoral districts.
 - 555 districts.

Campaign finance reforms

- Important reforms have been introduced in France since 1988 : much later than in other countries (candidates were reimbursed relatively early for certain campaign costs : 1962).
 - Until 1988, parties were not allowed to accept donations and there were no direct public subsidies.
 - Since 1988, direct public funding of parties (in proportion to legislative results) as well as additional indirect public funding in the form of public reimbursement of candidates for election campaign costs.
- 1990 : creation of the CNCCFP ("Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques") : reviews the accounts of parties and candidates (legal sanctions and fees)
- Candidates have to keep a record of their spending and revenues since 1995 for municipal elections (for cities larger than 9,000 inhabitants) and 1993 for legislative elections.

Campaign finance reforms

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- 1990 : creation of the CNCCFP ("Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques") : reviews the accounts of parties and candidates (legal sanctions and fees)
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 - ⇒ This data was never collected before and forms the basis for this paper.

Campaign finance rules : Spending limits

- Candidates cannot spend more than a spending limit.
 - Updated every 3 years to account for inflation.
- The limit depends on :
 - The population of the electoral district (but not linearly). tranches
 illustration
 - Whether candidates qualified for the 2nd round.
 - Single limit for legislative elections.
- For instance, in the 2008 municipal elections, for a city of 335,505 inhabitants (\simeq Nice) :
- Change in legislation for legislative elections :

Campaign finance rules : Spending limits

- Candidates cannot spend more than a spending limit.
- For instance, in the 2008 municipal elections, for a city of 335,505 inhabitants (\simeq Nice) :
 - €247,568 for all candidates.
 - Of which up to €118,000 can be refund (47.5% of spending limit).
 - €332, 684 for candidates qualified to the second round.
- Change in legislation for legislative elections :

Campaign finance rules : Spending limits

- Candidates cannot spend more than a spending limit.
- For instance, in the 2008 municipal elections, for a city of 335,505 inhabitants (\simeq Nice) :
- Change in legislation for legislative elections :
 - For **1993** election: spending limit = F500,000 (€104,806) for electoral districts with more than 80,000 inhabitants; and F400,000 (€83,845) for constituencies smaller than 80,000 inhabitants.
 - For **1997** election : F250, 000 ($\le 52, 403$) for all districts $+ F1 (\le 0.15)$ per inhabitant.
 - Since **2002** election : \in 38,000 for all districts $+ \in$ 0.15 per inhabitant.

Campaign finance rules: Sources of funding

- Private donations.
 - From legal entities / firms.
 - Until 1995 : limited to 10% of the spending limit and F500, 000.
 - Since 1995 (applied since 1997 legislative elections) : forbidden.
 - From natural persons / individuals.
 - Limited to €4,600 (F30,000).
 - Tax credit (as of 2017 : 66%, limited to 20% of taxable income).
- Personal contributions.
- Party contributions. Party financing
- Contributions in kind.
- In the majority of the cases, total revenues = total spending.



Campaign finance rules: Sources of funding

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Campaign finance rules: Sources of funding

- Private donations.
- Personal contributions.
- Party contributions.
- Contributions in kind.
- In the majority of the cases, total revenues = total spending.
 - Difference between revenues and spending = balance of the campaign account ("solde compte de campagne"). Median = 0 (mean=1, 500).
 - Not allowed to have a negative balance: in this case, accounts not approved and financial and legal sanctions.
 - However allow to have a positive balance.
 - E.g. Alain Juppé in 1995 : +117,000€ (830,000€ of expenses but private donations = 222,000, of which 172,000 donations from 7 legal persons).

Campaign finance rules: Public refund

- Candidates are refunded for their personal contributions to the campaign if they reach 5% of vote shares in the first round.
- The refund cannot exceed 47.5% of the spending limit (50% before 2011).
 - Exception: 1993 legislative elections: only 10% of the spending limit refunded.
- No refund if the campaign accounts are not approved by the CNCCFP (about 3% of the cases)

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Candidates and vote shares

- Data on votes obtained by each candidate from the "Centre de Données Socio-Politiques" (CDSP), the Interior ministry, Bach(2011), and Cagé (2017).
 - Municipal elections: 1995, 2001, 2008, and 2014.
 - Legislative elections: 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012.
- Data on political parties from the Interior ministry and the newspaper Le Monde.
 - Legislative elections: 5 main political parties: (i) the Communist party; (ii) the Green party; (iii) the Socialist party; (iv) the right-wing party (UDF, RPR, UMP, etc.); and (v) the extreme-right party.
 - Municipal elections: political "affiliation" rather than political party:
 (i) extreme left; (ii) left; (iii) right; and (iv) extreme right.
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Campaign spending

- Build a unique dataset on campaign resources and spending.
- Paper data from the "Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques" (CNCCFP).
- ⇒ Information for 45,793 candidates/elections.
 - Merge with electoral results data using their name / electoral district.

