Edward J. Kane was Professor of Finance at Boston College. From 1972 to 1992 he held the Everett D. Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary Economics at Ohio State University. A founding member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Kane rejoined the organization in 2005. He served for twelve years as a trustee and member of the finance committee of Teachers Insurance. He consulted for the World Bank and is a senior fellow in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Center for Financial Research. Previously, Kane consulted for numerous agencies, including the IMF, components of the Federal Reserve System, and three foreign central banks. He consulted as well for the Congressional Budget Office, the Joint Economic Committee, and the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress. He wa a past president and fellow of the American Finance Association and a former Guggenheim fellow. He also served as president of the International Atlantic Economic Society and the North American Economics and Finance Association. Kane was a longtime research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. He authored three books and coauthored or coedited several more. He published widely in professional journals and served on seven editorial boards. He received a BS from Georgetown University and a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Edward J. Kane
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Double Whammy: Implicit Subsidies and the Great Financial Crisis
A financial industry safety net enriches bankers and their shareholders — at our expense
Europe’s Zombie Megabanks and the Differential Regulatory Arrangements that Keep Them In Play
This paper analyzes the link between Kamakura Risk Information Services (KRIS) data on megabank default probabilities and credit spreads.
Ethics vs. Ethos in US and UK Megabanking
Company law in the US and UK fails to acknowledge that authorities’ propensity to rescue giant banks from the consequences of insolvency assigns taxpayers a coerced and badly structured equity stake in too-big-to-fail institutions.
A Theory of How and Why Central-Bank Culture Supports Predatory Risk-Taking at Megabanks
This paper applies Schein’s model of organizational culture to financial firms and their prudential regulators.