Edward J. Kane was Professor of Finance at Boston College. From 1972 to 1992 he held the Everett D. Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary Economics at Ohio State University. A founding member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Kane rejoined the organization in 2005. He served for twelve years as a trustee and member of the finance committee of Teachers Insurance. He consulted for the World Bank and is a senior fellow in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Center for Financial Research. Previously, Kane consulted for numerous agencies, including the IMF, components of the Federal Reserve System, and three foreign central banks. He consulted as well for the Congressional Budget Office, the Joint Economic Committee, and the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress. He wa a past president and fellow of the American Finance Association and a former Guggenheim fellow. He also served as president of the International Atlantic Economic Society and the North American Economics and Finance Association. Kane was a longtime research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He authored three books and coauthored or coedited several more. He published widely in professional journals and served on seven editorial boards. He received a BS from Georgetown University and a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Edward J. Kane
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This paper proposes a theoretically based and easy-to-implement way to measure the systemicrisk of financial institutions using publicly available accounting and stock market data.
Recent weeks have surfaced an intense exchange of top-level finger pointing, both between Congress and the leadership of the Federal Reserve System, between Fed officials and executives in the private sector and within the Fed between the Board of Governors and the New York Reserve Bank.
Statement on Banking and Banking Regulation to The Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis
Government safety nets give protected institutions an implicit subsidy and intensify incentives for value-maximizing boards and managers to risk the ruin of their firms. Standard accounting statements do not record the value of this subsidy and forcing subsidized institutions to show more accounting capital will do little to curb their enhanced appetite for tail risk.