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COMMISSION NATIONALE DES COMPTES DE CAMPAGNES ET DES FINANCEMENTS POLITIQUES (CNCCFP)

PUBLICATION SIMPLIFIÉE DES COMPTES DE CAMPAGNE

Élections municipales de l'année 2014







Élection municipale générale des 23 et 30 mars 2014

Département : Ain

Commune : Ambérieu-en-Bugey

Plafond des dépenses : 20 767 € au premier tour ; 28 597 € au second tour.

Scrutin non contesté

				RECETTES (PAR ORIGINE)							
CANDIDATS,	DÉPENSES	RECETTES						compte	DÉV	RFE	Déc.
têtes de listes	totales	totales	Dons	Apport	Concours	Autres	Apport	de	(1)	(2)	CNCCFP
				partis	en nature		personnel	campagne			
Mme EXPOSITO Josiane	11 652	11 652	0	0	153	0	11 499	0			
	11 991	11 991	0	0	553	0	11 438	0		11 038	ARM
M. FABRE Daniel	12 652	13 988	270	0	0	0	13 718	1 336			
	13 052	14 388	270	0	400	0	13 718	1 336	0	11 982	ARM
M. FORTIN Christophe	10 492	10 492	1 250	0	0	0	9 242	0			
	10 692	10 692	1 250	0	200	0	9 242	0		9 042	ARM
Mme PIDOUX Catherine	11 497	11 497	2 670	0	349	0	8 478	0			
	11 303	11 303	2 270	0	349	0	8 684	0		8 684	AR

Municipal elections : spending

▶ distribution


	Spending (cst 2014 €)						
	Mean	Median	sd	Min	Max	N	
Total spending per candidate							
1995	23,389	14,235	31,151	0	426,652	3,839	
2001	25,323	14,913	35,398	0	477,550	3,488	
2008	21,765	13,345	29,905	0	393,380	3,743	
2014	21,177	13,094	28,694	0	458,914	4,435	
Per candidate & per voter	•	•	•		•	,	
1995	1.24	1.15	0.89	0.00	4.80	3,683	
2001	1.31	1.28	0.92	0.00	4.51	3,023	
2008	1.12	1.11	0.75	0.00	3.88	3,454	
2014	1.05	1.02	0.71	0.00	3.98	4,313	
Total spending per voter						,	
1995	4.81	4.55	2.42	0.00	14.99	945	
2001	4.25	4.18	2.82	0.00	13.26	933	
2008	3.84	3.66	1.88	0.00	13.31	1,002	
2014	4.32	4.08	1.84	0.00	12.31	1,052	

Legislative elections : spending


	Spending (cst 2014 €)						
	Mean	Median	sd	Min	Max	N	
Total spending per candidate							
1993	21,637	11,143	26,916	0	170,564	5,116	
1997	15,113	2,186	19,400	0	75,226	6,040	
2002	11,261	1,414	17,148	0	81,169	7,981	
2007	11,323	654	17,063	0	76,281	7,190	
2012	18,282	17,320	17,164	0	71,351	3,942	
Per candidate & per voter							
1993	0.33	0.16	0.42	0.00	4.08	5,060	
1997	0.23	0.03	0.30	0.00	1.87	6,007	
2002	0.17	0.02	0.26	0.00	1.58	7,848	
2007	0.16	0.01	0.24	0.00	1.50	6,760	
2012	0.23	0.20	0.22	0.00	1.29	3,896	
Total spending per voter							
1993	2.97	2.80	1.19	0.49	9.10	555	
1997	2.47	2.35	0.74	0.00	6.24	555	
2002	2.34	2.12	0.93	0.56	7.34	555	
2007	1.90	1.77	0.65	0.42	5.34	555	
2012	1.68	1.61	0.52	0.00	4.51	540	

