

Is Bigger Really Better?
Moral Hazard Issues in
Expanding Financial Safety
Nets
Global Solutions Summit
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#### Topics

Ten years after:

Where do we stand?


Small is beautiful:

The German "Three Pillar System"

Moral hazard and safety nets:

Better inventives for bank managers


### What has changed since 2007? Private sector deleveraging, high public deficits



Private net financial balances = Current account minus Fiscal balance (Source: IMF)


#### Bank lending stagnant with the exception of China






Source: BIS


#### Business models have become more conservative





Source: BIS Annual Report 2018

Capital and liquidity shortfalls coming down<sup>2</sup>




2 The height of each bar shows the aggregated capital shortfall considering requirements for each tier (ie CET1, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2) of capital for the major internationally active banks monitored by the BCBS (BCBS (2018)).

#### NPL declining, but still high in Southern Europa

#### NPL reduction continued, but at varying paces across countries

Aggregate NPL and foreclosed assets ratios (left panel) and NPL ratios in high-NPL countries between 2014 and H1 2018 (right panel)

#### (2014-H1 2018, percentage of total loans)



Source: ECB supervisory data


Notes: In line with FINREP reporting on non-performing exposures, loans and advances also include cash balances at central banks and other demand deposits. Left panel: net NPLs and net foreclosed assets are calculated as gross NPLs/foreclosed assets less accumulated impairments. Right panel: based on country-level aggregates for significant institutions. Country-level NPL ratios refer to a balanced sample of significant institutions and are adjusted for mergers and acquisitions.

Source: ECB, Financial Stability Review November 2018

#### **Expanding Safety Nets?**

- Lender of Last Resort is already unlimited for countries indebted in their own currency
- Global dimension: Presentation by Helene Schuberth
- Considerable progress in extending the safety nets of the euro area:
  - ELA (Emergency liquidity): Country specific lender of last resort
  - European Stability Mechanism (500 billion Euro): Lender of last resort for member state governments indebted in a "foreign currency".
  - Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), backed by Single Resolution Fund (SRF). ESM serves as backstop for SRF
  - Work in progress: European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) with a target size 0.8 percent of deposits is grossly overrated


# Small is beautiful: Germany's ,,3 Pillar System"




 Balance sheet total excludes total cumulated assets of Building & Loan Associations of €213.1bn Source: Bundesbank



#### Is bigger better? The German "Three pillar system"





Source: Deutsche Bundesbank

#### Smaller is more profitable



#### Advantages of the smaller banks


- Long-term orientation due to independence from capital markets
- ➤ Local anchoring combined with centralized service centers
- ➤ Support of social and cultural activities at the local level

# Who is saved by financial safety nets?

Source:

Presentation Edward J. Kane

#### GENUINE REFORM MUST SHIFT THE FOCUS OF RESCUE POLICIES FROM HELPING BANKS TO HELPING SOCIETY




"I DON'T WANT TO ALARM YOU, BUT IF YOU DON'T GIVE THIS MAN A TRANSFUSION RIGHT NOW, YOU COULD DIE."


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#### Profits private, losses social?

Stock prices of German Banks and DAX (14 May 2007=100)



## Setting the right inventives for bank mangers (Dudley-Proposal)



#### Summary

#### The world has changed dramatically since 2007

- Net private lending has almost vanished (China is the exception)
- Bank business models have become more conservative
- No obvious need for expanding safety nets

The German experience: Diversified banking systems ("Three Pillar") with small banks provide stability and to low costs for customers (=low profitability of banks)

The problem is not that banks were safed, but that the managers were not held responsible for their mistakes

- Share holders made huge losses
- Instead of increasing capital requirements to prohibitive levels, change the compensation of bank managers (Dudley Proposal)
- Responsible divers are better than more and speed limits



Why we need strong banks