- Decrease in spending after 1993. \Rightarrow Mainly due to change in regulation.
- Drop in number of obs. in 2012 : change in reporting requirement rule. distribution

Municipal elections: Spending share vs. Vote share



Legislative elections: Spending share vs. Vote share



Sources of revenues

Municipal elections

	Mean	Median	sd	Min	Max	Obs
Private donation (%)	15.9	5.8	22.5	0	100	15,146
Party contribution (%)	7.3	0.0	19.9	0	100	15,147
Personal contribution (%)	73.9	84.5	29.3	0	100	15,144
In-kind contribution $(\%)$	2.5	0.0	7.6	0	100	15,243
Other (%)	0.3	0.0	2.5	0	94	15,242

Legislative elections

	Mean	Median	sd	Min	Max	Obs
Private donation (%)	15.3	0.0	27.0	0	100	24,455
Party contribution (%)	28.4	5.2	37.5	0	100	24,462
Personal contribution (%)	50.7	56.4	41.6	0	100	24,427
In-kind contribution $(\%)$	4.5	0.0	14.6	0	100	24,555
Other (%)	8.0	0.0	4.9	0	100	24,555

Municipal elections: Breakdown by political party

	/1\	(0)	(2)	(4)	/F\
	(1) Extreme left	(2) Left	(3) Right	Extreme right	(5) Left vs. Right
	mean/sd	mean/sd	mean/sd	mean/sd	b/t
% of total revenues	,	,	,	,	,
Private donation (%)	15.1	13.0	21.6	1.7	8.6***
()	(28.3)	(18.8)	(24.1)	(8.2)	(20.4)
Party contribution (%)	`37.7	`6.3´	`4.3´	`4.8	-2.0***
(1-)	(43.3)	(15.1)	(13.4)	(18.9)	(-7.3)
Personal contribution (%)	`38.5	`78.4	`71.5 [′]	`91.2 [′]	-6.9***
()	(43.3)	(23.9)	(26.9)	(22.3)	(-13.0)
In-kind contribution (%)	8.2	1.9	2.2	2.1	0.3***
()	(18.3)	(5.0)	(5.9)	(8.0)	(3.1)
In euros	()	()	()	(/	(- /
Private donations (cst 2014 €)	220	3,306	6,770	310	3,464***
,	(871)	(6,778)	(13,087)	(1,974)	(17)
Party contributions (cst 2014 €)	`354´	`2,598´	2,276	327	-323*
, , ,	(661)	(10.045)	(9.084)	(2,626)	(-2)
Personal contributions (cst 2014 €)	`952 [´]	19,433	20,002	19,695	5 69
	(2,756)	(23,609)	(25,489)	(21,808)	(1)
In kind contributions (cst 2014 €)	87	` 449 ´	700	245	251***
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(369)	(1.407)	(3.359)	(1.124)	(5)
Total revenues (cst 2014 €)	ì.889	25,856	30,376	20,695	4,520***
	(8,849)	(33,531)	(47,204)	(22,425)	(6)
Expenditures	(, , , , ,	(,)	(, -)	(, -)	(-)
Total expenditures (cst 2014 €)	1,554	25,463	28,785	20,478	3,322***
. ,	(3,075)	(33,192)	(35,827)	(22,324)	(5)
Obs	1,068	5,901	5,521	1,389	11,422

Legislative elections: Breakdown by political party

	(1) Communist	(2) Green	(3) Socialist	(4) Right	(5) Extreme right	(6) Socialist vs. Right
0/ ()	mean/sd	mean/sd	mean/sd	mean/sd	mean/sd	b/t
% of total revenues						
Private donation (%)	12.3	5.6	18.3	26.5	1.2	-8.3***
	(22.3)	(16.0)	(21.9)	(25.3)	(5.2)	(-11.5)
Party contribution (%)	16.3	27.5	12.5	29.1	1.9	-16.6***
	(30.6)	(38.0)	(19.8)	(20.3)	(11.6)	(-27.3)
Personal contribution (%)	68.4	61.5	65.5	40.3	95.3	25.2***
()	(37.5)	(40.0)	(30.7)	(28.0)	(15.3)	(28.1)
In-kind contribution (%)	`2.1 ′	`4.4 ′	`2.4´	`3.1 ´	`0.9 ´	-0.6***
(,	(9.2)	(12.1)	(4.6)	(5.7)	(6.4)	(-4.0)
In euros	(*)	()	()	(011)	(***)	(,
Private donations (cst 2014 €)	2,348	440	10,020	17,073	261	-7,053***
	(7,772)	(1,854)	(17,870)	(25,354)	(1,684)	(-11)
Party contributions (cst 2014 €)	1,546	878	5,154	14,015	244	-8,861***
arty contributions (est 2011 c)	(3,973)	(2,100)	(9,188)	(11,455)	(1,742)	(-28)
Personal contributions (cst 2014 €)	13,296	5,783	24,261	18,512	22,054	5,750***
cisonal contributions (est 2014 e)	(12,750)	(9,228)	(12,901)	(13,846)	(11,398)	(14)
In kind contributions (cst 2014 €)	167	173	847	1,259	119	-412***
iii kiila colitributiolis (cst 2014 €)	(844)	(723)	(1,778)	(2,611)	(785)	(-6)
T-+-1 (+ 2014 6)						
Total revenues (cst 2014 €)	17,783	7,331	41,147	51,846	22,822	-10,700***
F dia	(22,362)	(10,033)	(20,280)	(26,534)	(11,183)	(-15)
Expenditures	17.100	7.004	00.076	47 505	00.000	0.010***
Total expenditures (cst 2014 €)	17,169	7,234	39,376	47,595	22,663	-8,219***
A1	(15,365)	(10,030)	(17,315)	(19,097)	(11,134)	(-15)
Obs	2,639	2,367	2,543	2,306	2,813	4,849

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Main empirical challenges

- Multiparty electoral data: OLS doesn't work.
 - Need to use statistical model satisfying two conditions :

vote share
$$c_{cmt} \in [0, 1]$$
 for all m and c (1)

$$\sum_{c=1}^{C} \text{vote share}_{cmt} = 1 \text{ for all } m.$$
 (2)

- Multivariate logistic transformation and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) (Katz and King, 1999; Tomz et al., 2002 ⇒ Clarify statistical suite).
- Missing data: political parties do not run everywhere.
- Endogeneity of spending: high quality candidates are likely to receive a higher share of the votes and have high campaign expenditures.



Main empirical challenges

- **1** Multiparty electoral data : OLS doesn't work.
- Missing data : political parties do not run everywhere.
 - Estimate the effect of spending on votes only in fully contested districts.
 - "Full information approach" (Honaker et al., 2002) : estimate the *effective* rather than the *actual* vote (⇒ *Amelia* statistical suite).
- Endogeneity of spending: high quality candidates are likely to receive a higher share of the votes and have high campaign expenditures.

Main empirical challenges

- **1** Multiparty electoral data : OLS doesn't work.
- 2 Missing data: political parties do not run everywhere.
- Sendogeneity of spending: high quality candidates are likely to receive a higher share of the votes and have high campaign expenditures.
 - \Rightarrow IV strategy.

Empirical specification

vote share
$$_{\mathsf{Communist}\ mt} = \alpha_1 + \sum\limits_{j=1}^5 \beta_{1j} \, \mathsf{spending}_{jmt} + \sum\limits_{j=1}^5 \delta_{1j} \, \mathsf{Incumbent}_{jmt} + \mathbf{X}'_{\mathbf{mt}} \mathbf{x_1} + \lambda_{1m} + \eta_{1t}$$
 vote share $_{\mathsf{Green}\ mt} = \alpha_2 + \sum\limits_{j=1}^5 \beta_{2j} \, \mathsf{spending}_{jmt} + \sum\limits_{j=1}^5 \delta_{2j} \, \mathsf{Incumbent}_{jmt} + \mathbf{X}'_{\mathbf{mt}} \mathbf{x_2} + \lambda_{2m} + \eta_{2t}$ vote share $_{\mathsf{Socialist}\ mt} = \alpha_3 + \sum\limits_{j=1}^5 \beta_{3j} \, \mathsf{spending}_{jmt} + \sum\limits_{j=1}^5 \delta_{3j} \, \mathsf{Incumbent}_{jmt} + \mathbf{X}'_{\mathbf{mt}} \mathbf{x_3} + \lambda_{3m} + \eta_{3t}$ vote share $_{\mathsf{Right}\ mt} = \alpha_4 + \sum\limits_{j=1}^5 \beta_{4j} \, \mathsf{spending}_{jmt} + \sum\limits_{j=1}^5 \delta_{4j} \, \mathsf{Incumbent}_{jmt} + \mathbf{X}'_{\mathbf{mt}} \mathbf{x_4} + \lambda_{4m} + \eta_{4t}$ vote share $_{\mathsf{Extreme}\ right\ mt} = \alpha_5 + \sum\limits_{j=1}^5 \beta_{5j} \, \mathsf{spending}_{jmt} + \sum\limits_{j=1}^5 \delta_{5j} \, \mathsf{Incumbent}_{jmt} + \mathbf{X}'_{\mathbf{mt}} \mathbf{x_5} + \lambda_{5m} + \eta_{5t}$

where t index election, m the district & j the political parties.

- ullet vote share $_{jmt}$: log ratio of party j's share of the vote relative to that of the "other" party.
- \Rightarrow Equations estimated simultaneously via SUR.



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Legislative elections

·		Log ratios of vote shares with respect to other party						
	Communist party	Green party	Socialist party	Right-wing party	Extreme-right party			
Communist party spending	0.51***	0.05	-0.57**	-0.22	0.01			
	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.17)			
Green party spending	0.46**	3.35***	-ì.59* [*] *	-0.19	0.21			
	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.23)			
Socialist party spending	-0.15*	-0.24*	0.78***	-0.25*	-0.15			
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.10)			
Right-wing party spending	Ò.18* [‡]	-0.03	`0.20´	1.49***	`0.11´			
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.09)			
Extreme-right spending	`0.26	-0.07	`0.04´	`0.19´	0`.80** [*]			
	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.18)			
Election FE	Yes	` ′	, ,	` '	` '			
District FE	Yes							
Controls	Yes							
Observations	1,870							

- ⇒ A one-euro increase in spending by the communist party increases the log ratio of the communist party share of the vote relative to the "other" party by 0.5.
 - Large magnitude of the effect for the right-wing party : +1.49.

Magnitude of the effect

- Perform two counterfactual estimations :
 - Assume spending by the right-wing party candidates = 0 in all the districts/years.
 - ② Assume all the right-wing party candidates spent €4 per eligible voters (maximum amount allowed in 1993).

The price of a vote: around 6 euros

No spending for right-wing party

	Model	No	spending by Rig	ght		
Year	Votes	Votes	Change in votes	95% CI	Change in spending	Price of a vote
1993	7,346,828	4,066,068	-3,280,760	-3.4 , -3.1	-€20,753,246	€6.3
1997	7,779,341	5,145,501	-2,633,840	-2.7 , -2.4	-€17,810,772	€6.8
2002	8,745,621	5,015,407	-3,730,214	-3.8 , -3.5	-€15,649,208	€4.2
2007	13,439,828	6,833,705	-6,606,123	-6.8 , -6.3	- €16,588,917	€2.5
2012	8,100,697	5,832,752	-2,267,945	-2.4, -2	- €13,252,376	€5.8

Maximum spending (€4) for right-wing party

	Model	Ma	x spending by Ri	ght		
Year	Votes	Votes	Change in votes	95% CI	Change in spending	Price of a vote
1993	7,346,828	19,639,708	+12,292,880	12.2; 12.3	+ €62,170,496	€5.1
1997	7,779,341	24,853,326	+17,073,984	17, 17.1	+ €87,126,656	€5.1
2002	8,745,621	24,225,274	+15,479,653	15.4 , 15.5	+ €86,635,632	€5.6
2007	13,439,828	33,006,806	+19.566.978	19.4 , 19.6	+ €122,774,000	€6.3
2012	8,100,697	28,174,862	+20,074,164	19.9 , 20.1	+ €105,708,400	€5.3

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	Log ratios of vote shares with respect to other party				
	Communist party	Green party	Socialist party	Right-wing party	Extreme-right party
Communist party					
Private donations	-0.10	0.13	-0.54	0.17	-0.01
	(0.26)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.27)
Party contribution	0.15	0.31	-0.37	-0.84	0.22
	(0.41)	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.63)	(0.43)
Personal contribution	0.75***	0.21	-Ò.59* [*] *	-0.20	-0.03
	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.19)
Green party	` '	,	` '	` '	,
Private donations	-0.52	-0.61	-0.73	-2.84**	-0.81
	(0.86)	(1.17)	(1.19)	(1.32)	(0.91)
Party contribution	-0.01	4.93***	0.97	2.27*	1.16
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	(0.79)	(1.07)	(1.09)	(1.21)	(0.83)
Personal contribution	0.62***	3.52***	-1.28***	-0.03	0.37
	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.25)
Socialist party	(1.20)	(5.52)	(3.32)	(3.50)	()
Private donations	-0.23**	-0.31**	0.33**	-0.32*	-0.25**
acc donacions	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.12)
Party contribution	-0.38	-0.80**	-0.05	-0.72**	-0.47*
i dity contribution	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.24)
Personal contribution	-0.01	0.00	1.53***	0.02	0.04
r ersonar contribution	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.15)
Right-wing party	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.13)
Private donations	0.23***	0.20*	0.29**	0.94***	0.22**
Frivate donations	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.09)
D			0.11)	1.31***	
Party contribution	0.16	-0.30			0.07
D 1 (3) (1)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.14)
Personal contribution	0.30**	0.21	0.07	1.61***	0.16
e	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.14)
Extreme-right party	1.01	2.44	0.00	2.50	0.26
Private donations	-1.21	-2.44	-0.90	-2.59	-0.26
Danta annih atian	(1.16)	(1.58)	(1.60)	(1.79)	(1.23)
Party contribution	0.78	(1.26)	-0.03	(1.42)	1.41
	(0.93)	(1.26)	(1.28)	(1.43)	(0.98)
Personal contribution	0.17	-0.06	-0.07	0.06	0.74***
	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.18)
Election FE and District FE	Yes				
Controls	Yes				
Observations	1,870				
			4 □		▶ ব ৳ ▶ ৳ ৳ □ ● ০ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □

Robustness & Additional results

Robustness:

- Results do not change if estimate the effects on effective votes taking into account all the districts/years.
- Similar results for municipal elections. Ptable
- Results robust to controlling for temporal and spatial correlation (Ferguson *et al.*, 2016).
- Additional results : positive effect of spending on turnout. Fies Financial


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Empirical strategy

- 1995 : change in legislation. No longer allowed for a candidate to receive donations from private entities.
 - Applied for the 1st time for the 1997 legislative elections.
- Did not affect all the candidates the same way: some candidates were relying strongly on private donations from legal person, while others were not. Party

	Legislative elections (1993)						
	Mean	Median	P95	P99	Max	Obs	
Donations from legal persons	8,608	0	58,396	103,571	350,355	5,111	
Per registered voter	0.13	0.00	0.84	1.59	6.67	5,055	
As a $\%$ of total revenues	12.4	0.0	70.6	91.0	100	5,109	
As a % of total private donations	22.6	0.0	96.6	100	100	5,088	

- Idea : use legislation change as an exogeneous shock on total spending.
- More precisely, instrument change in spending between 1993 & 1997 legislative elections by donations from legal persons in 1993.
 - ⇒ Candidates were not able to recover from the ban.



IV estimates consistent with naive findings

Log ratios of vote shares with respect to other party

	Naive	estimates		IV
	Socialist party	Right-wing party	Socialist party	Right-wing party
Socialist party Actual spending	0.48*** (0.13)	-0.19 (0.14)		
Right-wing party Actual spending	-0.19 (0.13)	0.20 (0.14)		
Socialist party Predicted spending	(0.10)	(0.1.)	0.31*** (0.09)	-0.18* (0.10)
Right-wing party Predicted spending			-0.07 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)
Controls			` /	,
Socialist party Incumbent	0.55*** (0.12)	0.29** (0.12)	0.53*** (0.12)	0.29** (0.12)
Right-wing party Incumbent	0.14 (0.10)	0.25* [*] (0.11)	0.13 (0.11)	0.27** (0.11)
% 15-19 years old	0.45*** (0.12)	0.37*** (0.12)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.37*** (0.12)
% 20-24 years old	-0.11*	-0.13*	-0.10	-0.12*
% 65 of older	(0.06) 0.11***	(0.07) 0.10***	(0.07) 0.09***	(0.07) 0.10***
% no diploma	(0.02) 0.01 (0.02)	(0.02) -0.00 (0.02)	(0.02) 0.01 (0.02)	(0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
% higher education	0.06**	0.05*	Ò.06* [*]	Ò.05* [*]
% blue collar workers	(0.02) 0.01	(0.02) 0.00	(0.02) 0.01	(0.02) 0.00
Unemployment rate	(0.01) -0.04** (0.02)	(0.01) -0.06*** (0.02)	(0.01) -0.03** (0.02)	(0.01) -0.06*** (0.02)
Observations	113	(0.02)	113	(0.02)

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Conclusion


- Using French data for local (municipal and legislative) elections, we
 have shown that money matters in elections: for a candidate,
 increasing spending is an efficient way to increase vote shares.
- This suggests that we need to introduce stronger spending limitations, and more equal public funding.
- ⇒ Private money is a danger for democracy not only in the U.S. but also in Europe.

Many thanks for your attention!

Spending limits calculations: 2008 municipal elections

FRACTION DE LA	PLAFOND PAR HABITANT DES DÉPENSES ÉLECTORALES						
POPULATION DE LA		en e	uros				
CIRCONSCRIPTION	élection des cons	eillers municipaux	élection des	élection des			
ÉLECTORALE	listes présentes	listes présentes au	conseillers	conseillers			
	au 1 ^{er} tour 2 ^{ème} tour		généraux	régionaux			
jusque 15.000 habitants	1,22	1,68	0,64	0,53			
de 15.001 à 30.000	1,07	1,52	0,53	0,53			
de 30.001 à 60.000	0,91	1,22	0,43	0,53			
de 60.001 à 100.000	0,84	1,14	0,30	0,53			
de 100.001 à 150.000	0,76	1,07	0,30	0,38			
de 150.001 à 250.000	0,69 0,84		0,30	0,30			
excédant 250.000	0,53	0,76	0,30	0,23			

Spending limits




A note on party contributions

- Candidates also receive financing support for political parties.
- Parties are financed through a number of a different ways :
 - Membership dues;
 - Elected representatives' contributions;
 - Public funding;
 - Private donations.
- The relative importance of these different sources of revenues varies strongly from one party to the other.
- In 2014, party contributions to electoral campaigns ("aides financières aux candidats") have represented on average 9.6% of total parties' spending (9.37% for the "Parti socialiste" but 1.05% for the UMP).
 - Support paid to the candidate / representative & direct payment of electoral expenses.



Parties' sources of revenues : 2012



Legislative elections : Political parties used in the empirical analysis

	1993	1997	2002	2007	2012
	Number	Number	Number	Number	Number
Communist party	555	535	484	507	543
Green party	326	434	446	519	468
Socialist Party	542	516	495	540	484
Right-wing party	533	543	551	547	517
Front National (FN)	554	555	554	552	550

Municipal elections : Political colors used in the empirical analysis

	1995	2001	2008	2014
	Number	Number	Number	Number
Extreme Left	126	193	226	227
Left	931	783	917	929
Right	889	753	921	908
Extreme Right	427	286	138	431

Spending per registered voter: municipal elections ▶ back

FIGURE: 1995

FIGURE: 2001



Spending per registered voter : legislative elections $({\bf r}_{\rm back})$







FIGURE: 2002





Spending per registered voter: legislative elections (ct'd)





Average vote share obtained by the "other" party, Legislative elections, Fully contested districts

			C . I					
	Vote share of the other party							
	Mean	Median	sd	Min	Max	N		
1993	15.7	10.9	12.2	0	68	304		
1997	13.9	12.0	8.3	0	58	379		
2002	17.9	14.3	10.8	4	70	359		
2007	19.5	16.5	9.9	6	75	456		
2012	11.4	7.3	10.8	1	71	372		

Average spending per registered voter, Legislative elections, Fully contested districts

	Communist	Green	Socialist	Right	Extreme right
	mean/sd	$\overline{mean/sd}$	mean/sd	$\overline{mean/sd}$	mean/sd
1993	0.27	0.15	0.70	1.03	0.20
	(0.29) 0.38	(80.0)	(0.46)	(0.42)	(0.09)
1997	`0.38´	`0.05´	`0.55´	`0.70´	`0.51´
	(0.23) 0.23	(0.08)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.12)
2002	`0.23´	`0.13´	`0.56´	`0.64´	0.27
	(0.26)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.29) 0.49	(0.18) 0.26
2007	`0.13´	`0.04´	`0.41´	`0.49´	`0.26´
	(0.20)	(0.10)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.18)
2012	`0.20′	`0.08´	`0.44´	`0.46´	`0.27´
	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.09)

Legislative elections: Full Information Approach

		Log ratios of	vote shares with	respect to other pa	rty
	Communist party	Green party	Socialist party	Right-wing party	Extreme-right party
Communist party spending	1.15***	0.11	-0.28	-0.02	0.20
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.14)
Green party spending	0.29*	3.93***	-2.21* [*] *	-0.01	0.09
	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.17)
Socialist party spending	0.09	0.02	1.63***	-0.02	0.09
	(80.0)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)
Right-wing party spending	0.31***	0.36***	0.20*	1.91***	0.27***
	(80.0)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.07)
Extreme-right spending	0.07	0.11	0.10	0.02	1.08***
	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.16)
Election FE	Yes	` ′	, ,	, ,	
District FE	Yes				
Controls	Yes				
Observations	2,571				

Municipal elections : Fully contested Districts

	Log ratios of vote shares with respect to other party			
	Left	Right		
Left spending	0.32***	0.12		
,	(0.11)	(0.11)		
Right spending	`0.09´	Ò.21* [*]		
3 . 3	(0.08)	(0.08)		
Election FE	Yes			
District FE	Yes			
Controls	Yes			
Observations	2,291			

Spending and first round turnout : Legislative elections

Turnout	Turnout	Turnout
		<u> </u>
(0.08)	0.20	0.20
		-0.39
	(0.33) 2.14***	(0.35) 2.10***
		(0.48)
	0.63***	0.66***
		(0.20)
	Ò.48* [‡]	Ò.47* [*]
	(0.19)	(0.19)
	-0.12	-0.07
		(0.38)
		0.13
	(0.12)	(0.11) -0.10***
		(0.02)
Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes
0.88	0.88	0.88
2,759		2,759
		572 ▶ 63.26 ■
	0.24*** (0.08) Yes Yes 0.88	0.24*** (0.08) -0.39 (0.35) 2.14*** (0.49) 0.63*** (0.20) 0.48** (0.19) -0.12 (0.39) 0.02 (0.12) Yes Yes Yes Yes 0.88 2,759 572 572

Spending and first round turnout : Municipal elections

- back	Turnout	Turnout	Turnout
Total spending	0.79***		
	(0.06)		
Extreme-left spending	()	-0.01	-0.07
,		(0.71)	(0.72)
Left spending		0.87***	(0.72) 0.83***
		(0.09)	(0.09)
Right spending		0.67***	0.64***
		(80.0)	(80.0)
Extreme-right spending		0.87***	0.82***
		(0.18) 1.03***	(0.18) 0.97***
Spending by other candidates			
		(0.13)	(0.12)
Number of candidates			0.19***
			(0.05)
Election FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-sq	0.82	0.82	0.83
Observations	3,755	3,755	3,755
Clusters (districts) Mean DepVar	1,079 57.9	1,079 57.9	1,079 57.9
Sd DepVar	6.6	6.6	6.6
Ju Dep vai	0.0	<u>U.U</u>	0.0

Summary statistics : Donations from legal persons

- Dack						
	(1)	_(2)	(3)	_(4)	_ (5)	(6)
	Communist	Green	Sociálist	Right	Extremé right	Socialist vs. Right
	mean/sd	mean/sd	mean/sd	mean/sd	mean/sd	b/t
Donations from legal persons	765	47	4,482	7,750	52	-3,268***
	(5,684)	(817)	(15,599)	(22,832)	(673)	(-6.0)
Per registered voter	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.12	0.00	-0.050***
•	(0.10)	(0.01)	(0.24)	(0.36)	(0.01)	(-5.88)
As a % of total revenues	1.6	0.4	6.2	8.1	0.2	-1.9***
	(9.0)	(5.5)	(17.9)	(20.0)	(2.1)	(-3.6)
As a % of total private donations	`3.1	`0.7	`11.5´	`14.1´	`0.9´	-2.6***
	(15.4)	(7.9)	(28.5)	(30.8)	(7.8)	(-3.2)
Obs	2,616	2,306	2,558	2,688	2,748	5,246